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This dissertation looks at the details of Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the 
revaluation of all values. The dissertation will look at the idea in several ways to 
elucidate the depth and complexity of the idea. First, it will be looked at through its 
evolution, as it began as an idea early in Nietzsche’s career and reached its full 
complexity at the end of his career with the planned publication of his Revaluation of All 
Values, just before the onset of his madness. Several questions will be explored: What is 
the nature of the revaluator who is supposed to be instrumental in the process of 
revaluation? What will the values after the revaluation be like (a rebirth of ancient values 
or creation of entirely new values)? What will be the scope of the revaluation? And what 
is the relation of other major ideas of Nietzsche’s (will to power, eternal return, overman, 
and amor fati) to the revaluation? Different answers to these questions will be explored. 
Ultimately, the conclusion is that the revaluation is meant to be an imminent or near-
contemporary event instituted by an extraordinary but realistic revaluator, who will 
transform the values of the whole of society after revaluation personal values by 
returning to ancient values as well as creating new values and that Nietzsche meant for 
many of his key ideas to have a revaluative role. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been little emphasis on Friedrich Nietzsche’s idea of the revaluation of all 
values in the secondary literature on Nietzsche, yet the revaluation was probably the most 
important project of Nietzsche’s late writing. He spoke extensively of the revaluation 
throughout his published works and his notebooks and planned a work exclusively on the 
subject. He believed that the rise of nihilism in Europe was one of the main concerns of 
his day, and he saw the revaluation as the only antidote. 
He feared the rise of nihilism because he believed that the values of Europe had 
been for many centuries exclusively grounded in a belief in the Christian God. God 
defined for Europeans what was good and what was to be valued. But now that belief in 
God was in decline, Christianity was losing its influence, and, though the forms and 
rituals of Christianity might persist for a long time, that role of determining the thoughts 
and values of the Western world was in the past. God’s central influence over society 
admittedly had long been in decline, but now, in Nietzsche’s day, outright disbelief in 
God was dramatically on the rise and was starting to change the direction of society. The 
question was what would ground the values of Europeans absent God. A revaluation of 
all values was necessary so that new values independent of the old assumptions could be 
formed. 
If Nietzsche thinks we are to revaluate all values, this leads to a number of 
questions. For example, from what perspective do we question the old values? What is to 
be the ground of these new values? How do we justify these new values? Are we to 
justify them by new assumptions? Who’s qualified to establish new values for 
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Europeans? Are we really to revaluate all values, or are there some that are above 
question? 
Nietzsche is not explicit about how he would answer these questions, and we, as 
interpreters, may not be fully capable of discovering his answers. Nietzsche’s planned 
project of the Revaluation of All Values, a work that would explain the revaluation in 
greater detail, was ultimately incomplete. We have the parts of it that he did complete. He 
wrote the first book of it, The Antichrist; he integrated many parts originally planned for 
it into Twilight of the Idols; and he left behind in his notebooks several different plans for 
the work as well as numerous notes on issues relevant to the topic that weren’t published. 
Nonetheless, there is much that he perhaps might have explained if he continued through 
with that project and had been able to complete it. That leaves us in the position of trying 
to fill in some of the gaps left behind. 
In addition, even if he had completed the work, Nietzsche was never the type to 
simply set things out straightforwardly—he was not intent on laying out some plan for 
some future revaluator to follow. One of Nietzsche’s main strategies in these writings, as 
in other places, is trying to effect an end, instead of simply trying to describe ideas. Since 
Nietzsche was deeply interested in psychology and ancient history, he began to notice 
pretty early in his philosophical development that the beliefs that we take to be true have 
profound influence on what we perceive, and thereby influence our actions and can shape 
our world. Because of this, as opposed to philosophy’s traditional role of simply 
describing the world as it is, Nietzsche saw philosophy as a practical pursuit with effects 
that should be anticipated and certain practical ends that should be sought. For this reason 
Nietzsche’s philosophy is better described as more practical, rather than illuminative. 
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Nietzsche saw considerable, if not insurmountable, barriers that stood in the way of 
actually describing things as they are, noting the distance between our language and the 
world, as well as the limitations of our perspectives. In fact, when we look at history what 
we see is a train of evolving and changing ideas that give us no confidence that our 
particular perspective at the present has any priority. 
The difficulty of reaching truth admittedly might lead us into some sort of 
resigned skepticism or even nihilism, but, as noted, our beliefs have a profound influence 
on our world and Nietzsche seriously doubted that we would want to live in a world 
predominantly shaped by nihilism and skepticism. In fact, from his perspective, if 
philosophy can’t get us to truth and our beliefs shape the world, then why not try to shape 
the world (at least as we perceive it) with our ideas? Nietzsche saw philosophy as trying 
to achieve certain effects rather than finding insights into reality as it is or trying to 
explain the nature of things. 
In the case of the revaluation of all values, that end is to undermine old values, 
and to hopefully accomplish the grand task of revaluating all (or many) values. In fact, as 
part of this strategy of trying to effect an end, Nietzsche may have himself been trying to 
produce at least a partial revaluation of all values, not to try to explain how someone else 
might do it. This idea I will be defending in a subsequent chapter. Nietzsche uses a 
number of techniques to undermine old values, techniques that may show us how he 
expected the revaluation to be performed. These include: genealogical analysis to show 
the drives and motivations that underlie our values and ideals both historically and 
psychologically; exposing hypocrisy or underlying self-contradictoriness within moral 
rules or values; showing how values are essential to life and are only possible by living 
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things, but that some values are life-denying and thus undermine valuing itself; and 
others. Nietzsche also puts contemporary values against what he regards as higher values 
and shows how they are in conflict. A number of strategies are in fact employed, which 
have been explored in great detail by E. E. Sleinis in his book on the revaluation and 
which will thereby not be explored here. 
The possibility that Nietzsche was himself trying to bring about a revaluation of 
values through his writings leads us to a few other corollary conclusions about the 
revaluation: that the revaluation was meant to begin immediately or very soon after 
Nietzsche’s day, that the revaluator needn’t be some super-human figure (like the 
overman), and that some of Nietzsche’s ideas were presented in order to undermine old 
values and/or to create new ones. In subsequent chapters I will be defending these 
interpretations. 
Outline of the Revaluation 
We will start here by outlining, very briefly, what Nietzsche’s revaluation of all values is. 
First, we’ll have to understand what values are. Nietzsche speaks of tables of values and 
ranks of values and even proposes the idea of quantifying values (WP 710; WLN p253, 
14[105]). As Nietzsche uses the term and as it is generally understood, values are, firstly, 
hierarchical. They are potentially quantifiable denominations meant to organize things in 
terms of higher and lower: a ranking of the relative importance of all things. Secondly, as 
Nietzsche believes it, values are not independent. Values are determined by valuing 
beings. The hierarchy of values is not written into the way the world is, but is a result of 
the interaction of living things with the world: “Whatever has value in the present world 
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has it not in itself, according to its nature—nature is always value-less—but has rather 
been given, granted value”(GS 301). Thirdly, values are completely relative. Something 
is only valuable in relation to something else, namely more valuable or less valuable than 
it. Nietzsche says, “[becoming] has no value at all, for there is nothing against which it 
can be measured and in relation to which the word ‘value’ would have meaning” (WLN 
p212, KGW 11[72]; cf also WP 708). Nothing can have value unless there is something to 
compare it to. This is why “The total value of the world is unevaluable”(ibid) and “There 
can be no overall evaluation of life”(TI II 2). In other words, just as for Aristotle the 
world as a whole has no place because there is nothing outside of it, for Nietzsche the 
world as a whole and life as a whole have no value because there is nothing against 
which to compare them to. 
Values are also at the center of practical action. In fact, values are indispensable 
for action. Because values are hierarchical, non-independent, and relative, then a 
particular activity or object or end has value because it can be compared to other possible 
activities, objects, or ends by a valuing being. We use values to choose among 
alternatives. Without values we would be always faced with a type of Buridan’s Ass 
problem at every decision. Two alternatives will be both equally rational and logical 
absent any value considerations. It is neither illogical nor irrational to stay in bed all day 
rather than get up and work. It is so only if I deem it important to earn a living or 
accomplish something today. If choosing between a tasty but unhealthy meal or a bland 
but healthy meal, what could compel me to prefer one except, for example, my deeming 
long-term health more valuable than transient pleasure for my taste buds? We might tend 
to think that the healthful choice is more rational, but this is only because we have 
6 
already decided in advance that a life that last longer or has fewer health problems is 
more desirable than the sacrifices that have to be made to achieve this. What we perceive 
of as “rational” is already mixed with numberless value-judgments, not to mention that 
even preferring the “rational” over the “irrational” is already a value judgment. There is 
no value-free means of choosing amongst alternatives. 
Organizing practical action around hierarchies of value is a radical departure from 
the traditional morality Nietzsche rejects. Traditionally moralities are comprised of sets 
of Oughts and Ought-Nots, which demand full and constant compliance. If one follows a 
hierarchy of values, then one is rather choosing among possibilities and making trade-
offs. When one chooses A, one will have to opt-out of B, C, D, and so on. One does not 
abide by rules of Ought and Ought-Not, but rather chooses in favor of what is relatively 
most valuable. 
Additionally, if there is a given arrangement of values from higher to lower, what 
we are doing when we revaluate is reconsidering that arrangement. Some values will be 
raised up; some will be lowered; some will be discarded altogether as of little to no value, 
and some will stay where they are. A revaluation of all values would be a re-ordering of 
all existing values into a different hierarchy, as well as the creation of some new values 
and the destruction of some old values. 
Some Further Questions About Revaluation 
This only explains the most basic framework and raises many further questions. What 
type of values would we expect after the revaluation? On what ground would a 
revaluation be based? Is the revaluation meant to apply to all people or is it a personal 
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project for Nietzsche and like-minded individuals? To answer these questions we must 
look at Nietzsche’s approach to the revaluation of all values. 
To begin with the first question: To what type of values do we expect the 
revaluation to lead? The interpretation that I will defend, is that the revaluation will lead 
to new values that are largely like the ancient values that the “Christian Revaluation of 
Ancient Values” replaced. There are reasons why I think that the new values will not be 
entirely a revivification of ancient values. The methods of the revaluation are not such 
that they will necessarily lead to any particular mix of values. It is merely a method of 
testing values to see which are most beneficial and preserving those, whether they be 
ancient, Christian, or something entirely different. On the other hand, Nietzsche does 
revere ancient values and puts them in contradistinction to Christian values, which are 
presented as deeply problematic. He does present the revaluation as having two sides, a 
destructive side and a creative side, and it seems that the destructive side will largely 
undermine Christian values and the creative side will largely resurrect ancient values, but 
will bring in new values as well. These ideas lead to the conclusion that there is a simple 
reversion going on at times (reversing Christian values to create ancient values), but since 
this won’t always be the case, then the values will be largely similar to ancient values, but 
still different. These arguments, though, will be explored in more detail in a subsequent 
chapter. 
Another question is how will these values be grounded. In other words, how do 
we justify that it is this set of values that we should abide by, and not a different set of 
values? In general commentators have focused on Nietzsche deriving or intending to 
derive his values from certain core values or higher values, especially life-affirmation. 
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Here I think we should be cautious. If we look at Nietzsche’s major historical example of 
a revaluation—the Christian revaluation of ancient values—it was, at least partially, 
based on certain metaphysical assumptions. For example, it was based on the belief in a 
separate world (another better, truer world beyond the sensible world) on believe in a 
benevolent all-powerful God, and on belief in an immortal soul. If we reject such ideas, 
such as the distinction between the apparent and the real world, then certain values 
evaporate. In fact, Nietzsche’s revaluation is, for one, based on the rejection of this other 
world. Equally, he is going to build his revaluation on the assumptions that there is no 
benevolent, all-powerful creator who imbues reality with certain values. If a divine 
creator puts values into the world, then any subjective human valuations or any 
revaluation, to begin with, would be a distortion of reality. Valuation would be a matter 
of discovering the values of the creator. Thus, part of his revaluation is to embrace the 
possibility of being able to create values and revalue. These considerations lead us to 
conclude, that the values after revaluation may not be based on certain core values but on 
certain key assumptions about the way the world is, and thus a revaluation may be a 
based on a reappraisal of the nature of the world. 
Furthermore, I would like to argue in following that among the perspectives that 
Nietzsche uses for this revaluation are his core ideas. These include and we will be 
focusing on the eternal return of the same, the will to power, amor fati, and the overman. 
I will focus on these four ideas as an exemplary, though not necessarily all-inclusive list. 
It is possible to imagine that a full revaluation of all values would require a considerable 
set of ideas perhaps beyond the scope of a single philosopher. But these basic ideas cover 
multiple important areas of human perspective. He hereby questions the status of and 
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future of humanity, questions the nature of life and basic building blocks of physical 
reality, as well as questions the nature of time and progress with these ideas. The values 
built on the assumption of the eternal return, will to power, amor fati, and overman will 
represent a significant departure from the Christian values of Nietzsche’s day. 
We should note from the outset that these ideas evolved in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. It’s very clear that the eternal return began as something different—a sort of 
thought experiment to test one’s capacity to affirm life—but it evolved into something 
that could become the basis of a revaluation. The will to power, as well, was an idea that 
germinated slowly, out of the idea of humans’ “desire for power,” which evolved into a 
description of the ultimate nature of physical phenomena as will to power. We will have 
to spell these histories out in more detail later, but for the moment, suffice it to say that, 
especially with these two ideas, they were not originally intended as part of the 
revaluation and later would become integrated into Nietzsche’s project of revaluation. 
The overman is different since it seems that from the first it was proposed as an idea to 
undermine old values, but it didn’t persist or evolve in Nietzsche’s thought like the other 
two ideas. And amor fati is also an important though not as thoroughly developed idea as 
the others. Nonetheless, I want to interpret these four ideas as part of or later integrated 
into Nietzsche’s project of revaluation. 
This raises the question of how accurate or how well these ideas are meant to 
represent things as they are. As noted at the beginning, Nietzsche’s attitude towards 
philosophy is more strategic than revelatory. But the ideas meant to facilitate a 
revaluation can’t be entirely fabulous, else people would never accept them. There must 
be some truth to them. For example, if we deemed it prudent to persuade people that the 
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world is a single flat landmass surround by water guarded at its edges on all sides by 
terrible sea creatures, it would be a hard sell, since there’s ample evidence that disproves 
it. Nietzsche proposes ideas that are meant to persuade and meant to be accepted, and that 
Nietzsche himself may even be willing to accept. But he certainly can’t vouch for their 
irrefutable truth, and he certainly doesn’t promote these ideas as truths in themselves but 
as means to facilitate the more important project—that is, the revaluation. Part of the 
revaluation was Nietzsche’s willingness to question the high value placed upon truth. 
This is not to say that truth is completely without value, merely that truth is arranged on a 
scale of values, and that there are things that are, at least in some cases, more valuable 
than truth. In cases where one has to choose between truth and one of these more 
valuable objectives, then truth must give way. Thus, if we are to assume that the 
overcoming of nihilism is more important than discovering truth, then it is acceptable to 
adopt untrue ideas if they are useful in overcoming nihilism. This doesn’t mean it is 
necessary to adopt untrue ideas, but it does mean that whether an idea is true, untrue, or 
partially true is irrelevant if it serves the more important project of revaluation. 
We might also ask whether the revaluation that Nietzsche speaks of is meant to be 
society wide or individual. Is it meant to be universal revaluation, where the values for all 
people within the society are reshaped by key influential figures, or is it meant to be 
personal, whereby individuals seek out new ways to arrange the values that they 
individually abide by? The original Christian revaluation is clearly of the universal type 
and Nietzsche’s writings tend to suggest that the revaluation is of this type. This universal 
revaluation is meant to combat the rise of nihilism and to give life to society after the 
death of God. On the other hand, there is a heavy strain of individualism throughout 
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Nietzsche’s writing. The themes of “becoming what you are” and cultivating virtues that 
are entirely your own and that are not shared with others (cf Z I “On the Passions of 
Pleasure and Pain”) suggests the possibility of an individual revaluation. It is possible 
that individuals might create their own tables of values and that there might be an 
individual corollary to the universal revaluation. The individual revaluation would be 
built on individual perspectives and experiences. According to this interpretation of the 
revaluation the will to power, the eternal return, amor fati, and the overman are possible 
perspectives upon which individuals might found their own personal revaluation. And 
since nihilism is simply the problem of the absence of values, any revaluation that gives 
value to things and creates values would be a solution to nihilism. Is it possible that 
Nietzsche might be advocating a more individual revaluation instead of a universal 
revaluation that is meant to apply across the whole of society? 
The weight of evidence leans towards the more universal revaluation, which 
seems to be what he is talking about most of the time. Nonetheless, indirect evidence 
does also suggest the individual revaluation. For this reason, I will interpret these two 
types of revaluation as simply two sides of the revaluation, each with their significance 
and importance in Nietzsche’s full idea of the revaluation. 
History of Interpretation of Nietzsche’ Revaluation 
Interpreters’ opinion on the revaluation of all values and Nietzsche’s theories of values 
have evolved over the years. It would be impossible to give a thorough account of all the 
interpretations, but I describe some of the highlights from throughout the history of 
Nietzsche scholarship. 
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Anthony M. Ludovici was among the earliest major Nietzsche commenters and 
the first that we’ll look at here. Concerning Nietzsche’s theory of revaluation, he 
interpreted Nietzsche as arguing that, because the current conditions favored the 
flourishing of certain baser types of persons (Ludovici 80), the revaluation was necessary 
in order to improve the conditions and make it possible that a higher type of person might 
emerge (73). According to Ludovici, Nietzsche was not writing his books for a general 
audience but only for the current higher types of persons. Nietzsche appealed to them, 
hoping that they would be able to realize these changes (73–4). 
Karl Jaspers was probably the next most significant interpreter before Heidegger. 
Writing around the 1930s, Jaspers argued that Nietzsche’s revaluation had its source in 
the death of God (Jaspers 429). According to Jaspers, the creative revaluation (the 
creation of new values) will lead to a new “morality,” (413) that is a new system of 
values that is not based on the law of God (143). The new system will be based upon 
nature, upon the reinstatement of “purely naturalistic values in place of moral 
values”(327). Jasper also argued that, since values are human-created and subjective, 
“Values are never final; at any given time they must be created”(154). Thus, he 
interpreted Nietzsche as saying that the cycle of revaluation is endless; a new revaluation 
will always follow the previous. 
Martin Heidegger in the 30s and 40s in his essays and lectures argued for a more 
systematic interpretation of Nietzsche. Heidegger believed there was unity of the 
concepts of will to power, eternal return, and revaluation of all values: “The doctrine of 
the eternal return of the same coheres in the most intimate way with that of will to power. 
The unity of these teachings may be seen historically as the revaluation of all values 
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hitherto”(Heidegger, Nietzsche 18). Heidegger believed that values for Nietzsche were 
grounded in life and life-affirmation (Nietzsche 156), and Heidegger thereby argued for a 
connection between will to power and revaluation (“Nietzsche’s Word” 173), with 
power/life-affirmation as the ground of the revaluation. He also saw the thought of the 
eternal return as being capable of achieving revaluation (Nietzsche 157). He also 
described the process revaluation as a simple inversion: “Nietzsche’s procedure, his 
manner of thinking in the execution of the new valuation, is perpetual reversal, (Nietzsche 
29). 
Walter Kaufmann, beginning in the 1950s, argued against many of Heidegger’s 
interpretations. Kaufmann believed that the revaluation consisted of a return from the 
contemporary Christian values to the previous ancient values, in other words, a return to 
naturalistic values instead of values based on belief in God (Kaufmann Nietzsche 102). 
Kaufmann also believed that the revaluation will come in multiple stages. As it is being 
carried out in the present, it is only a critique of current values (111). The process of 
creation of values is left to the philosophers of the future, who are uniquely capable of 
creating new values and will come about many generations from now. Kaufmann 
believed that Nietzsche undermines moral values primarily by showing that our morality 
is immoral by its own standards (113). 
Gilles Deleuze offered his own unique interpretation in his 1962 work on 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. Like Heidegger, Deleuze argued for revaluation as simple 
reversal: “all values known or knowable up to the present have been reversed”(171). But 
he presented a unique version of this. He argued that the revaluation was a “change and 
reversal in the element from the which the value of values derives”(163). This reversal 
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was accomplished by exchanging life-negation with affirmation: “Values and their value 
no longer derive from the negative, but from affirmation as such. In place of a 
depreciated life we have life which is affirmed”(175).  
In 1983 Richard Schacht’s monograph on Nietzsche provided new interpretations 
of the revaluation of all values. Schacht argued that revaluation was necessary to fill the 
void created by the undermining of current values and to overcome the problem of 
nihilism (Schacht Nietzsche 344). Like Heidegger, Schacth argued the revaluation was 
grounded in the will to power (Nietzsche 346). He argued that the real value of something 
is in its value for life and quotes Nietzsche as saying that “Life is will to 
power”(Nietzsche 354). Life affirmation and life-denial are thereby that which is in 
accord and antagonism to will to power respectively. Like Kaufmann, he believed that 
this revaluation would be a task of the genuine philosopher (Nietzsche 109 & 343), the 
new breed of philosophers Nietzsche speaks of in Beyond Good and Evil. 
Brian Leiter in his book on Nietzsch’s morality argues that revaluation is a 
reassessment of the value of our moral values (136). Similar to Ludovici, he argues that 
Nietzsche attacks morality because it threatens human excellence (26) and thereby seeks 
to undermine moral values, which serve the herd of mankind at expense of the most 
excellent. Leiter also argues that Nietzsche’s works are for these higher types and the 
revaluation seeks to rid these people of the false belief that the dominant morality is good 
for them, thereby loosening the attachment of potentially great human beings to this 
morality (27). Leiter argues that Nietzsche’s genealogy, looking into the origins of our 
morals, is guided by an interest in reassessing the value of our morality (43). 
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More recently, Bernard Reginster has argued that revaluation is a strategy to 
overcome nihilistic despair. As he writes, “The affirmation of life results from a 
revaluation of the nihilist’s life-negating values”(“Nihilism” 59). Nihilism results from 
commitment to certain life-denying values and ideals (Affirmation 50), and thus genuine 
life-affirmation is only possible after a thorough revaluation (Affirmation 15). Reginster 
believes that revaluation of suffering and compassion, and redefinition of the ideals of 
happiness and human greatness are particularly central to this revaluation (Affirmation 
149). 
Outline of the Present Work 
To understand Nietzsche’s revaluation, I want to look at it historically. In the first chapter 
I will begin with a description of how the idea of revaluation changes throughout the 
history of Nietzsche’s philosophy. We will look at his early works, and I will talk about 
Nietzsche’s early interest in values. Critique of the value of truth is a concern that 
emerges early in Nietzsche’s thought. Nietzsche also speaks of the nature of the true 
philosopher, which will be an early model for the type of great figures capable of creating 
new values and which a revaluation will help to foster. Also, we will look at the 
beginning of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, a critique that will change significantly as 
Nietzsche’s thought matures. 
In the period of his “middle works,” by which I mean those of the early 1880s, we 
see a growing interest in values: in hierarchies of values and creation of values and 
ultimately in the emergence of the concept of “revaluation.” Nietzsche’s critique of 
morality evolves into his “Genealogical Critique,” namely a critique of morality and of 
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values via uncovering their history and their evolution. Genealogy will thus become part 
of the negative part of revaluation, of destroying values. 
Finally I will look at how the revaluation develops in Nietzsche’s last 
philosophical works, in the published writings of 1888 (Twilight of the Idols, Antichrist 
and Ecce Homo) and in his unpublished notebooks. At this point, Nietzsche begins to 
make a connection between the revaluation and nihilism, perceiving the revaluation as an 
antidote to nihilism. Nietzsche planned a lengthy treatise titled the Revaluation of All 
Values, which he didn’t finish. We will look at the ideas he planned on exploring in this 
treatise and how his plans for it changed through the years. 
In the second chapter, we will explore both the nature of the person responsible 
for revaluation and the values that will result from such a revaluation. We will look at 
certain distantly future figures as models of the revaluator, such as the “genuine 
philosopher” of Beyond Good and Evil, who is spoken of as capable of creating values 
and as being a person of the future. I will argue that such a person, though capable of 
creating values, is not the minimum standard for one capable of creating values, and that 
when Nietzsche imagines the more immediate revaluation that is supposed to address the 
imminent threat of nihilism, he is thinking of a more realistic figure, such as a great artist 
or philosopher. In fact, I will argue that Nietzsche sees himself as a revaluator and 
believes that he is actively participating in a great historical transition. 
In this chapter, we will also look at the question of what types of values are meant 
to result from the revaluation. We will explore what I consider to be the two leading 
interpretations, that the values that result will be a rebirth of ancient values and that the 
values that result will be entirely new values. We will explore arguments in favor of both 
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of these positions. I defend a compromise position, that the values that result will be new 
but will largely resemble ancient values. 
In the third chapter, we will be looking at the question of whether the revaluation 
is a society-wide event, in which the values of all society are to be revaluated by some 
exceptional individual. This is the way that the revaluation is generally spoken of in 
Nietzsche’s works. Then, we will look at the revaluation as a personal project, namely 
that Nietzsche is speaking directly to his readers and asking them to reassess their own 
personal values. I will try to integrate these two ideas and suggest that perhaps the 
personal revaluation is a precursor to the society-wide revaluation. 
In the fourth chapter, we will begin to look at the particular ideas of the will to 
power, the eternal return, amor fati, and the overman as they evolved through Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. I want to look at them as the foundations of Nietzsche’s revaluation. We will 
briefly look at them as they evolved through Nietzsche’s thought so that we can fully 
understand these ideas better and understand better their place with the revaluation. 
We will start with the concept of the overman. I intend to show how the overman 
is pat of a reappraisal of ideals about humans and our place in the universe. Nietzsche 
intends to undermine our pretensions and place us within the history of evolution and 
how we are limited by that evolution and have yet to achieve our highest possibility. This 
is also part of reassessing values related to these ideas. With the eternal return of the 
same, I intend to show how the eternal return is part of a reappraisal of ideas about 
progress and history. Within the scope of the eternal return, key values relating to 
progress and the striving for progress are reassessed. With amor fati, I intend to show 
how amor fati is also a reappraisal of ideas about free will and sin. Within the scope of 
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amor fati, key values relating to virtue and vice are reassessed. Finally, with the concept 
of the will to power, I intend to show how the will to power is part of a reappraisal of 
ideas about life, human emotions, and human drives, and that it was part of reassessing 
values related to these ideas. 
In the end, I intend to try and show, through these chapters, that the concept of the 
revaluation of all values was an evolving concept and that in his mature thought, 
Nietzsche thought of it as an imminent, society-wide historical event that he was 
participating in. He was actively trying to revaluate values using some of his notable 
ideas and aiming towards a set of new values that largely resembled the ancient values 
that he frequently praises. 
On the Weight of Evidence 
In this work I will be using as evidence both Nietzsche’s published writings as well as his 
unpublished writings: unfinished works, unpublished works, notes and, in some cases, 
letters. I take this approach because I believe my goal in interpretation is to explicate 
philosophical biography, namely that we, as interpreters, are trying to explain the 
thoughts that Nietzsche thought. We are not simply trying to interpret his writings, or 
trying to interpret some subset of “canonical” or “official” writings.  
If we open ourselves to using works that are not published and thus not having 
Nietzsche’s official imprimatur, then we need to consider the strength of different forms 
of evidence. When we speak of Nietzsche’s thought, we wouldn’t want to take some of 
Nietzsche’s more passing or fleeting thoughts as relevant facets of his overall thinking. I 
am trying to interpret his thought, but not everything that passed through his mind is 
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relevant, rather only that which is considered and is part of his overall philosophy—that 
is the overall network of ideas that we might consider to be his worldview. 
This means that, firstly, everything he wrote is potential evidence of his thoughts, 
but those ideas and concepts that recur frequently must represent more important 
thoughts. If they recur frequently, they mustn’t be fleeting and thus are more likely to be 
part of his philosophy. Hence, any idea or argument that only appears once in Nietzsche’s 
published or unpublished writings will be considered as less likely to represent his 
philosophy, and the more frequently it recurs the stronger is the evidence that it is part of 
his philosophy. 
Secondly, we should consider whether a passage appears in a published or 
unpublished work. Ideas that appear in published writings will be considered to be more 
likely to represent his philosophy. Because producing, revising, and finishing for 
publication a published work requires considerable time and effort, then it is much less 
likely that ideas that Nietzsche didn’t really give serious consideration to would be let to 
slip through into publication, as opposed to passages appearing in notebooks, which were 
probably written on the spur of the moment (we see a great many passages that are 
fragments of thoughts, frequently not even complete sentences). Additionally, Nietzsche 
would be more careful with his language and choice of words in his published works, 
versus his notebooks. 
Based on these considerations we can create a hierarchy of reliability based on the 
effort and thought that went into various types of works. The published works are at the 
top. At most only slightly below that would be works Nietzsche wrote that were finished 
and polished but not published, such as his lectures (Rhetoric, Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 
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On the Future of Our Educational Institutions), Ecce Homo, and short, completed essays 
(for example his Prefaces to Unwritten Works and his short essays from his student days 
and time as a professor). Somewhat below that would be uncompleted works that were 
nonetheless quite polished and finished, such as Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks and On Truth and Lying. Below that we should include the notebooks. And even 
further below that, I would place Nietzsche’s letters. I put these at the bottom mostly just 
because they weren’t primarily written with the aim of expressing philosophical ideas and 
thus, even when he does speak of his thoughts, he may be speaking of fleeting thoughts 
and speaking of them in an unphilosophical way. 
Thirdly, we should consider the time when relevant passages appear. Nietzsche’s 
thoughts evolved over time, and he sometimes came to disagree with his younger self. 
The idea we’re focused on here, the revaluation of all values, is one mostly from his last 
years of sanity. Hence, passages and quotations that come well before the period we’re 
focused on won’t offer as strong of evidence of his thought as ideas that appear at the 
same time. And we might generalize this as well: ideas that appear close in time with one 
another are thus more likely to be combinable—that is to say they are consistent with one 
another and might be combined to create more complex ideas.  
For this reason, consideration of the overall timeline of Nietzsche’s thought will 
be useful in constructing his philosophy, and it is to that we will turn in the first chapter.
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CHAPTER 1 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE IDEA OF THE REVALUATION 
We will begin by looking at the revaluation of all values and closely connected ideas as 
they changed over the course of Nietzsche’s philosophical career. The purpose of this 
chapter is to give us an overall look at the main ideas of the revaluation before we delve 
into some of the more perplexing and difficult-to-interpret details in subsequent chapters. 
I have presented this as biographical survey so that when we subsequently look at many 
of the questions pertinent to understanding the revaluation, we can put Nietzsche’s 
relevant statements concerning these questions in context, and so that we can understand 
the revaluation as an evolving idea that grew and expanded and was being constantly 
modified and groomed. Nietzsche’s views on the revaluation change in subtle (and 
sometimes not so subtle) ways, and it will help us in understanding Nietzsche to view 
some of these questions as having changing answers. When we look at revaluation in 
subsequent chapters, we will generally look at the most developed version of the 
revaluation, namely that of late 1888, but there will be times we will consider earlier 
versions. 
We will also be looking at many of the ideas that are part of and pertinent to the 
revaluation in their earliest manifestations. We hope that by looking at many of these 
ideas earlier it will help clarify them. For one, looking at earlier, usually simpler 
manifestations of an idea can help us see more of the details of more complex 
manifestations of the idea. It can also expose the ideas behind some of these concepts that 
Nietzsche did not explain in his later work. We will also find at times that there are ideas 
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that Nietzsche employed or proposed that he later abandoned. The reasons why such 
ideas were abandoned also give us insight into the idea of revaluation. 
Looking at the ideas as they germinated means that the focus of this chapter will 
be more on Nietzsche’s earlier works, since this is where many of these ideas began. 
When we look at later works, it will be only to see what new ideas have been added and 
how these earlier ideas have changed, if at all. Many of the ideas introduced in these 
earlier works did not go through any appreciable alteration in later works. 
As we look at the evaluation of Nietzsche’s ideas, one of the major trends is that 
of accretion. Nietzsche started with some key ideas, added new ones, and integrated and 
interrelated many ideas that he would develop over the years into these ideas of 
revaluation, such as nihilism, the eternal return, and the will to power. He started with a 
few small pieces (critique of value of truth, idea of the true philosopher, eternal return) 
and built around them, by adding pieces to them, broadening their application, and 
connecting them to other ideas. As we look at this history, we will see that the questions 
early on were more narrowly focused, for example questioning the values of specific 
concepts, such as the value of truth or the value of art or historical scholarship. The 
importance of value only increased as Nietzsche expanded his critique of morality. As he 
started to see more and more problems with morality, he realized that an overall 
alteration of these values was necessary. Nietzsche began to believe that the deficiencies 
of the current values were at the heart of the cultural problems he perceived in his age 
and began to think that a profound alteration of these morals would be helpful, perhaps 
even necessary. Nietzsche was also thinking about nihilism as he began to articulate this 
idea in more detail, and he started to perceive a certain historical inevitability to the 
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progression of nihilism and the ultimate revaluation that must follow. At the time of his 
latest writings, he was planning on a substantial work that would explain how this 
revaluation was supposed to occur and that might itself be instrumental in initiating the 
imminent revaluation. The onset of Nietzsche’s madness cut short these plans and make it 
difficult for us to ascertain how he would have followed through on this project, or even 
if he would have followed through on it at all. But it does clearly show the importance 
that revaluation had for Nietzsche throughout his career, and especially in these later 
works. 
Early Thoughts on Value and Revaluation 
We will begin by looking at the early writings of Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s writing career 
spanned roughly from 1872 (publication of The Birth of Tragedy) to 1888 (last full year 
of sanity, completion of Antichrist), but Nietzsche doesn’t explicitly refer to 
“revaluation” (Umwerthung or its variants, such as Umwerthen and Umzuwerthen) in any 
of his published writings or surviving notes until 1884 (KGW VII2 26[259])1 nor does he 
refer to any other concept explicitly connected to revaluation, such as “new values” or 
“new value-judgments” until 1880 (KGW V1 5[25]). Nonetheless, even if these ideas 
were not explicitly mentioned, we can still say that the revaluation was being developed, 
in that important foundational ideas were being explicitly explored. Looking back upon 
his earlier works later on, Nietzsche recognized that he was interested in many of the 
                                                
1 When quoting translations from Nietzsche’s notebooks (namely, Philosophy and Truth, 
Will to Power, Writings from the Early Notebooks, and Writings from the Late 
Notebooks, I will also reference the location of the passage in the Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe (KGW). 
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issues that would more seriously concern him later on from his earliest works. In 1888 he 
would call his first book, the Birth of Tragedy, his first revaluation of all values (TI 
“Ancients” 5), and it does seem as if in these early works the precursors of his more fully 
developed idea of revaluation are present. Nietzsche was certainly concerned with values 
and valuation throughout his philosophical career. 
In the early works, Nietzsche was more focused on questioning the value of 
certain specific ideas, such as truth, scholarship, art, and history. Not until his later works 
did he seek a more wholesale questioning of all values and talk about the historical 
immanence of such a revaluation. To look at these early works insofar as they pertain to 
the development of the revaluation, we will look at three critical ideas: the critique of 
truth, the nature of the philosopher, and the early critique of morality. 
Critique of Truth 
Nietzsche’s early writings show a consistent interest in undermining specific values. 
Nietzsche tries to show that certain values have simply been raised too high and that 
these excessive valuations interfere with other values that are genuinely more important, 
such as the pursuit of fruitful living. We will look at the revaluation of specific values as 
a first step towards a more generalized revaluation of all values. Here, we will look at 
probably the most important value Nietzsche critiqued in his early work, truth. Nietzsche 
would never really stop critiquing the value of truth, speaking of it extensively in Beyond 
Good & Evil and numerous times through his works of 1888, such as in Twilight of the 
Idols and Antichrist and elsewhere. Nietzsche seems to have started to question the value 
of truth very early on, writing, for example, in an 1868 student paper “On Schopenhauer” 
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that sometimes erroneous ideas are more valuable than true ideas: “The errors of great 
men are worthy of honour because they are more fruitful than the truths of the small”(p 
260). We will look at this value both because it is so central to these early works and 
because many of the details and arguments will resonate throughout Nietzsche’s career 
and his later critiques of value. 
The view of truth that Nietzsche attacked Slienis calls the “absolute theory of 
truth”(23). It is the prevailing understanding of truth as an absolute, universal ideal. 
Slienis, using Nietzsche’s writings, says that absolute truth has five characteristics: 
uniqueness (only one truth), objectivity (independent of any conscious being), 
unrevisability (always the same), unconditionality (independent of conditions of the 
knower), impartiality (independent of needs/wants/desires of knower), and universality 
(true for everyone and everywhere) (Sleinis 23–24). The alternative that Nietzsche will 
later present is his theory of perspectivism, but at this point early in his career, the 
concern is simply with critique. And the concern is also more so with the value of truth, 
than with the concept itself. Whether Nietzsche, throughout his career, believes absolute 
truth is genuinely possible or exists in some ontological sense is unclear, but it is clear 
that he thinks the value of absolute truth is greatly exaggerated.  
Nietzsche questioned the value of absolute truth for two main reasons: firstly, 
because there are limitations to our ability to get at truth and secondly, because it 
sometimes doesn’t serve to promote healthy human activity. This is to say that, first of 
all, though the value of complete and perfect truth may be great, the value of the 
attainable truth that we can reach is of much more limited value, and certainly not of 
greater value in comparison to living a healthy and fruitful life. What he seems to think of 
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“healthy” human activity is whatever contributes to the health of a culture, and what 
defines a healthy culture is one that attains great cultural achievements and is admired by 
later generations. 
He attacks truth first by looking at the limitation of language. He begins with the 
assumption—laid out as the first tenet of his short 1869–70 essay, “On the Origin of 
Language”—that, “All conscious thought is possible only with the help of language” (p 
209). Nietzsche seems to have retained this idea throughout his career, writing as late as 
1887, “the thinking which becomes conscious is only the smallest part of [thinking]… for 
only that conscious thinking takes place in words”(GS 354). Now, if our only way of 
thinking consciously about reality is through our language, then the limitations of 
language create limitations for our ability to philosophize about things and know them as 
they are. 
The limitations of language that Nietzsche sees are quite substantial. A first 
limitation is that our words are only human-guided signs quite divorced from the things 
they signify. A word is like a metaphor of a metaphor of a thing, as Nietzsche explains in 
“On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” with each metaphor quite divorced from its 
object since they are in entirely different spheres: “each time there is a complete leap 
from one sphere into the heart of another, new sphere” (TL, p 144). The word has no 
resemblance to the thing that it is meant to represent, no essential connection, thus 
making thought on that thing within that language quite divorced from the thing. 
In addition, these metaphors of metaphors are not directed by the nature of the 
things they represent but are guided by human interests. Both the individual and the 
community shape language, both in that individual speech artists create speech and 
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language, and in that the taste of the community as a whole restrains these individuals. 
People then play with this language, in ways that, according to then current standards, are 
errors, until they are widely adopted (LR III, p 25). The result is a language built by the 
needs of the community. 
To sum up, Nietzsche writes, “What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, 
metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations which have been 
subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and decoration”(TL p 146). 
“Language is rhetoric,” Nietzsche says, which Blair and Gilman explain as: 
“Consciousness does not grasp things, but impulses or imperfect copies of things, and 
these impulses are represented only in images.… [Language] conveys an attitude or 
opinion, a partial view rather than an essential knowledge of the thing”(LR xiii). 
A second limitation of language is its identification of dissimilar things, which is 
the basis of our logic. Each and every individual thing is unavoidably unique and 
singular, but we completely efface this when we try to group together a bunch of unique 
singular things with a word and assume they are uniform and interchangeable. As 
Nietzsche says, “Whereas every metaphor standing for a sensuous perception is 
individual and unique and is therefore always able to escape classification, the great 
edifice of concepts exhibits the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium, while logic 
breathes out that air of severity and coolness which is peculiar to mathematics”(TL 146-
7). Our language divides up the world with rigid lines, though in truth the world is a place 
of fluid continuity. 
The logic that is built upon language implicitly assumes that language works like 
mathematics. Numbers are genuinely interchangeable. The 2 in “2 apples” and “2 trees” 
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are the same 2 because this is an abstract, precisely defined concept. Thus, the language 
of math is capable of precisely signifying the world of numbers. But the same does not 
apply to the logic of non-mathematical words and concepts. To assume that a statement 
such as, “all prime numbers greater than 2 are odd” and “all ravens are black” have the 
same status is naïve. Both “raven” and “black” are human-defined categories (just like 
“good” and “bad”); they are sets without well-defined edges encapsulating many non-
interchangeable objects with ambiguous categorization. The sets of prime and odd 
numbers are unambiguous: even though we don’t know all their members, we can decide 
with indisputable certainty whether any given number falls into either category. The same 
cannot be said of “raven” and “black”—we can’t define exactly what constitutes a raven 
or what borderline cases fit into the class of “raven” and we can’t decide, consistently and 
non-arbitrarily, exactly what shade of gray is the darkest shade before black. 
We should note that Nietzsche does not take the extreme view that, from the 
limitations of our thought, we can’t know anything about anything; rather he takes the 
more cautious view that the limitations of language set limits on what we can know, 
writing, “The full essence of things will never be grasped”(LR III, p 23). This means we, 
as humans, exist in an intermediary position between full truth and ignorance, a position 
he seems to maintain throughout his career.2 
As I said, this isn’t to say that truth has no value, but when the pursuit of this 
limited attainable truth gets in the way of something more valuable, such as the pursuit of 
healthy human activity, it is problematic. This seems to be a continuing idea throughout 
                                                
2 For example, we can see Nietzsche, as late as The Antichrist, Nietzsche speaking of 
“truth” both using quotation marks to indicate so-called truth and without quotations 
marks. For one, he writes about faith as an enemy of truth (A 52, 54), among many other 
barriers to truth. 
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Nietzsche’s career. He writes, for example, in 1886: “Whenever you reach a decision, 
close your ears to even the best objections: this is the sign of a strong character”(BGE 
107). In Birth of Tragedy he describes our ability to attain knowledge as limited—“the 
imperturbable belief that thought, as it follows the thread of causality, reaches down into 
the deepest abysses of being” is a delusion (BT 15, p 73)— and as detrimental to the 
activity, which is necessary for health: “Knowledge kills action; action requires one to be 
shrouded in a veil of illusion”(BT 7, p 40). As he adds in a contemporaneous note: 
“Illusion necessary for the sentient being to live. Illusion necessary for progress in 
culture… [the insatiable drive for knowledge] is hostile to culture. Philosophy tries to 
restrain it”(WEN p 112; KGW III4 19[64]). In fact, myth is often of much greater value 
than truth: “Without myth… all cultures lose their healthy, creative, natural energy; only 
a horizon surrounded by myths encloses and unifies a cultural movement”(BT 23, p 108). 
Nietzsche continues to argue these ideas in “History in the Service of Life,” in the 
context of historical scholarship. A historical scholar that simply seeks to uncover the 
straightforward facts of history will undermine healthy activity because the true events 
are seldom so useful as the myths and misrepresentations of the past. As Nietzsche 
writes: 
A historical phenomenon which is clearly and thoroughly understood, and 
which is resolved into a phenomenon of knowledge, is dead to the person 
who has understood it, because he has understood the madness, the 
injustice, the blind passion, and, in general, the whole dismal and earthly 
horizon of that phenomenon”(HL 1, p 94). 
In other words, the awareness of full historical truth is not healthy for a culture because 
the full absurdity of human action is disconcerting and discouraging and prevents a 
culture from thriving. The value of truth does not supersede all values and when it does in 
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an individual or culture that value is harmful. Nietzsche argues that “forgetting is 
necessary to all activity” because otherwise one will tend to struggle under the burden of 
the past which obstructs and distorts one’s actions (HL 1, p 89). As before, Nietzsche 
does not take the extreme view that we should completely ignore or forget the past, since 
the past does have value. Rather, an excessive regard for the past—excessive knowledge 
of the past—is stifling. 
These ideas about the limitations of knowledge, as well as the more particular 
limitations of language and logic will continue to be in the background of Nietzsche’s 
thought, and are the base that he builds upon. As suggested, Nietzsche doesn’t seem to 
have abandoned these ideas, only expanded them. 
Nature of the Philosopher 
The question of the nature of the philosopher builds on the limitations of truth. If our 
access to truth is limited, then a philosopher, someone traditionally seen as one pursuing 
truth, must be seen in a different light too. In fact, the model of the philosopher that 
Nietzsche sets out in these early works will be similar to the sorts of human ideals that 
will crop up throughout Nietzsche’s career, such as the overman, higher man, philosopher 
of the future, and the revaluator. 
Nietzsche doesn’t elaborate on the characteristics of the philosopher and of 
philosophy all in one place. Among the early works, he discussed what he thought of 
philosophy most particularly in the beginning of the unpublished and incomplete 
“Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,” and in his third Untimely Meditation, 
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“Schopenhauer as Educator,” as well as in notes that he’d written for use in his planned 
work “The Philosopher.” 
Throughout these works, the overall picture of the philosopher is that of a unique 
and special individual who acts as a cultural leader and the creator of a culture’s outlook 
on life. The philosopher is a type of intellectual innovator, a creative individual that is 
truly responsible for great cultures like the Ancient Greeks and that the great masses of 
people are primarily there to foster and produce. Great individuals are the pride and 
measure of any culture and to create them is its object, and the great philosopher in 
particular is the intellectual spokesperson for this great culture. 
What distinguishes philosophers from other members of a culture and makes them 
such good spokespersons, as he writes in “Schopenhauer as Educator,” is that a 
philosopher is “not only a great thinker but a genuine human being”(SE 7, p 214). We can 
contrast this to his portrait of the scholar: a scholar cannot become a philosopher because 
a scholar is too much steeped within the ideas of others and within the past. The scholar, 
“lets concepts, opinions, past events, and books come between himself and things”(ibid). 
Presumably, philosophers can “see things for the first time”(ibid), as he says, because 
they can see them with their own ideas and values. They are genuine human beings 
because they are persons that live by their own ideas and values. 
This explains the importance of freedom for the philosopher, which needs to be 
maintained on all fronts: “a nonscholarly education; exemption from the constraints of 
patriotism, from the necessity of earning a living, from any connection with the state,” 
etc. (SE 8, p 215). The more one is constrained by such institutions and ideologies the 
more one’s ideas will be a reflection of those institutions and ideologies, the less truly 
32 
genuine and individual one’s ideas will be. The philosopher is an individual set apart 
from the culture, free from the culture. 
What also distinguishes philosophers from others is their capacity to select ideas. 
Philosophy, as opposed to other disciplines like science, is most concerned with the ideas 
most worthy of consideration. As he would write in 1873, “Science rushes headlong, 
without selectivity, without ‘taste,’ at whatever is knowable, in the blind desire to know 
all at any cost. Philosophical thinking, on the other hand, is ever on the scent of those 
things which are most worth knowing”(PTA p 43). Thus, science may just as easily 
investigate a deeply important question to us as the origin of the universe, as investigate 
“On the Comparative Palatability of Some Dry-Season Tadpoles from Costa Rica.”3 
According to Nietzsche, for science the question of the value of an idea is merely 
determined by certainty, how confident is a scientist in the conclusions; whereas, to 
Nietzsche, a better criterion is the “indispensability for men”(“Philosopher” 40; KGW 
III4 19[37]) or the “beauty and sublimity”(“Philosopher” 61; KGW III4, 19[76]) of an 
idea. Nietzsche fears that the quest for truth is in conflict with truly grand and lofty 
achievements and individuals that make great civilizations great. This concern with the 
small but certain will sap the vitality of a culture. Thus, the philosopher’s superior taste 
can guide a culture to embrace what is truly great and will make it a great culture. This is 
the idea of the “Philosopher as Cultural Physician.”4 A genuine philosopher can amend 
the ills of a wayward culture. 
When Nietzsche talks about a “healthy” culture, the adjectives he associates with 
it are prosperous, fortunate, successful, and joyous. He identifies great cultures with 
                                                
3 Richard Wassersug. American Midland Naturalist 86, (1) (July 1971): 101-109. 
4 The name of a planned work from 1873; see Philosophy & Truth p. lv. 
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healthy human activity, in that they are characterized by vigorous energy and living a 
beautiful existence, which is to say, “the man who is ready to risk his existence lives most 
beautifully”(HL 2, p 96).5 In “Homer’s Contest,” he had identified the competitive spirit 
in Greece as a major factor in its thriving, since it pushed men to excellence (HC 83). 
And in an 1875 note, he identifies the basis for great intelligence as “violent 
energy”(WPh V:188, p 385; KGW IV1 5[188]). In short, we’re talking about a culture 
that is active and vibrant, willing to take risks, willing to conquer. The health of a culture, 
as with the health of an individual, will be prosperity, victoriousness, and joyfulness. 
Additionally, such healthy cultures will tend to produce good philosophies: “If 
philosophy ever manifested itself as helpful, redeeming or prophylactic, it was in a 
healthy culture.” (PTA 27). These healthy cultures are in turn strengthened by the healthy 
philosophies they produce. But it also works the other way, the unhealthy culture will 
tend to produce unhealthy philosophies, which will only make things worse: “If 
philosophy ever manifested itself as helpful, redeeming or prophylactic, it was in a 
healthy culture. The sick it made even sicker”(ibid). Fortunately, there can exist genuine 
philosophers who will stand outside their culture, who can emerge even in unhealthy 
cultures, who emerge out of nowhere, as Nietzsche says, like a comet—frightful because 
they are unpredictable and unexpected (PTA 34). Such philosophers in particular will be 
cultural physicians to their cultures and provide a model for the philosophical reformer. 
When Nietzsche starts to look at these issues later in his career in terms of the 
revaluation, this model of the healthy culture is still prominent. He will diagnose the 
problem of cultural ill health as nihilism later on, but the idea is correlative. He will also 
                                                
5 Echoed later in Gay Science 283. 
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later return to the question of the traits of the genuine philosopher. Whereas here the 
philosopher is a possessor of the good taste necessary to recognize what makes great 
ideas great, in Beyond Good and Evil, the genuine philosopher is a creator of values 
(BGE 211). And we will see similarities, with the contrast between, on the one hand, 
philosopher and “philosophical laborer,” and between, on the other hand, philosopher and 
scholar. 
Early Critique of Morality 
A part of such a philosophical reformer’s mission would be the undermining of 
contemporary morality, which Nietzsche certainly saw as part of the illness of his age. 
We will look here at how he began to develop this critique in his next works, Human, All 
too Human and Daybreak. By Nietzsche’s own account, his “campaign against morality” 
began with Daybreak (EH “Daybreak” 1), but much of that critique is continuous with 
ideas brought up first in Human, All too Human. Though Nietzsche had taken issue with 
certain morals and virtues of his age before, it’s not until the works of the late 1870s and 
early 80s that Nietzsche begins to devise an overall critique of morality. The critique 
begins out of his developing ideas about value, and his previous critique of truth. 
Morality, as Nietzsche seems to be speaking of it here, is adherence to a uniform 
(equally applicable to all [HAH 25]) set of rules, derived from a higher authority, such as 
custom or a divine lawgiver. The emphasis in these earlier critiques is on morality as 
obedience to custom: those who deviate from custom are considered morally bad, 
whereas those who follow it are considered morally good (HAH 96). The act of 
accustoming oneself to follow rules and to derive pleasure in following rules is called 
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virtue, and our moral sense, our feeling of morality, is a sense of obeisance to a higher 
authority that commands, and which we follow because it commands (HAH 99). We feel 
an elevation in this obedience by feeling as if we are in accord with something higher 
(HAH 40). 
In Human, All too Human and Daybreak, Nietzsche will begin to define how he 
understands values. We should note at the outset that the concept of value as Nietzsche 
used it was quite novel.6 It was a concept borrowed from economics and tied up in that 
discipline with the concept of price and exchange. Though Nietzsche shows no 
knowledge of economics and holds a general disdain for capitalism and capitalists, his 
usage is correlative. Values are relativistic and hierarchical feelings of rank order. As 
Andrew describes it, despite Nietzsche’s general ignorance of economics and disdain for 
the market, he “exported the language of values from economics”(66). In fact, Nietzsche 
will much later write that we should seek to attempt to create a numerical scale of values, 
since it will help our understanding of values advance more rapidly (WP 710; KGW VIII3 
14[105]), something correlative to a price list. From this we can understand that the value 
of a thing is only meaningful in terms of its relative value compared to something else 
(and there is an order of higher and lower in which all values can be arranged) and its 
context (the value of a work of art vs. the value of an action; or the value of an action 
done in war vs. the value of an action done in peace). Nietzsche will speak throughout his 
career about “tables of value” and “orders of rank,” suggesting the idea that one could, at 
least in theory, create an ordered list of values. 
                                                
6 See Andrew, “The Cost of Nietzschean Values,” p 63. 
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The idea of the order of rank as he first introduces it in Human, All too Human is 
“The order of rank of desirable things”(HAH 42; also 107 & 132). It is a ranking and 
order of the values that we live and act by. The Order of Rank, as a means of ordering 
things according to some standard of value is a concept that will continue in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, though it will transform, applying to the rank order of values (BGE 224, GM 
I:17), of goods (BGE 194), of drives (GS 116, BGE 6), and, most frequently, to the 
ranking of persons (e.g. BGE 62, 257, 294, HAH P 7, GS 373, A 57). 
We depend on these orders of rank for our living and thinking. It isn’t possible to 
live without evaluating because we need aversion and partialities in order to make 
decisions (HAH 32). In Daybreak he will say, “All actions may be traced back to 
evaluations”(D 148). Living is dependent upon attraction and desire for certain things and 
aversion to other things. Even as late as Twilight of the Idols, he will say that, “life itself 
forces us to posit values”(“Morality as Anti-Nature” 5). 
From these ideas, Nietzsche looks to first criticize morality for its dichotomy of 
good and evil. We think that good and evil are two separate categories, but Nietzsche 
argues that they are merely differences of degrees. Our actions are implicitly guided by 
their rank on such hierarchical orders of values as “orders or rank” and “tables of value.” 
In other words, it is considered immoral to desire things that are considered to rank lower 
than things that are considered to rank higher. We base immorality and morality on 
relative degrees of deviation from what is considered the proper order of values. Thus, in 
these early writings, good and evil are not different in kind, but rather differences of 
degree along a spectrum (HAH 107). At one end of the spectrum is good, and at the other 
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is evil. Different actions are either more good or less good, more evil or less evil. In 
traditional morality actions are divided simply into the good and the evil. 
Nietzsche also looks to criticize traditional morality by looking at the less than 
moral origins of morality. For one, many moral rules were not originally moral—they are 
either derived from the values of the elite or from considerations of usefulness of the 
society as a whole. Secondly, those rules of morality are a set of rules that were originally 
adopted for some purpose, but which have lost that purpose and are now adhered to 
merely because they’re customary. They are thereby arbitrary—if different conditions in 
the past had dictated different rules we would have different customs and thereby 
different morals. In fact, even the measure of utility might be quite arbitrary and 
unscientific (D 11). For example, if a tribe noticed that after they did a particular song 
and dance before hunting that they seemed to have better luck hunting, they might adapt 
the dance as a tradition, without seriously scrutinizing the actual difference between 
hunting with or without the dance, and they might regard as evil anyone who interfered 
with this song and dance. The idea behind our traditional morality is that there is some 
absolute good; but Nietzsche is saying this good is an arbitrary good based on historical 
accident. 
Nietzsche first looks at the origin of morality with an early version of the idea of 
master and slave moralities. Nietzsche explains that there is a twofold origin of morality: 
“firstly in the soul of the ruling tribes and castes.[…] Then in the soul of the subjected, 
the powerless”(HAH 45). For the rulers, morality originates in those who are capable of 
requiting good with good and evil with evil, only those who are powerful enough to level 
the scales, to make things just, are considered good. For the subjected person, being weak 
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and mistrustful, all other persons are considered evil; even outward appearances of 
morality, like benevolence, are mistrusted as duplicitous. Thus, the morality of the 
subjected is a morality of distrust and suspiciousness of others. Nietzsche concludes 
(quite in opposition to the position he will later take) that our current morality must have 
derived from the morals of the rulers, since the mistrustfulness of the subjected 
undermines cooperation: “Signs of goodness, benevolence, sympathy are received 
fearfully as a trick, a prelude with a dreadful termination, a means of confusing and 
outwitting[…]. When this disposition exists in the individual a community can hardly 
arise”(ibid). Thus, the morality we have today is merely derived from the commanding 
power of those who rules. 
The preference for the morals of the master is for practical reasons: the distrustful 
morals of the subject peoples make cooperation, and thus society, untenable. 
Additionally, rulers and subjects adopt their particular moralities for practical reasons. 
For the rulers, those who are most powerful are best able to rule and thus are regarded as 
the most useful and thus the most moral. For the subjected, on the other hand, since they 
are so vulnerable, a tendency to be overly cautious is most useful—better to regard all 
others as evil and be on one’s guard. In The Wanderer and His Shadow, in 1880, 
Nietzsche also emphasizes a more general utilitarian description of the origin of morality, 
noting that, “Morality is first of all a means of preserving the community”(WS 44). He 
explains that morals start out as useful rules meant for the benefit of the community. For 
various reasons, they become entrenched—youngsters see adults doing such things and 
imitate them, and are praised for following their elders; when the habit is established it 
becomes normal and people become fearful that deviating from it could lead to some 
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great harm (WS 40). Over time these customs become entrenched and useless, but this 
lack of usefulness only enhances their status as morally good (WS 40). The logic seems to 
be that to do something moral is to do it without personal motive. So, if we can exclude 
the motive of utility or other selfish motives, we can only assume it must be done for the 
sake of morality. Thus utility and morality are exclusive: if a thing is useful it can’t be 
morally good, and if morally good it can’t be useful. 
He also criticizes the universality of morality—namely, that the rules are 
supposed to apply to all. He says that different people will need different things in 
different circumstances, and sees a higher morality in which people act by their own 
standards, in which individuals become their own lawgivers (HAH 94). 
Nietzsche continues the critique in his next work Daybreak along many of the 
same lines, again attacking the morality of custom and adherence to inherited rules. 
Emphatically, Nietzsche states that, “morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than 
obedience to customs”(D 9). He defines customs as “the traditional way of behaving and 
evaluating”(ibid). In short, morality is nothing more than obedience to a higher authority 
via inherited rules. And any individual who establishes personal rules, independent of 
custom, is considered deviant, or evil. Again Nietzsche repeats the ideas that these 
customs developed initially as genuine insight into what is beneficial—“Custom 
represents the experiences of men of earlier times as to what they supposed useful and 
harmful”(D 19). But again, over time, these moral rules become divorced from this sense 
of utility and harm. 
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In Daybreak, he expands on the problems of morality with four more critiques: 
the adherence to tradition makes morality insulated from revision, it leads to otherworldly 
metaphysical assumptions, it is opposed to individualism, and it stifles human action. 
First of all, its divorce from utility means that there really are no independent 
criteria for evaluating it. With something useful (Nietzsche uses the example of baking 
bread) we evaluate it by whether it does what it’s supposed to and how well it does it 
(does our recipe produce good bread?) (D 24). But morality is simply considered good 
because it is what has been considered good, making it independent from any revision. 
Customs are based on criteria like age and sanctity, which make morality a hindrance to 
new and better customs (D 19). 
Morality also leads to metaphysical assumptions that give an appropriately lofty 
explanation to customs. For example, one may imagine the origin of a moral rule in some 
divine being, or one may imagine an otherworldly place of punishment or reward for, 
respectively, obeying or disobeying this command. Nietzsche sees this as spoiling “one’s 
sense for reality and one’s pleasure in it”(D 33). One has forgotten that the custom is 
merely an ossified habit and one is escaping from the real world with these otherworldly 
myths. 
Morality is also dangerous to the individual, since individuals, to be moral, are not 
supposed to regard themselves as individuals. One must act, “without thinking of oneself 
as an individual”(D 9), without adverting to personal motives or personal needs, only 
with regard to the community. One cannot even bear the guilt of one’s own misdeeds, as 
the community can tend to interpret the sins of individuals as the sins of the community 
and think it appropriate to punish the whole community for the acts of a few. This can 
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enhance the need for punishment, since the community must punish wrongdoers to 
protect itself. The danger, thus, of any individual who seeks to be individual, who intends 
to act by individual motives, who seeks to be free of tradition, who seeks to create new 
customs and traditions, is the rejection of the community. Such an individual is regarded 
as immoral and will be attacked with every intent of forestalling what the community 
regards as a danger to itself. 
Also, morality stifles life by stifling human activity. Nietzsche describes morality 
as creating a pall hanging over our head. Because most human action is egoistic, the 
perception that egoistic action is of low value, and thus immoral, makes it seem as if 
human activity and life is predominately immoral and that man is thereby inherently evil 
(D 148). Characterizing most action as evil is stifling to action, and it also demeans the 
value of humans. In response, Nietzsche criticizes the value of free and unegoistic actions 
(ibid). Nietzsche explains that both unegoistic and free actions have been overvalued 
hitherto. The reason for this is because there aren’t really any actions that are completely 
unegoistic or free—all actions are at least partially unfree or egoistic; the difference is, 
again, one of degree and not one of kind. This reduces the value of, for example, doing 
something generous because we realize there is an element of egoism even in such action; 
and making a completely ungenerous action comparatively more valuable. He calls for us 
to adjust our value-feelings so that we value egoistic actions more highly than previously. 
By revaluing egoistic action: “we thus remove from the entire aspect of action and life its 
evil appearance!”(D 148). 
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Conclusion 
A number of ideas emerge in these early writings, many of which will continue to be 
important throughout his career. Of particular importance for us here, are his attempts to 
revaluate the value of particular values. His critique of the value of truth in terms of the 
value of language and logic is not one that will continue, though his concern with the 
value of truth will remain prevalent, focusing more later on an interest in the value or 
lack of value in specific myths and half-truths. His interest in the health of a culture and 
what defines the health of a culture begins in this period, as well as his interest in looking 
at the value of a culture in new ways. Additionally, he also first seeks to revaluate the 
value of egoistic action here, something he will continue to do throughout his career. The 
importance of taste and discrimination, particularly the taste of higher person is of great 
importance. He also focuses on value of independence and freedom, which certainly will 
become important in Zarathustra and Gay Science, if not so much in later works. 
The critique of the value of certain things is at the time focused, as it will be 
throughout his career, on questioning the value of things in terms of their purpose. For 
example, the problem of the value of truth is that it doesn’t always serve certain purposes, 
such as the thriving of a culture or the health of an individual. When Nietzsche critiques 
language, the purpose is not to say that language is flawed and needs to be changed so 
that it better serves the discovery of truth; the purpose is to say that it has evolved to 
serve our human needs and that truth in the strict philosophical sense of complete and 
certain knowledge is not among these. 
This period also introduces several new critiques of morality that will continue to 
be important throughout his philosophical career. Among these, Nietzsche critiques 
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morality on the ground that it is internally self-contradictory (that morality itself can be at 
times immoral), and that it leads to otherworldly assumptions (like God and a place of 
afterlife punishment, like Hell). 
Certain other critiques Nietzsche seems to abandon later, or, at least, they aren’t 
really brought in later works. Nietzsche for one critiques here the logic of morality in 
ways that are in accord with his critique of language, and does so rarely in subsequent 
work. Namely, he here questions the categories of good and evil as non-discrete are 
arbitrarily defined categories. Also, the idea that moral rules sometimes begin as 
genuinely (or at least apparently) useful practices that rigidify over time, is rejected his 
later works. 
In general, the focus of these works is on a critique of morality, revaluation of 
specific values, most especially the value of truth, and in definition of the nature of the 
philosopher. 
Revaluation in the Middle Works 
With the writing of Nietzsche’s next two works, the first four books of The Gay Science 
in 1882 and Zarathustra in 1883-85, Nietzsche starts to write in the language of the 
creation of values. In notes of this time he will begin to use the term “revaluation” to 
refer to this value creation. Following Zarathustra, with Beyond Good & Evil, he even 
speaks in terms of the “revaluation of all values,” which he will further expand in his 
Genealogy. In these works, revaluation itself is much more the emphasis and Nietzsche 
starts to think through the idea of an actual historical event of revaluation, a profound 
reshaping of our values. At the same time, as he is developing ideas such as the will to 
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power, the overman, amor fati, and the eternal return of the same, he will think these 
ideas in terms of one another. There are still new developments that won’t appear until 
even later works, and there are certainly ideas that he is integrating from earlier works 
that we have discussed, but this time period represents the core of Nietzsche’s thought on 
revaluation. 
Creating New Values 
In Human all too Human and in Daybreak, Nietzsche had a few times alluded to the idea 
of individuals that create their own rules and do not simply obey established customs, 
noting how these people are considered evil and are shunned by the rest of the 
community. With Gay Science, Nietzsche really starts to explore the idea of 
individualism in more detail and the importance of not just creating new rules and new 
customs for such individuals, but creating new values. 
Nietzsche emphasized individualism as a major theme of Gay Science from the 
very beginning, in one of the poems from his prelude, called “Vademecum – Vadetecum” 
(“Go with me – Go with yourself”) writing: “To thine own self and way be true: / Thus 
follow me, but gently do!” 
Earlier we mentioned how Nietzsche had alluded to a problem of logic, namely 
that it assumes that all reality can be divided into interchangeable and uniform things, 
such as bird and tree. Nietzsche reiterates this problem of logic in Gay Science (GS 110), 
and then applies it to morality: morality too assumes that all people are basically the same 
and should abide by the same rules and that actions designated by the same name are also 
uniform. Nietzsche attacks this part of morality via a critique of Kant’s first formulation 
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of the categorical imperative: that we ought to live by a maxim that can be willed as a 
universal law. Nietzsche describes it as: “the feeling, ‘here everyone must judge as I 
do’”(GS 335). Nietzsche argues that the categorical imperative represents a shallowness 
and pettiness because it overlooks the unique features of an action or person and only 
looks at what they have in common, what is on the surface. Universal laws are 
superficial; they only apply to the “rough exterior” but in their fullness and depth, “there 
neither are nor can be actions that are all the same[…] every act ever performed was done 
in an altogether unique and unrepeatable way”(ibid). Each and every individual and every 
act they perform are unavoidably unique and incomparable. 
Correlatively, Nietzsche argues that the popularity of something is inversely 
proportional to its value. He says, that if you want to rob something of its value, you 
should promote it to all people up and down, and as a result, “all the gold that was on 
them will have worn off through handling, and all the gold inside will have turned to 
lead”(GS 292). Value creation occurs away from the marketplace (Z:I “Flies in the 
Marketplace”). By making something too common the uniqueness of it completely 
disappears. 
Additionally, our values are malleable; they are not intrinsic and unalterable. 
Ultimately nature is value-less (GS 301). Values are granted to the world by us: “It is we, 
the thinking-sensing ones, who really and continually make something that is not yet 
there: the whole perpetually growing world of valuations, colours, weights, perspectives, 
scales, affirmations, and negations”(ibid). 
For these reasons, Nietzsche advocates the pursuit of individual values, which 
will determine what we consider moral and immoral, right and wrong, proper and 
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improper: “Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and value 
judgements and to the creation of tables of what is good that are new and all our 
own”(ibid). He concludes that, “We, however, want to become who we are – human 
beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create 
themselves!”(GS 335) 
In Daybreak, Nietzsche had noted that the basis of morality is in feelings of 
morality and immorality and that if we want to really undermine morality, we have to not 
only learn how to think differently, but to feel differently (D 103). Again, the idea is 
repeated, this time with Nietzsche latching onto the feeling of our conscience, which 
ultimately determines what we judge to be right and wrong, moral and immoral (GS 243 
& 335). The same applies to our value judgments—they are feelings too. Nietzsche 
speaks a number of times of our value-feelings,7 of our creation of these value-feelings 
(KGW VIII1 6[25]), criticizes the raising of these value feelings to absolute value 
principles (KGW VIII2 9[1]), and even speaks of orders and ranks of these value feelings 
(BGE 186, KGW VII2 27[28]). These value feelings are described as “aversion and 
partiality”(HAH 32) feelings of “respect and antipathy”(HAH 107), and “inclinations, 
aversions”(D 35). Thus the creation of new values is the creation of new feelings. In 
Daybreak Nietzsche had said that we must first learn to think differently in order to 
subsequently feel differently (D 103), suggesting that it would take a long time of 
thinking a certain way (consciously thinking in linguistic terms, as explained above) 
before that thought was imprinted on the (non-linguistic) depths of our feelings such that 
                                                
7 He’ll use the phrase “value feeling”(Werthgefühl) a few times in published works (D 
148, BGE 4, 186) and even more in his notebooks (KGW VII2 27[28], VII3 35[37], VIII1 
2[161], 6[25], 6[26], VIII2 9[1], 9[16], 9[30], 9[60], 9[62], 10[2], 10[23], 10[149], 
10[167], 10[168], 12[1], VIII3 14[134], 14[185], 15[17] & 15[192]). 
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we automatically feel in a certain way. In Gay Science, Nietzsche speaks of how much of 
our mental activity is unconscious (GS 333), which is probably the reason why our 
feelings are so difficult to shape, because they are the result of unconscious and unfelt 
mental processes that are not directly accessible. 
In Zarathustra, Nietzsche argues that this valuing, just as our language, is 
inevitably going to be human-centered, that is, based on human needs and desires; and it 
is human to create such values (Z:1 “Thousand & One Goals”). This is, in a sense, a 
reversal of the idea from “On Truth & Lies,” when Nietzsche said that language doesn’t 
reflect the world because it is human-centered, that it was grounded in our needs and 
desires and not grounded in reality, which it is meant to describe. Human-centeredness 
was a problem for language with respect to truth, but it is acceptable, even desirable, 
when it comes to the creation of value since these values are meant to serve us, not truth. 
In Zarathustra, Nietzsche also starts to explicate some of the features of the 
creator of values. He alludes in multiple ways to a creator of values, first with the child 
from “The Three Metamorphoses” and then with the Creator. The child is the final 
metamorphosis, following the lion that does battle with traditional morality (in the form 
of a dragon covered in scales of “thou shalt”). Only the child can create new values 
because, “The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling 
out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying”(Z:1 “3 Metamorphoses”). In 
speaking of the creator, as one who creates values, Nietzsche similarly says this creator 
must destroy (Z:1 “Prologue 9, “1001 Goals,” Z:2 “Self-Overcoming,” Z:3 “Old & New 
Tables” 1). And Nietzsche also alludes to the creator’s need for freedom (Z:I “Way of the 
Creator”), as he had with his model of the philosopher earlier. 
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Additionally, we see Nietzsche speaking in terms of the historical relevance of 
creating new values. He still holds the idea that values were created in the past for 
preservation: “Humans first placed values into things, in order to preserve 
themselves”(Z:1 “1001 Goals”). But he also many times speaks of the future and the 
creation of new values as part of the development of a new future: “I shall join the 
creators, the harvesters, the celebrators: I shall show them the rainbow and all the steps to 
the overman”(Z:1 Prologue 9); “A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge 
to the future”(Z:2 “Redemption”); “He, however, is the one who creates a goal for 
mankind and gives the earth its meaning and its future”(Z:3 “Old & New Tablets 2”). In a 
contemporaneous note, Nietzsche says that a higher morality would facilitate the creation 
of the overman (KGW VII1 7[21]), and he seems to be saying here that new values, better 
values, would facilitate the emergence of the future overman. In other words, the creation 
of values is about setting the stage for persons of the future capable of greater things. 
A number of key ideas are expanded at the time of Gay Science and Zarathustra. 
The idea that values are only values for a specific context gets more emphasis and 
expansion at this time. Specifically Nietzsche emphasizes the human-centeredness of our 
values. He also expands on the importance of higher persons here. The need for their 
independence/freedom is again repeated, but we see it in a different light as it is based on 
their role of creating values. The importance of higher persons for creating values can be 
seen in the previous time period, if we look closely at earlier works, for example, in the 
unique role of philosophers in their capacity for taste and discrimination. But now it is 
more explicit and more generalized. 
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A number of ideas are added as well. The importance of value feelings (though it 
actually is first introduced in Human All too Human) is an important idea that is added 
here. We learn about the idea of values as feelings and about the inaccessibility and 
difficulty of changing these values. The historical significance of the creation of new 
values is also introduced. Creators of values aren’t just defying rigidified moral rules; 
they may have a genuine role or shaping the culture and contributing to its future. 
“Revaluation” 
Beginning with Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche starts to speak in the language of the 
“revaluation,” and begins to really define what key values are the main targets of the 
revaluation. The first appearance of the phrase “revaluation of all values” (Umwerthung 
aller Werthe) is in a note from an 1884 notebook, where he lists the title of a proposed 
book, called “Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence” (Wiederkunft), with the subtitle 
“Attempt at the Revaluation of All Values”(KGW VII2 26[259]). A little bit later in the 
same notebook he speaks of the “revaluation of all values” as the means of enduring the 
“hardest idea,” (which, based on context, seems to be referring to the idea of the eternal 
return). 
He lists some of the core ideas that will be revaluated: “No longer joy in certainty 
but in uncertainty; no longer ‘cause and effect’ but the continually creative; no longer 
will to preservation but to power; no longer the humble expression, ‘everything is merely 
subjective,’ but ‘it is also our work!’”(WP 1059, KGW VII2 26[284]). In short, he speaks 
of revaluating ideas of certainty, cause and effect, will to preservation, and subjectivity so 
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that we more highly value uncertainty, continual creativity, will to power, and 
subjectivity (over and above objectivity). 
The first appearance of the word “revaluation” in a published work is in 1886 in 
Beyond Good & Evil.8 It is first mentioned in an aphorism from Part 3 “The Religious 
Character” where he describes Christianity as a “revaluation of all the values of 
antiquity”(46). We first see here a model of revaluation that he will continue to use, 
namely of Christianity as the first comprehensive revaluation of all values. Some of the 
ancient values Nietzsche mentions here being reversed are of freedom, pride, and self-
confidence, qualities extolled by Nietzsche, which he sees as denigrated by Christianity. 
The image that summarizes much of this inversion is the striking image of the “god on 
the cross”(BGE 46). The reason it was so striking is because it was a total reversal of 
traditional views of deities: a god sacrificing himself, even humbling himself, abasing 
himself, descending to the level of human to be treated as the lowliest of humans, instead 
of the usual order, where it was normal for people to make sacrifices to the gods and to 
revere them. What could be more opposite to the ancient’s way of viewing the gods as 
free, proud, and clearly above humanity? Since for both Ancients and Christians, their 
God is meant to be the highest model, the ultimate example to be imitated, from the 
inversion of the self-sacrificing god follows the values of self-sacrifice, humility, and 
obedience, which Nietzsche discusses. 
In Beyond Good & Evil 203, Nietzsche again speaks in terms of a greater future 
promised by a revaluation and the undermining of what are considered to be “eternal 
                                                
8 The exact phrase “Umwerthung aller Werthe” doesn’t appear in Beyond Good & Evil, 
but the closely similar phrases: 46: “Umwerthung aller antiken Werthe”; 203: “‘ewige 
Werthe’ umzuwerthen, umzukehren” and “Umwerthung der Werthe” 
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values.” He believes that with these new values our leaders will actually be able to 
control and guide the future, “To teach humanity its future as its will, as dependent on a 
human will.” The alternative is the way events proceed through history now, which is 
arbitrary and meandering. The empowered leader can “put an end to the gruesome rule of 
chance and nonsense that has passed for ‘history’ so far.” 
There is no allusion to the overman here—or for that matter, anywhere in Beyond 
Good & Evil—but, similarly, the idea of revaluation as a path to a high culture and to 
higher human beings is explicit, and one can’t avoid being reminded of the notebook 
entry mentioned earlier, that a higher morality would facilitate the creation of the 
overman. In the language of Beyond Good & Evil, better values would facilitate the 
creation of the much higher genuine philosophers, the philosophers of the future. 
The major contributions of this period are, first of all the first explicit mention of 
the revaluation of all values, which he now defines as an historical event. It happened 
once in the past, with the Christian revaluation of ancient values, and it may happen in 
the future. Also, in speaking of the revaluation, he expands on the list of ideas that are to 
be revaluated. Uncertainty, subjectivity, self-preservation, pride, and so on are 
emphasized. 
One of the most significant developments of Beyond Good & Evil is the 
introduction of genealogy and the genealogical critique, which is first introduced in an 
aphorism near the end of the book, and which is expanded upon in his subsequent work, 
The Genealogy of Morality. This we’ll discuss next. 
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Genealogical Critique 
The idea of a distinction between a master morality and a slave morality, as mentioned 
above, is first brought up by Nietzsche in Human, All too Human 45, in which he argued 
that a master morality would be defined by a respect for power and effectiveness and a 
slave morality would be based on distrust and suspicion. Because a morality of distrust 
would be impractical for a society, our morality, he back then concluded, must’ve been 
derived from the master’s morality. 
This was a relatively short aphorism, and it seems to have the same point as his 
later genealogical critiques, to criticize morality by exposing its origin. This serves two 
purposes: to expose internal contradictions in this morality, only evident in its origin, and 
also to undermine the value of this morality by exposing its less savory origins. Nietzsche 
notes that pointing out the origin of a value is not a critique of that value, but a way of 
diminishing its value, in order to prepare the way for a fuller critique (KGW VIII1 
2[189]). 
Nietzsche further developed and adapted his genealogical critique with the 
distinction between master and slave moralities in Beyond Good and Evil 260, where he 
argues that current morality is derived from slave morality. He also brings a more 
sophisticated sense of morality to this critique. Instead of simply being adherence to 
universal custom, morality is more broadly a system of absolute values and absolute 
distinctions of good and evil that command obedience to some higher authority. 
In Beyond Good & Evil, he describes master morality as valorizing “elevated, 
proud states of soul” and being typified by value creation and self-glorification because 
the noble master types see themselves as the standard to which others should live up. He 
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explicitly sets this morality apart from utilitarianism, pity, and selflessness. Because the 
masters set their own values, they look down upon systems of morality that focus on the 
common good, such as utilitarianism. From the perspective of the masters they 
themselves are good and certain moral considerations (such as gratitude, justice, and 
friendship) apply only between them. From their perspective, the subject peoples, who 
are considered “bad”—meaning inferior, common, low—do not deserve the same moral 
considerations. 
Slave morality, derived from the experience of oppressed, unfree, and suffering 
peoples, is first of all defined by their unpleasant experience, leading to a pessimistic 
attitude and low opinion of the human condition. It is defined also by a disdain of the 
powerful who have subjected them, and a defining of good as the opposite of the strong, 
luxurious, unproductive masters above them—thereby extolling values such as humility, 
pity, generosity, patience, and industriousness. As opposed to the masters, who hold up 
themselves as their own ideal (what they are and what they have), the ideals of the 
subject peoples are that which they don’t have and are not (such as freedom and 
happiness) and lead to a dreaming of another world where such goods are attainable. 
Both the masters and subjects define themselves as “good,” but the meaning of this good 
varies. Whereas the powerful define themselves as “good,” and then, in opposition, 
defined their subjects as “bad” (common, low, inferior, falling short of the masters’ high 
standards) the slaves defined their masters as “evil” (powerful, dangerous, fearful [BGE 
260] as well as rich, godless, violent and sensual [BGE 195]) and themselves in 
opposition as “good.” So, to sum up the perspective here, we have two meanings of good: 
the masters’ “good” meaning something like “noble, high & uncommon” and the 
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subjects’ “good” meaning something like “not powerful, not dangerous, nonthreatening” 
and “poor, gentle, god-fearing and non-sensual.” 
The contemporary morality that we live in is a form of slave morality because we 
abide by a Christian morality—derived via its Jewish founders, such as Jesus and Paul—
from the morals of the Jewish people, who lived as a subject people under the Egyptians, 
Babylonians, and Romans. The morality we live by he calls a slave revolt against the 
ancient morality (BGE 195, GM I:7 & 10, KGW VIII1 2[128]). 
In Nietzsche’s next work, On the Genealogy of Morality, he elaborates on the 
origin of morality in more detail. In the preface, he points us back to some of the nascent 
passages of these ideas from Human, All too Human (GM P 4), reminding us of the 
concept of morality he is criticizing, morality as adherence to established customs. In 
Human, All too Human, Nietzsche had stressed morality’s need to forget the origin of 
customs, since remembering the origin would tend to knock them off their lofty perch 
(HAH 92 & 96, WS 40). A genealogy of morality, pointing out the less savory origin of 
morality, would be similarly be capable of undermining the value of morality (GM P 6). 
Nietzsche’s description of the origin of morality is in opposition to the so-called 
“English psychologists” who believed that morality stresses unegoistic principles since 
people in the past realized this was a the most exigent way of organizing a society. The 
logic is that people in the past recognized that unegoistically motivated action was the 
most useful and practical way to do things, since it is an important part of cooperation 
and collaboration and is opposed to the apparent destructiveness of selfish action. Over 
time, this became entrenched in culture and retained. Nietzsche himself had earlier 
advocated the idea of forgotten origins, and he had accepted the idea of moral rules as 
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originally being genuinely useful guidelines (as noted above), that people established 
customs based upon what rules are effective for achieving desired ends (HAH 39, WS 40, 
44). But, the problem with the argument of the English psychologists is that if unegoistic 
action has and always will be useful, the origin should not have been forgotten (GM I:3). 
If this is its true origin, we should still explicitly recognize that we do unegoistic action 
for practical reasons. But it seems like we do unegoistic action because we consider them 
moral, that is, as a rule or “ought” that must be followed. 
Identifying morality as rooted in usefulness is also problematic because 
usefulness is only meaningful if there is some end aimed for. If a set of values is useful, 
what is it useful for? Earlier he had framed the original purpose of morals as 
“preservation of a community”(HAH 96), but even such a seemingly unquestionable end 
as that is not absolute or value-neutral. Preserving the community is a particular goal that 
a community may value, and certain morals may be useful for achieving it, but it’s not 
the only possible goal. Such goals can vary (GM I:17), such as expanding the community 
(say, through conquest) or enhancing the happiness or physical health or economic 
prosperity of the community, or perhaps not focusing on the whole community at all, but 
promoting the success of the most valuable members. 
Nietzsche argues against the English psychologist and against his earlier ideas by 
arguing that our current morality is grounded in slave morality. Just as he wrote in 
Beyond Good and Evil, the masters see themselves as the standard of value and believe 
themselves capable of creating values. The subject peoples, in contrast, define their ideal 
as the opposite of their masters, who are defined as evil. Slave morality is a reaction to 
the morality of their masters and is built out of hatred and revenge against those who 
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subjected them. According to Nietzsche, the Jewish people, from whom we derive our 
morals, developed morals that specifically extolled lowly people like themselves and 
belittled those in power. They imagined those in power laid low by divine wrath while 
they themselves will be raised up. They developed these morals through a revaluation of 
previous values, a reversal of established ancient moral values (GM I:7). 
The important critiques in this history are first of all that the Christian morality, 
which extols such virtues as love, benevolence, and forgiveness, is, in Nietzsche’s 
account, actually grounded in revenge and hatred. Nietzsche will later describe the 
genealogy as demonstrating “the birth of Christianity out of the spirit of 
ressentiment”(EH “Genealogy”). Even the Jews who condemn the powerful, prophesy a 
second coming when they will themselves be powerful (GM I:15). 
Additionally, since every system of values has a value, this genealogical history is 
also meant to diminish the value of the Christian moral values and its history in Jewish 
morality. As Nietzsche puts it: “The question: what is this or that table of values and 
‘morals’ worth? needs to be asked”(GM I:17). This is an important later idea of the 
“value of values,” namely the relative merits of a table of values versus another table of 
values. To evaluate the value of a table of values we’d look first at the value of the end 
sought after and second, how well it achieves that end. The original end of Jewish 
morality, as stated, was revenge—revenge against their masters. It was built out of hatred 
and ressentiment. This end cannot be divorced from the valuations of current morality 
since they are the same valuations. A morality or system of values aimed towards an end 
that’s of low value, such as ressentiment, would thereby be of low value. 
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Conclusion 
A number of new ideas are added and other expanded in this period from the Gay Science 
to the Genealogy. Nietzsche introduced the idea of value-feelings as the basis of values 
and spoke the first time of asking about the value of a system of values. He also 
developed the genealogical critique as a method of undermining the value of a system of 
value. 
Nietzsche also questioned earlier ideas of his. His definition of morality as simply 
tradition is altered so that morality now is defined as a system of obedience to absolute 
values and absolute good and evil. He also rejects the idea of morality being grounded in 
master morality and the idea of morality originating from utility. Nietzsche argues that 
moral rules cannot have begun as useful practices, for one, because utility itself depends 
on some standard of value. 
This period also emphasizes the importance of freedom and independence for 
individuals, something that will not continue to be emphasized in later works. He also 
expands on the idea of the value of higher individuals for the well-being of a culture. At 
this point, we begin to see these higher individuals in a historical context, namely that 
they may be instrumental for a future revaluation. Additionally, the revaluation is seen 
historically, as something that has happened at least once before, in the Christian 
revaluation of ancient values. Such ideas will become critical as we look at the 
justification of revaluation and the ground of revaluation, which we’ll discuss later. 
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Revaluation in the Late Works 
In Nietzsche’s last few sane years, he made big plans for the explanation and 
development of the revaluation. In the late 1880s, while writing Beyond Good & Evil and 
Genealogy, Nietzsche was also planning a new work on revaluation. It was perhaps his 
most ambitious work, initially titled “The Will to Power” and later retitled “The 
Revaluation of All Values.” This work would have laid out the revaluation in great detail, 
but the work was cut short by the onset of Nietzsche’s madness in 1889. To understand 
what we can about these late ideas, we must mostly rely on his notes from the late 1880s 
and his last published works. There are some ideas added in the major published works, 
most notably Antichrist and Twilight of the Idols, but it appears that Nietzsche was 
reserving many important ideas for his uncompleted work. His notes give us insight into 
his thoughts, but as we might expect from notes written off hand and casually, they aren’t 
as finished and thought-out as the writings of his published works. From these works we 
do see some new ideas introduced late in his thought, particularly the importance of 
revaluation and nihilism. 
Nihilism 
Nietzsche’s concern with nihilism appears to have only developed relatively late in his 
career. The references to this concept in his published writing are significant,9 but much 
                                                
9 There are 30 appearances of the word “nihilismus” and its variations (nihilisten, nihilin, 
nihilistich, etc.) in Nietzsche’s published works. In chronological order: BGE 10, 208, BT 
P 7, GS 346-47, GM P:5, I:12, II:12, 21, 24, III:4, 14, 24, 26-28, CW Postscript, TI 
“Arrows” 34, “Skirmishes” 21, 32, 50, A 6-7, 9, 11, 20, 58, EH “Books” 1, “BT” 1-2 
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of the real explanation of this idea is found in his unpublished notes, suggesting he 
would’ve like to have developed it in more detail in his uncompleted “Will to Power” 
project. The very first mention of nihilism is found in a note from 1880 (KGW V1 
4[103]), in which he referred to Schopenhauer as the nihilists’ philosopher, but he doesn’t 
make more than scattered references until around 1884-85. 
To understand how Nietzsche defines nihilism, Arthur Danto identifies two usual 
meanings of the term: firstly, “a belief that the world we live in and seem to know has no 
ultimate reality” and secondly, to hold “in total discredit the beliefs, tastes, and attitudes 
of [the nihilists’] elders and those in current authority”(10–11). This latter type was 
presented in terms of not holding any beliefs at all, which is how it is normally 
understood today. The way Nietzsche uses the term is unique but similar to these ways of 
using the term. Bernard Reginster defines Nietzsche’s nihilism as the despair “that our 
highest aspirations cannot be realized”(“Nihilism & Affirmation” p 56). But this view is 
difficult to reconcile with the positive elements of Nietzsche’s nihilism, such as the active 
nihilism (and how he describes nihilism as a recreation for philosophers), and seems 
more in accord with the meaning of pessimism, which Nietzsche calls a preliminary to 
nihilism (KGW VIII2 10[58]). On the other hand, most commentators have tended to read 
Nietzsche as using nihilism to refer to a belief in the absence of values or a belief that 
nothing has any value,10 which seems to be how he usually uses the term. 
Nonetheless, Nietzsche uses “nihilism” in a variety of contexts. He calls it: “the 
radical rejection of value, meaning, desirability” (KGW VIII1 2[127]) and calls it the 
belief that existence in general is “inherently worthless”(GM II:21). He refers to nihilism 
                                                
10 E.g. Heidegger, “Nietzsche’s Word” pp166-167; Schacht, “Nietzsche and Nihilism” p 
65; and Larmore, p. 82. 
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as “the belief in the absolute worthlessness, i.e., meaninglessness” of the world (WP 617; 
KGW VIII1 7[54]), “aimlessness”(KGW VIII1 7[61]) and the belief that nothing is true 
(BT P 7, KGW VIII2 11[108]). He also identifies nihilism with a preference for 
nothingness over existence. In Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche calls Buddhism 
nihilistic because he sees the goal of nirvana as nothingness,11 calling nihilism elsewhere 
a “will to nothingness”(GM III:14), and In Beyond Good and Evil he says it is nihilism to 
prefer to “lie dying on an assured nothing than on an uncertain something”(10). In short, 
even if Nietzsche is generally using nihilism to refer to the absence of values and 
meaninglessness of this world, he uses it in several different ways. 
At times, Nietzsche deviates from this negative perspective on nihilism and gives 
it a positive perspective. Nietzsche acknowledges potential virtues of nihilism. He calls it 
a recreation for philosophers (KGW VIII2 11[108] & VIII3 16[30]); he says the most 
extreme form of nihilism, the complete rejection of a true world, could be considered a 
divine [göttliche] way of thinking (KGW VIII2 9[41], 12[1]:31); and he calls nihilism a 
state for strong spirits and wills (KGW VIII2 11[23]). 
This ambiguity may derive from the distinction Nietzsche makes between 
“Passive Nihilism” and “Active Nihilism”(KGW VIII2 9[35]). Active nihilism he calls a 
possible sign of strength and a sign of the “increased power of the spirit” and passive 
nihilism he calls a possible sign of weakness and a “decline and retreat of the spirit’s 
power.” Heidegger, noting that Nietzsche sees pessimism as a precursor of nihilism, 
identified the distinction in Nietzsche between the “Pessimism of Weakness” and 
“Pessimism of Strength”(“Nietzsche’s Word” 168). Pessimism of weakness is a 
                                                
11 GM I:6; cf. also GS P:3, A 7 and KGW VII3 34[204]. 
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pessimism of resignation, a conviction that all activity will only end up in failure that 
therefore leads one to seek out nothingness. On the flip side is a pessimism of strength, 
which sees the danger of inactivity and recognizes the ugliness of life and seeks out 
mastery of the situation. In short, we have a passive nihilism of weakness that resigns 
itself in the face of valuelessness and is the dangerous, and a negative type of nihilism 
that Nietzsche mostly speaks of. But then there is an active nihilism of strength that is 
liberated by the lack of pre-determined values, freed from constraints from traditional 
morality to do and think new things. 
As nihilism applies to morality and values, Nietzsche believed that it is “the 
necessary consequence of recent value estimates”(KGW VIII1 2[100]) and that any 
system of morality (by which he means traditional Judeo-Christian-based morality) or 
any religion based on such morality is bound to lead to nihilism (KGW VIII1 7[43], VIII1 
7[64]). The reason for this is that, on the one hand, morality tends to lead us to value 
truthfulness (KGW, VIII1 5[71]) and also our religion tends to lead us to regard ourselves 
as unworthy of positing our own values (KGW VIII1 7[64]), since there is some higher 
power to which we are supposed to advert. The common values held by all must be based 
on some sort of fiction, like a divine lawgiver or some form of otherworldly justice. 
When our will to truthfulness leads us to doubt this fiction, which is the source of values, 
then we come to believe that the world has no value because, when we come to believe 
that there is only one source of valuation, such as God for example, the demise of that 
fiction can lead us to think that no other source of valuation exists (KGW VIII1 5[57]). A 
belief in God is not necessary for leading to nihilism, since even Buddhism leads to 
nihilism; the problem is the value-setting according to morality (KGW VIII1 7[64]), 
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according to a system of universal rules built on some fiction, which our will to 
truthfulness will eventually doubt. 
The danger of nihilism is that, because we need values in order to live and act (as 
mentioned above), in a state of nihilism life and activity will be undermined. Human life 
cannot continue without values, and certainly it is impossible to live a life of healthy 
human activity in the absence of values. 
Reginster sees nihilism as having two possible sources. He sees nihilism in the 
undermining of our ultimate goals for life and argues that there are two ways we can fall 
into nihilistic despair over failure of these goals, “a devaluation of the goals in the 
realization of which our life has hitherto found its meaning, or the conviction that these 
goals are unrealizable”(Affirmation 24). Nihilism is emerging both because of the death 
of God (discrediting the value of our values) and an undermining of our belief in the 
realizability of our goals (Affirmation 49). For example if we have a view of absolute 
truth as the only valuable form of truth or absolute moral perfection as the only valuable 
form of moral action, and these absolutes are shown to be unreachable, then it can also 
lead to nihilistic despair. 
In order to address the problem of nihilism, we need revaluation. In particular, we 
need revaluation that will replace the unrealizable, life-denying goals and values with 
life-affirming values. As Sleinis argues, I think correctly, “The overall goal of the 
revaluation of all values is to replace life-denying values with life-affirming values”(xiv). 
We need values that no longer depend on some fiction outside of life or some unrealistic 
absolute (we’ll discuss the idea of “life-denying” or “anti-life” values below). Nietzsche 
even thinks that nihilism is important as a precursor to revaluation—“we must experience 
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nihilism before we can find out what value these ‘values’ really had”(WP P:4; KGW 
VIII2 11[411]). This is distinct from previous discussions of value creation and 
revaluation that had mentioned revaluation as a step away from mediocrity and 
democratization towards a higher culture and higher persons. Though the idea of creating 
a higher type of person may not have been abandoned (see KGW VIII3 15[100,102]), the 
importance of nihilism is definitely new. 
With his discussion of nihilism, Nietzsche is expanding on the historical 
significance and meaning of revaluation with this new idea of nihilism. There is a certain 
sort of historical determinism in these ideas, of traditional morality eventually leading to 
nihilism, and nihilism requiring, even setting the stage for, revaluation. This seems to 
change the meaning of revaluation from a useful tool for directing the future, to simply a 
historical phase. Admittedly, his understanding of nihilism and revaluation is unclear and 
Nietzsche may have intended to develop these ideas even further in his uncompleted 
book The Revaluation of All Values, which we’ll look at next. 
The Project of Revaluation 
Alongside this discussion of nihilism, Nietzsche planned a work that would explain 
nihilism and the revaluation in more detail. In truth, Nietzsche planned out and took notes 
on many never-written works throughout his career, sometimes nothing more than titles 
that pop up only once in his notes. The most ambitious of his late projects was a book 
titled “The Will to Power,” which would later be abandoned for a work titled “The 
Revaluation of All Values.” Based on what plans we have, the “Revaluation of All 
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Values” appears to be not an entirely new work, but rather a new version of “The Will to 
Power,” which he would have completed had not madness prevented him. 
Nietzsche seems to have first thought of the idea for this project at least as early 
as 1885–1886 when he wrote down a book title (among other book titles) in his 
notebooks: “The Will to Power: Attempt at a new interpretation of all events”(KGW 
VIII1 1[35]). Shortly afterwards, it was subtitled “Attempt at a new world-
interpretation”(KGW VIII1 2[73]). The planned sections suggest themes and issues 
relevant to revaluation, being about the physiology of ranking, “the great midday,”12 
breeding, and the eternal return (KGW VIII1 2[74]). 
In 1886, Nietzsche quickly changed the subtitle to “Attempt at a revaluation of all 
values”(KGW VIII1 2[100]), a subtitle he would retain from then on. This new plan 
focused more on nihilism and the undermining of current values. The subtitle makes it 
clearer that this work was intended to explain revaluation in some detail. We see 
subsequent plans dealing with the value of truth, the history of European nihilism, the 
eternal return, critiques of current values, and predictions of a future after the end of 
current values (KGW VIII1 5[75], VIII 2 9[164]), and a section on breeding (“Zucht und 
Züchtung”) (KGW VIII1 7[64]). 
On February 13, 1888, Nietzsche wrote to Franz Overbeck that he had already 
completed the first draft (Niederschrift) for the “Attempt at a Revaluation.” But he 
continued to revise the plan several times that year (KGW VIII3 14[78], 14[136], 
15[100,102]). He is clear, at least with one of these outlines, that these new values would 
                                                
12 “The great midday” was spoken of in Zarathustra as the midpoint between the 
transition from animal to overman, and was meant to imply a step on the way to a greater 
future (Z:1 “Bestowing Virtue” 3). It’s also associated with “the great choice”(see KGW 
VIII3 14[77-78]). 
65 
be based on the will to power (KGW VIII3 14[136]). In a somewhat later outline, he 
identified four areas of false values: morality, religion, metaphysics, and modern ideas, 
and listed the will to power as among the criteria of truth (KGW VIII3 16[86]). 
By September 1888, Nietzsche decided to rename this project simply “The 
Revaluation of All Values” (KGW VIII3 19[2]). Though a continuation of the “Will to 
Power” project, it was also a new project. A large chunk of notes planned for “Will to 
Power” were used for The Twilight of the Idols, which was written in August–September 
1888, but many ideas were carried over into this new project. The change in the title from 
“Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values,” to simply “Revaluation of All 
Values” suggests perhaps a change in emphasis. Perhaps he realized revaluation as a 
more central an idea than will to power; or perhaps it was a recognition that the will to 
power would not be the sole vehicle for revaluation. 
Nietzsche laid out a plan in four books: 
1) “The Antichrist: Attempt at a critique of Christianity,” 
2) “The Free Spirit: Critique of philosophy as a nihilistic movement,” 
3) “The Immoralist: Critique of the most completely ill-fated kind of 
ignorance, morality”  
4) “Dionysus: Philosophy of the eternal recurrence” (KGW VIII3 19[8]). 
Only one other outline for this work appears in Nietzsche’s notebooks, with the 
only difference being that the third chapter is retitled, “Our yes-saying (Wir 
Jasagenden),” with the same subtitle. Nietzsche completed the first book of the planned 
“Revaluation,” namely The Antichrist, in September, though he continued to make 
corrections. He wrote to Paul Deussen on November 26, 1888 that he had finished the 
“Revaluation of Values,” with the main title of “The Antichrist.” And some time shortly 
before the onset of his madness in January 1889, Nietzsche changed the subtitle of The 
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Antichrist from “Revaluation of All Values” to “A Curse on Christianity,” which some13 
have taken as an indication he had decided to abandon the project of revaluation. It’s best 
probably not to read too much into this, though. For one, the four books had subtitles in 
the two plans. It’s possible he simply decided he preferred “A Curse on Christianity” to 
“Attempt at a Critique of Christianity.” And at least as late as November of 1888, he still 
planned on four books (see letter to Overbeck 11/13/1888). Admittedly, though, we can’t 
say for certain what his intent was since he soon after fell into madness and was no 
longer able to contribute to the expression of his philosophical ideas. 
Looking at the overall history of “The Will to Power” and subsequent 
“Revaluation of all Values,” we can get a general idea of the themes that were at play in 
Nietzsche’s last thoughts on revaluation. Clearly a critique of the modern world and its 
values and their connection to nihilism, including morality and Christianity, would be 
central; this would include a critique of the over-valuing of truth; the will to power would 
probably play some part; predictions about a future after the revaluation would be 
explained, a probably better future world, perhaps defined by a higher type of person; and 
the eternal return might be integrated into these ideas. 
Thought it’s impossible for us to say in detail what Nietzsche intended to be 
included in this late work, much of what appears throughout these various plans an in the 
late notebooks is familiar from throughout Nietzsche’s thought on the revaluation and 
allows us to guess at what he intended for this idea late in his career. As discussed, the 
revaluation is a corrective for traditional morality (especially embodied by Christianity) 
and its consequence (nihilism), and revaluation will facilitate the creation of higher 
                                                
13 For example, Karl Schlechta Werke in Drei Bänden vol III, p 1388, and Keith Ansell 
Pearson and Duncan Large, The Nietzsche Reader p 447. 
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cultures and higher human beings, perhaps through some process of breeding; revaluation 
will involve undermining at least certain key ideas, such as permanence, unegoism, and 
pity, and will involve a yes-saying, an opposition to pessimism, and an embrace of this 
world. 
Twilight of the Idols to Antichrist 
As mentioned, Nietzsche used some notes originally planned for “The Will to Power” in 
Twilight of the Idols and that Antichrist was written with the intention of being only the 
first book of the “Revaluation of All Values,” and we can see some of the new and 
emerging themes from these late works reflected here. At this stage, the ideas 
surrounding revaluation were already highly developed, and most of the new ideas, such 
as on the issues of nihilism and the future of revaluation and the nature of the revaluator, 
were apparently to be reserved for the planned work he never wrote. 
There are some notable ideas in these works, though, that I want to highlight. In 
Twlight of the Idols, Nietzsche continues his critique of morality on the grounds that it is 
anti-life. For one, he thinks it is anti-life because it leads to the valuing of the otherwordly 
over this world. For example, he discusses the belief that there is a “true” world that is 
secretly hidden behind the “apparent” world that we perceive as a “sign of decadence” 
and “a symptom of life in decline”(“‘Reason’ in Philosophy” 6). Since the apparent world 
is the one we live in and the one our body exists in, such an idea is antagonistic to life 
and living. As I said above, life-affirming or life-promoting ideas are ones that promote 
healthy human activity, and to deny the importance of this world, the body therein and 
the activity therein, is to downgrade this life. Nietzsche predicts an upward evolution in 
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thought towards one in which the true-versus-illusory-world distinction will dissolve 
(“How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable”). Also, he suggests that morality is 
hostile to our tangible, living body: “The church combats the passions by cutting them off 
in every sense: its technique, its ‘cure’, is castration…. But attacking the root of the 
passions means attacking the root of life”(“Morality as Anti-Nature” 1). The idea of 
morality as antagonistic to healthy living has been discussed before, but here, as well as 
in Ecce Homo, there is more of a focus on the physical body, and the health and needs of 
that body as central and important. 
In Ecce Homo, among the most notable developments are, first, the idea of 
revaluation as imminent and revolutionary. It is something that will “rack the earth with 
convulsions”(EH Wagner 4), and it will do so soon. Second, Nietzsche himself will be 
playing an important part in the revaluation: “Revaluation of all values: that is my 
formula for an act of humanity’s highest self-examination, an act that has become flesh 
and genius in me,” and “coming from my mouth, the mouth of the first immoralist”(EH 
Destiny 1). These ideas will be explored more in later chapters, but it is important note 
that it is first brought up in published works here. 
The last of his published works, The Antichrist, is focused on a critique of 
Christianity. Within the context of the planned “Revaluation of All Values,” the purpose 
of this work was apparently as the first part of a critique of current values. He explicitly 
connects here the end of Christianity with the beginning of the revaluation: “Why not 
count from its last day instead?– From today?– Revaluation of all values!”(A 62). 
Additionally, he’s also clear that there was another attempt at the revaluation of all 
Christian values, during the period of the Renaissance, which was forestalled by the 
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Reformation (A 61). The subtitle from the “Will to Power,” the “Attempt at a Revaluation 
of All Values,” would suggest that this is the second attempt at the revaluation. The idea 
that the first attempt fails would imply that this revaluation might fail as well, but it 
certainly suggests that Nietzsche thinks we are in another period like the Renaissance, 
wherein Christianity and its values are being seriously challenged. Also, like in Ecce 
Homo, Nietzsche identifies himself as working to effect a revaluation of all values. Here, 
though, he says here is merely one of many immoralists who “already constitute a 
‘revaluation of all values’”(A 13). This seems to imply that he believes that the 
revaluation of all values is already in process and that he is only one among others. 
Conclusion 
In these later works, the basic addition to previous ideas is to put the revaluation in a 
historical setting. For one, he sets up the revaluation as the antidote to nihilism, which is 
something he perceives as a historical inevitability, due to the current values. He predicts 
that revaluation will eradicate the problem of nihilism, even begins to think rather later 
on that the revaluation is beginning and that he is a part of it. 
We will try to develop more of the details of this revaluation in subsequent 
chapters. What we have outlined here is a chronological framework in which we can 
understand the ideas that Nietzsche presents. As we look at the important ideas in the 
revaluation, we will see how they fit within this framework. Beginning with certain key 
ideas, the revaluation was a concept in continuous development. So, it’s not really 
appropriate for us to think of the revaluation as a finished or completed project. It was a 
project started early and developed until the end of Nietzsche’s career. It might even be 
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appropriate to think of it as an uncompleted idea. As we look at the revaluation in more 
detail, we will try to keep this in mind and put the questions and answers we discuss in 
their context within this development, since the answers do sometimes change at different 
points in Nietzsche’s career. This should help us better understand the relation among 
such ideas, since ideas that appear at different time periods may not be integral to one 
another. It’s also hoped that by looking at earlier versions of certain later ideas that we 
can understand those ideas more clearly, by seeing how they evolved or how they were 
justified by a younger Nietzsche. Overall, this chronological survey should serve as a 
background for subsequent, more detailed exploration. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CHARACTER OF THE REVALUATOR AND VALUES AFTER THE 
REVALUATION 
After looking at a chronological survey of the progression of the ideas about revaluation, 
we can begin to explore more closely some further questions, which have been touched 
upon or alluded to in the previous chapter. To begin, we will look at the question of the 
aim and direction of the revaluation. The question that will need to be addressed is what 
new values will result after the revaluation. What will the values of Europe look like after 
the revaluation process? Will these new values simply recreate the ancient values that 
Nietzsche often praised, or will they be something entirely new? 
We will also look at here the nature of the revaluator. It seems pretty clear that 
Nietzsche does not believe that any random person is capable of truly creating new 
values. There are going to be certain unique individuals that are capable of the rather 
difficult process of revaluing values. As was pointed out in the first chapter, the revaluing 
of values is a process of changing our value feelings, changing how we feel about the 
relative worth of various things, and these feelings are not easily changed. Thus, it would 
take quite a rare individual to change such values feelings, especially if such a revaluator 
is supposed to do it for the whole society.  
Understanding the nature of the revaluator will help us to answer the question of 
what values the revaluation will lead to. In particular, the autonomous, independent 
nature of the revaluator means that the values produced will be up to such a person and 
that they are not be constrained by the needs and desires of others. 
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The Revaluator 
In one of his outlines for the “Will to Power” from 1886, Nietzsche included a section 
titled “The problem of the lawgiver,” a section in which he would have discussed the 
character of a person who is capable of creating values. He outlined what he planned on 
in only sparse detail, writing, for one: “How would men have to be constituted whose 
evaluations would be the reverse? – Men who possess all the qualities of the modern soul 
but are strong enough to transform them into pure health?”(WP 905; KGW VIII1 2[100]). 
Presumably he means to say that such lawgivers would have values that are contrary to 
contemporary values but also have all the qualities of the modern soul. What precisely 
those qualities are is unclear. 
He then continues a bit further down:  
How the men undertaking this revaluation of themselves would have to be 
constituted. The order of rank as an order of power: war and danger 
required for a rank to maintain its conditions. The grandiose prototype: 
man in nature; the weakest, cleverest being making itself master, 
subjugating the more stupid forces”(WLN p 87; KGW VIII1 2[131]).  
There are allusions to a number of themes that Nietzsche speaks of quite frequently. He 
speaks of the revaluator as dominant and powerful and that only in conditions of war and 
danger would such a figure be capable of being created. But there’s not much to go on 
here, and we’ll have to look elsewhere for more clarity. 
Throughout Nietzsche's writings, there are a number of different, not quite 
identical characters we might describe as “higher persons,” which seem like plausible 
candidates for a revaluator type: the overman, Zarathustra, genuine philosophers, noble 
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persons, Dionysians, immoralists, free spirits, and so on. These various higher persons 
are definitely quite similar figures, and there appears to be much overlap amongst them, 
but they don’t appear to be identical figures. Not only are they described in distinct ways, 
but some of the characters are clearly only figures of the future, like the overman and the 
philosophers of the future, and others appear in the present day, like the immoralist and 
the free spirits. 
We will look at these various figures as possible examples of the nature of the 
revaluator. I will argue that since the revaluation is an event of the present or near future, 
that contemporary figures such as the noble persons and the free spirit represent our best 
model of the revaluator. Additionally, though the philosopher of the future is a figure of 
the future, it is also described as a creator of values and thus also gives us another, 
perhaps loftier, example of the revaluator. 
Genuine philosophers 
In Beyond Good & Evil, Nietzsche speaks of value creation in the context of what he 
calls “new philosophers”(203). He also calls them “genuine philosophers” and 
“philosophers of the future”, and speaks of them in several places (2, 42-44, 61, 205, 210-
213). In an 1885 note, Nietzsche acknowledges that in his younger days he also puzzled 
over the nature of the philosopher (KGW VII3 38[13]), referring to the 1870s, where 
Nietzsche had discussed the nature of the philosopher in some detail in published and 
unpublished writings. As discussed in the previous chapter, in those works he had 
emphasized individualism and taste. Individualism was the ability to be unconstrained by 
the influence of others or persuaded by other needs: such as a person unconnected with 
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the state, free from patriotism, not needing to earn a living, not steeped in the ideas of 
others. For example, he had distinguished the philosopher from the scholar, who was one 
steeped in the ideas of others (SE 7, p 214). And taste was that ability to select ideas, to 
distinguish truly worthy ideas from lesser ones. 
In that 1885 note, he suggests that he puzzled over the nature of the philosopher to 
no avail when he was younger because he had missed an important distinction: that 
between genuine philosophers and mere “philosophical laborers” (KGW VII3 38[13]; see 
also BGE 211). The philosophical laborer is someone who takes inherited sets of values 
and uses them to summarize the world. The true philosopher is a legislator of values; the 
true philosopher creates new values. Additionally, these genuine philosophers are also 
free, just as he had said earlier. The freedom of these “free spirits,” he realizes, is 
bittersweet, and makes them ultimately solitary (BGE 44). But this solitude is necessary, 
since only thereby will they attain their own truths (BGE 43). And their freedom extends 
to a freedom from fear and worldly concerns. These genuine philosophers are willing to 
take risks (BGE 205), “philosophers of the dangerous perhaps”(BGE 2), that “love to 
experiment in a new, perhaps broader, perhaps more dangerous sense”(BGE 210). Most 
prominently, they are effective and potent commanders who can deliberately shape the 
future, who can end the “gruesome rule of chance and nonsense that has passed for 
‘history’ so far”(BGE 203), and “whose conscience bears the weight of the overall 
development of humanity”(BGE 61).  
On the other hand, Nietzsche is very clear that this is definitely a philosopher of 
the future, many generations into the future: “The preparatory labor of many generations 
is needed for a philosopher to come about”(BGE 213). Walter Kaufmann used the 
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description of the genuine philosopher as the sole standard of the revaluator and, based 
on the fact that this is such a distantly future figure, concluded that the revaluation, at 
least as it is being carried out in the present, is only a critique of current values, not the 
creation of new ones (Nietzsche 111). Thus, according to Kaufmann, the immediate 
revaluation will simply be a criticism of current values and reversion to ancient values, 
but the task of truly creating new values, the creative side of the revaluation, will only 
come about with the emergence of these future philosophers.  
Such a multi-stage process, in fact, seems consistent with the description of the 
“Three Metamorphoses” from Zarathustra. The creation of values in Zarathustra is first 
spoken of with the example of the child from the “Three Metamorphoses.” The three 
metamorphoses are the spirit becoming camel, the camel becoming a lion and the lion 
becoming a child, representing stages of morality. The lion, correlative to the critical 
stage Kaufmann speaks of, does battle with the dragon, who is covered in scales of “thou 
shalt,” a symbol of contemporary morality, but the lion cannot create values. Only the 
child, the third metamorphosis, can create values because the child is capable of 
innocence, forgetting and yes-saying. The qualities of innocence and forgetting suggest 
an ability to ignore traditional ideas or values. The yes-saying is a complete opposition to 
pessimism, embracing reality and accepting everything, not considering anything worthy 
of disdain: “Nothing in existence should be excluded, nothing is dispensable”(EH “Birth 
of Tragedy” 2), even the unpleasant parts. In short, the yes-saying is a valuing of the 
whole of existence. Presumably since these three metamorphoses represent three stages, 
we could see the lion as representing the earlier critical stage and the child as 
representing the distantly future creative stage. 
76 
This connection is plausible, since the child is explicitly connected with the 
correlative idea of the “creator” in Zarathustra, a figure which presents another possible 
model of the revaluator. Nietzsche writes: “In order for the creator himself to be the child 
who is newly born, he must also want to be the birth-giver and the pain of giving 
birth”(Z:2 “Blessed Isles”). In short, the ideas of the “genuine philosopher,” “the child” 
and “the creator” appear to be interchangeable ideas. 
The connection of the three metamorphoses to Zarathustra himself may also be 
implicit.14 Zarathustra himself may be a genuine philosopher and creator. Higgins argued 
that Nietzsche’s choice of Zarathustra as his spokesman was because the historical 
Zarathustra performed a revaluation before the Christian revaluation of ancient values, by 
devaluing the deva worship of his day—rejecting many of the gods and rituals of his day 
(Comic Relief, 161). Thus, the characteristics of the creator may be mirrored in the 
characteristics of Zarathustra. 
This creator is the creator of values (Z:1 “Thousand & One Goals) and this figure 
is mentioned a number of times throughout Zarathustra. This creator is described in 
Zarathustra as hard and unpitying (Z:2 “Pitying,” Z:3; “Old & New Tables 29”) and quite 
independent and solitary, even selfish and lonely (Z:1 “Way of the Creator,” “Flies in the 
Marketplace”; Z:4 “Higher Man” 11), and this leads the creator to stand out (Z:1 “Way of 
the Creator). These creators are also fighters (Z:2 “Bestowing Virtue” 2), and since 
creating new values requires destructing, they are destroyers (Z:2 “Blessed Isles,” “Self-
Overcoming,” Z:3 “Old & New Tablets” 26). 
                                                
14 Robert Gooding-Williams argues that the Three Metamorphoses mirror the plot 
structure of Zarathustra, and that Zarathurtra himself passes through these 
metamorphoses in the course of the book (31). 
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Most importantly, as has been the case with the genuine philosopher and 
Nietzsche’s description of the lawmaker quoted above, the creator must be authoritative. 
In Zarathustra’s speech “On the Way of the Creator,” Zarathustra asks: “Are you a new 
strength and a new right? A first movement? A wheel rolling out of itself? Can you 
compel even the stars to revolve around you?” This makes sense as being a necessary 
condition for creators, since they would have to compel people to adopt their values. And 
in several places throughout Nietzsche’s career where he speaks of the changing/creation 
of values, customs, tastes, and the like, he speaks of the figures that can lead such 
changes as powerful, authoritative, influential and commanding (D 9, GS 39, BGE 211, 
KGW III4 19[39], VII2 26[243] & VIII1 2[131]). 
Critique of the Genuine Philosopher as Revaluator 
When we add up all of these characteristics, the character we get is quite an exceptional 
figure, perhaps even a bit unrealistic. In other words, we’re not going to find a person like 
this around nowadays. This is why Kaufmann thought that the revaluation was not for 
many generations hence, since only by that time might such a person be possible. 
Unfortunately, this runs into a problem when we look at what Nietzsche says. As I 
will elaborate, Nietzsche is explicit that the revaluation is something that is either just 
beginning or just about to happen, but the philosophers of the future that Kaufmann 
argues are to be the revaluators are clearly figures of the far future. Kaufmann reconciles 
this by separating the revaluation into two stages, a critical stage in the present day, 
which will involve critiquing and undermining current values, followed by a genuinely 
creative stage in the future, conducted by the genuine philosophers of the future.  
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Unfortunately, it seems pretty clear that the revaluation cannot be separated into 
two stages like this. For one, Nietzsche is insistent that creation and destruction of values 
are closely linked. Nietzsche says several times that one cannot create new values without 
destroying old values: “Change of values – that is the change of creators. Whoever must 
be a creator always annihilates”(Z:1 “1001 Goals”; see also GM II:24). And in at least 
one place, he had said it works the other way too, one cannot destroy old values without 
creating new ones: “Only as creators can we destroy!”(GS 58). And it makes sense that 
we wouldn’t be able to create new values without destroying old values since Nietzsche 
had earlier argued that we can’t live without valuing (“if only it were possible to live 
without evaluating”[HAH 32]). 
Also, the absence of values that would be left after the destruction of all values 
would lead to a state of nihilism (as a belief in the absence of values or that nothing has 
value), which Nietzsche describes as a danger that the revaluation is supposed to address. 
If the present revaluation is only destroying values, then it would seem that the 
revaluation is just as much responsible for creating nihilism as it is for rectifying it. But 
Nietzsche nowhere speaks of revaluation in this way. In short, we can’t have a separate 
critical stage of destroying current values. The creation and destruction of values must 
occur both at once. 
This must mean that when Nietzsche speaks of the revaluation going on, he is not 
just speaking of criticism of current values, he is also speaking of the creation of new 
values. But if the unrealistically high and lofty figure of the revaluator is not possible in 
the present world, how are new values to be created? 
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To reconcile this issue perhaps the rather high level of exceptionalness of these 
philosophers and creators is not a minimum condition for creating values. These genuine 
philosophers definitely are capable of creating values, but are they the only persons 
capable of creating values? If there is a whole rank order of higher persons with figures 
such as the philosophers of the future and the overman occupying one extreme end, then 
perhaps there are other more modest persons also capable of creating new values.  
In fact, how could it be that neither the philosopher of the future nor its like has 
ever yet existed (he doesn’t explicitly answer his question, “Have there ever been 
philosophers like this?”[211]15 but seems to imply that the answer is “no”) but that there 
have been revaluators in the past? It must be that the philosopher of the future is not the 
only person capable of creating values. Nietzsche speaks of the revaluation of all ancient 
values (BGE 46); he describes the Renaissance as an attempt at revaluation of all 
Christian values that was halted by the Reformation (A 61); and in his description of 
master and slave moralities, he describes the noble type as capable of creating values 
(BGE 260 & GM I:2). If such revaluations without the presence of the philosophers of the 
future or true creators were possible, then it’s possible that lesser persons are capable of 
revaluation. 
Nietzsche, in fact, suggests that a revaluation would create the possibility for such 
higher types as these genuine philosophers: “the probable paths and trials that would 
enable a soul to grow tall and strong enough to feel the compulsion for these tasks; a 
revaluation of values whose new pressure and hammer will steel a conscience and 
transform a heart into bronze to bear the weight of a responsibility like this”(BGE 203). 
                                                
15 Kaufmann interprets Nietzsche as answering in the negative (Nietzsche 108) 
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In short, we’d need a revaluation with its own revaluator to make the philosopher of the 
future possible. The idea that the current revaluation, which is meant to correct the 
problems of current values, will eventually lead to philosophers of the future that will 
also create values in the distant future implies that the current revaluation may not be the 
last and doesn’t represent some definitive solution. But the point for us here is that the 
current revaluation will not be a revaluation performed by these philosophers of the 
future. 
The case is similar with the overman, who bears enough similarity to tempt us to 
think of him as also a model for the revaluator (despite the fact that the overman is not 
explicitly spoken of as creating values). But, like the genuine philosophers, the overman 
is also clearly a figure of the distant future. And Nietzsche is also explicit that the 
revaluation would facilitate the emergence of the overman, just as with the genuine 
philosopher. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Nietzsche writes in his notebooks that 
a “new movement,” a movement opposed to previous moralities, would lead to the 
overman, whereas our current moralities would lead to the last man (KGW VII1 7[21]). 
Nietzsche seems to continue to hold to this idea even as late as 1887, writing in his 
notebook in an entry titled “The Overman”: “it is not my question what man displaces: 
but which character of man according to higher values should be chosen, wanted, 
bred”(KGW VIII2 11[413]). That is to say, a revaluation, by someone who is not a 
genuine philosopher or an overman, would create values that would make possible the 
overman or the genuine philosopher someday. 
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More Modest Models of the Revaluator 
This leaves us to consider the remaining higher persons—noble persons, Dionysian 
persons, immoralists, and free spirits, the four examples of higher figures that are 
possible in the present day—all more modest than the overman and genuine philosopher 
in the rank order of persons. Among the four of these, all are spoken of in connection to 
the revaluation, and thus probably serve as useful models for the revaluator. Though it is 
the noble person who is our strongest candidate, since this character is spoken of most 
explicitly as creating values. 
If we look first at the figures of the Dionysian person and the immoralist, though 
neither is spoken of as creating values, they both are connected with the revaluation. 
Concerning the Dionysian persons, Nietzsche does, at least in two of his plans for “The 
Revaluation of All Values,” have a section titled “Dionysus” (KGW VIII2 11[416] & 
VIII3 22[14]), and he does appear to suggest Dionysian values as higher values (EH BT 
3, Z 8, KGW VIII3 16[32]). Similarly, with the immoralist, which is the name of a section 
in three of his plans for “The Revaluation of All Values” (KGW VIII2 11[416], VIII3 
19[8] & 22[14]). He also speaks of himself in Ecce Homo as both the first immoralist as 
the person in which the revaluation of all values will be first enacted (EH Destiny 1). The 
“immoralist” is a term he primarily uses to refer to an underminer of morals, “the 
destroyer par excellence”(EH “Destiny” 2), but he also elsewhere says that a creator of 
values has to be a destroyer (Z:2 “Self-Overcoming”). 
The free spirit Nietzsche describes as a person who thinks differently than one 
would expect (based on origin, environment, class profession, the dominant views of the 
age)(HAH 225), one who is defined by self-determination and freedom of will (GS 347), 
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and one who lives experimentally and adventurously (HAH P 4). As for free spirits, one 
of Nietzsche’s plans for the “Revaluation of All Values” includes a section called “The 
Free Spirit”(KGW VIII 319[8]), and he does describe one of the characteristics of the 
philosophers of the future as being a free spirit (BGE 211). Free spirits are also 
cryptically described as revaluing values by their very nature in Antichrist: “we free 
spirits, already constitute a ‘revaluation of all values’, a living declaration of war on and 
victory over all old concepts of ‘true’ and ‘untrue’”(A 13).  
Noble persons, as described in the Genealogy of Morality, are the powerful, 
aristocratic rulers, who, by their own standards, believe in the value equation: “good = 
noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed”(GM I:7). The noble morality, in 
Nietzsche’s description, says yes to itself (GM I:10), namely the noble persons affirm 
themselves as models, ideals, exemplars. The noble persons are confident and frank with 
themselves (GM I:10). They are more complete (BGE 257) and are people of instinct. 
They can’t account for why they act the way they do (BGE 191) since they are their own 
standard of goodness, and thus don’t need any other justification beyond simply that what 
they do is good because it is what they do. They would be able to create values for 
society out of their personal autonomy and command, and this belief in oneself as a 
standard or exemplar. The noble person wants to create new values “The noble person 
wants to create new things and a new virtue”(Z I “Tree on the Mountain”). These noble 
persons are creators of value, judging “what is harmful to me is harmful in itself”(BGE 
260), using their own instincts and their own judgments as the standards of value. This 
noble type of person Nietzsche sees exemplified in the Ancient Greeks and Romans. 
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What all of these four higher figures—immoralists, Dionysian persons, free 
spirits, and noble persons—have in common is that they are presently attainable figures. 
There are identifiable examples that Nietzsche could point to (including himself) in his 
own day and in the past, unlike the genuine philosopher or the overman, which are 
definitely figures of the future. Also, compared to the overman and the genuine 
philosophers, on the rank order of persons, they are certainly not nearly as lofty (the 
reason that both the overman and the genuine philosopher are figures of the distant future 
is that it would take many generations of breeding to attain such lofty persons, in 
Nietzsche’s view16). But these four figures may still be lofty enough to create values. The 
fact that both genuine philosophers and noble persons are both spoken of as creating 
values indicates that there may be a range of persons that are capable of creating values. 
Certain characteristics seem to recur amongst many of these figure—authoritativeness, 
strength of will, freedom, autonomy—and it may be simply that one, in order to create 
values, simply needs these traits to a sufficient degree. 
Other commentators, like Conway (p 213) have argued that Nietzsche has more in 
mind for his revaluator a talented and capable artist like Goethe or Dostoevsky. The 
revaluation is to be initiated by great artists or intellectual leaders, just as the attempt at 
revaluation during the renaissance (A 61), could be attributed to great artists from that 
time period, like Raphael and Palestrina.  
In short, the revaluator is going to be, on the rank order of persons, compared to 
the great mass of mankind, quite lofty and rare, but need not necessarily be so lofty that 
                                                
16 Nietzsche mentions this in numerous places (BGE 61, 203, 251, EH “BT” 4, KGW 
VII1 15[4], VII3 37[8], VII3 40[48], VIII1 2[74], VIII1 7[64], VIII2 9[8] 
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they may only be possible in the distant future after many generations. The revaluator is 
thus a lofty figure, but not quite as lofty as some commentators have assumed. 
Nietzsche as Revaluator 
Realizing that Nietzsche had a less lofty type of revaluator in mind makes it more 
plausible that Nietzsche may have genuinely considered himself engaged in the project of 
revaluation.  
Most scholars, generally, do not believe that Nietzsche considered himself as 
worthy of being the revaluator. Kaufmann, as we have already mentioned, believed that 
the revaluation was a distantly future event, for which Nietzsche certainly could not 
qualify. Kaufmann writes: “Nietzsche’s conception of his own relationship to the 
legislating philosophers is expressed quite clearly in an earlier aphorism of the same 
work [BGE 44] where he speaks of himself as a ‘herald and precursor’ of ‘the 
philosophers of the future’”(Nietzsche p 109).  
But Kaufmann is mistaken in saying that Beyond Good & Evil 44 shows that 
Nietzsche didn’t consider himself capable of being a revaluator. Nowhere in this 
aphorism, nor in the entirety of Part 2 where the passage appears, does Nietzsche refer to 
revaluation. In context, Nietzsche is only referring to the philosophers of the future and 
thus is speaking of himself and those like him as precursors and heralds of these 
philosophers of the future. Nietzsche does speak of these philosophers of the future as 
creating values, but he also speaks of more modest and attainable figures as creating 
values as well. Since Kaufmann sees these philosophers of the future as the only persons 
capable of revaluation then his understanding that since Nietzsche is but a precursor of 
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the revaluator follows. But I have already objected to the interpretation that the 
philosophers of the future are the sole revaluators on the grounds that lesser persons than 
these rather grand philosophers of the future are capable of revaluation. 
There’s no indication that Nietzsche thought of himself as the overman or the 
philosophers of the future incarnate. But there is plenty of evidence he thought of himself 
as an immoralist (D P 4, BGE 226, EH “Destiny” 2–4, etc.), free spirit (A 13, 32, KGW 
VII3 37[8], etc.) and Dionysian (EH P 2, “Books” 5, etc.). He even, though not quite 
unequivocally, suggests he is of the noble type (EH “Wise” 3). For Nietzsche, this would 
seem to qualify him for the type of near-term revaluation he is speaking of. 
Not to mention that, in Nietzsche’s later notes and writings, he explicitly and 
repeatedly says that he is a person who is attempting revaluation. He speaks of 
revaluation multiple times in Ecce Homo, saying for one that “The task of revaluing 
values might have required more abilities than have ever been combined in any one 
individual,” but “this was the precondition, the lengthy, secret work and artistry of my 
instinct”(EH “Clever” 9). He then says that the revaluation of all values is “an act of 
humanity’s highest self-examination, an act that has become flesh and genius in me”(EH 
“Destiny” 1) and “I have a hand for switching perspectives: the first reason why a 
‘revaluation of values’ is even possible, perhaps for me alone”(EH “Wise” 1). And then 
he shortly afterwards further says, first quoting Zarathustra, that “a creator of values has 
to be a destroyer”(Z:2 “Self-Overcoming) and then calls himself “the destroyer par 
excellence”(EH “Destiny” 2). In Antichrist he says that, “we ourselves, we free spirits, 
already constitute a ‘revaluation of all values’, a living declaration of war on and victory 
over all old concepts of ‘true’ and ‘untrue’”(A 13).  
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Should we read Nietzsche literally in these passages? Is Nietzsche simply 
employing rhetorical hyperbole? Is he showing the first signs of madness? It certainly is 
the case that the most explicit evidence that Nietzsche saw himself as a revaluator is 
mostly confined to his last year of sanity, 1888. Does he have some other philosophical 
goal other than simply stating his intention of profoundly transforming values?  
If so, it’s difficult to account for Nietzsche speaking of this not just in his writings 
but also in his correspondence. Though we can’t discount madness, it seems unlikely that 
Nietzsche would have the same type of rhetorical goals in his letters. In a letter to 
Reinhart von Seydlitz (2/12/1888)17 he says that he is engaged in a “relentless and 
underground struggle against everything that human beings till now have revered and 
loved,” a task which he identifies as the “Revaluation of All Values.” He tells Paul 
Deussen in a letter (9/14/1888) that The Case of Wagner and Twilight of the Idols were 
recreations (Erholungen) in the midst of his decisive task of revaluation, adding: “Much 
is already astir in this most radical revolution that mankind has known.” 
Nietzsche apparently had a significant plan how his revaluation was supposed to 
unfold in his published work. Ecce Homo was meant to be a sort of preface to “The 
Revaluation of All Values,: in which he would lay out the development of his philosophy 
up until then. He explained in a letter to Gast, “I want to present myself before the 
uncannily solitary act of [revaluation]” (10/30/1888). Thus, Nietzsche’s planned but 
unwritten work, “The Revaluation of All Values” was meant to perform this act of 
revaluation.  
                                                
17 Quotations from Nietzsche’s letters in English come from Middleton, Selected Letters. 
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Nietzsche certainly speaks of this planned book as being world-changing and 
earth shattering. He speaks on several occasions of how revolutionary “The Revaluation 
of All Values” and its only completed book The Antichrist (which he also refers to as 
“The Revaluation of All Values”) will be. He speaks of the “Revaluation” as “a book that 
will rack the earth with convulsions”(EH “Wagner” 4) and of himself as “dynamite”(EH 
“Destiny” 1). He similarly speaks in such terms in his correspondence, saying that he is 
“shooting the history of mankind into two halves”(letter to Overbeck, 10/18/1888), and 
the book will shock everything in existence (letter to Constantin Georg Naumann 
11/26/1888). In a letter to Peter Gast (10/30/1888), he mused that The Antichrist is so 
dangerous it ought to be confiscated and tells Georg Brandes “in two years we shall have 
the whole earth in convulsions”(11/20/1888).  
And this shouldn’t come as a surprise. If we had expected the “Revaluation of All 
Values” to simply be a book describing the process of revaluation, this expectation would 
be dashed by reading its first book, The Antichrist. The book has a strong rhetorical style. 
It is written as a polemical attack on Christianity. The subtitled “Curse on Christianity” is 
meant to make people consider it “indecent” (unanständig) to be a Christian (letter to 
Paul Deussen 9/14/1888). It is an attack on Christian values and even on the value of 
Christianity itself. It shows that Nietzsche, in his “Revaluation of All Values,” was not 
simply planning on describing the process of revaluation but was actually planning on 
doing it. The attack on Christianity is clearly part of the critical side of revaluation, of 
destroying old values. It’s not unlikely that other parts of the book would provide the 
creative side of creating new values. 
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Many commentators have been reluctant to assign the role of revaluator to 
Nietzsche because they have over exaggerated the characteristics needed for a person to 
be a revaluator, associating it with great and lofty figures like the overman and the 
philosophers of the future. This makes it possible to dismiss these many statements as 
either insane hyperbole or ironic bombast. In fact, it’s hard to know what to make of 
Nietzsche titling a section of his autobiography “Why I am a Destiny?” Yet he does tell 
Meta von Salis in a letter (11/14/1888) that the last section of Ecce Homo, “Why I am a 
Destiny” is precisely written to prove that he is a destiny and straightforwardly says to 
Georg Brandes (11/20/1888): “I am a man of destiny.” It may be that he is presenting an 
earnest and carefully considered position. If we consider that the revaluator doesn’t need 
to be so grand and superhuman, then Nietzsche’s statements don’t seem quite as 
exaggerated. Though his ambitions are lofty, they are not so unrealistically lofty as some 
commenters have thought. Nietzsche believes himself to be initiating a process of 
reshaping the values of Western society. 
Some commenters have agreed that Nietzsche is engaged in revaluation himself. 
Heidegger had argued that Nietzsche was acting as revaluator and intended to perform 
the revaluation (Nietzsche vol 3, p 176). Conway similarly argues that the process of 
revaluation as it has been portrayed as the great task of distant higher figures is not what 
Nietzsche had in mind. As mentioned, Nietzsche frequently idolized artistic leaders, like 
Goethe, Raphael, and Dostoevsky (Conway p 213), who are more humanly possible 
revaluators than the unrealistic super beings like the overman and philosopher of the 
future. Nietzsche saw himself, like them, engaged in the process of fighting nihilism in 
many of his writings (Conway p 220). Though he does speak, at least in Ecce Homo, as 
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quoted above, as if he is the sole figure capable of revaluation, his constant reference to 
“we free spirits” (A 13) suggests that he considers himself as one among several other 
like-minded individuals engaged (consciously or unconsciously) in the process of 
revaluation. Nietzsche speaks as if he is only one among many of these “‘no-sayers and 
outsiders of today,” these “last idealists of knowledge in whom, alone, intellectual 
conscience dwells and is embodied these days”(GM III:24). 
We only find passages where he explicitly acknowledges his role as revaluator 
late in his career since only then did his project of the revaluation of values start to 
develop into a fuller theory. Clearly in many of his writings, even before he began to 
recognize the importance of values to morality and human activity (as early as Human, 
All too Human and Daybreak) Nietzsche seems to have been engaged in the undermining 
of values. As already mentioned, Nietzsche would later call his 1872 book The Birth of 
Tragedy his first revaluation of all values (TI “Ancients” 5) and also said (perhaps 
contradicting himself) that his “campaign against morality” began with his 1881 book 
Daybreak (EH “Daybreak”). But the idea of the “Revaluation” grew later out of these 
ideas, and his role in this revaluation emerged even later. 
Additionally, you can see some of the traits of the revaluator reflected in 
Nietzsche’s own situation, most particularly the loneliness that accompanies the freedom 
of the revaluator. Nietzsche had left behind the scholarly community, had even “slammed 
the door on the way out”(Z:2 “Scholars”) as Zarathustra says in what is meant as an 
autobiographical speech.18 He too loves freedom and identifies himself with other free 
spirits. 
                                                
18 The parallels in this aphorism to Nietzsche’s own life (of being a professor in academia 
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Nietzsche may have had unrealistic expectations of the ultimate effects of his 
attempt at revaluation (though perhaps he was just being colorful), but I certainly think 
that he wanted his work to have those effects. He wanted the revaluation to be earth 
shattering and he was attempting to make that a reality with his book, “The Revaluation 
of All Values.” 
Kaufmann claimed that, according to Nietzsche’s plan for his unwritten book the 
“Revaluation of All Values,” it would contain no value legislation: “Three of the four 
parts of the Revaluation were meant to be critiques” […] “the projected fourth book 
would not have included any new value legislation either”(114). This may not be entirely 
accurate, since Nietzsche’s plans were constantly being revised, and Kaufmann doesn’t 
seem to be looking at all of them. One plan for “The Will to Power: Attempt at a 
Revaluation of all values” starts with an opening section titled “critique of values” and 
then is followed by a second section titled “The New Principle of Value. Morphology of 
the Will to Power”(KGW VIII3 14[136]). Nietzsche describes a little further what he 
plans on including in this section, and it is still sketchy, but he does say: “we had a 
principle, that of considering right those who hitherto succumbed, and wrong those who 
hitherto prevailed: we have recognized the ‘real world’ as a ‘false world’ and morality as 
a form of immorality. We do not say ‘the stronger is wrong’”(WP 401; KGW 14[137]). 
This suggests that he will be describing a new system of values based on the will to 
power in this second section. Also, he has a couple of plans, including the last two plans, 
titling the fourth book “The Eternal Return”(KGW VIII1 5[75], VIII3 19[8], VIII3 
                                                                                                                                            
and leaving it) and the lack of connection to Zarathustra’s life (since he lived in a time 
before academia even existed), suggest that it is Nietzsche talking about himself and is 
not about Zarathustra. 
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22[14]). Such plans could suggest he would be describing new values based on the 
eternal return. One plan has seven chapters, with the final being titled “We 
Hyperboreans.” This chapter Nietzsche describes as the “Redemption of 
uncertainty”(KGW VIII3 14[156]). Perhaps he was to write a section of value creation 
built not on the ideas of being and certainty, but built on the ideas of becoming and 
uncertainty. There is certainly a lot of uncertainty about what Nietzsche intended for the 
unwritten “Revaluation of All Values,” but there is at least enough to suggest in some of 
the plans that it may have included value legislation. 
If we put these plans for the “Revaluation” next to what Nietzsche said about the 
book in his letters and published writings, it seems quite likely that he intended the book 
as an attempt at revaluation and that Nietzsche considered himself to be part of the 
project of revaluation. Though I don’t think we could say whether Nietzsche considered 
himself to be the sole revaluator (he does use a lot of “we” language), he certainly saw 
himself as part of the process, as part of a revaluation that would realign our values and 
set the stage for the future development of the overman and/or the philosophers of the 
future. 
If Nietzsche considers himself to be a revaluator and creator of new values, then 
this means that Nietzsche believed that the historical revaluation of all values was to be 
an imminent event. It was not going to be broken up into two stages, with an undermining 
of values in the present day and then the creation of values far into the future. The 
revaluation as I’ve argued, is a process of destruction and creation of values, both 
occurring at the same time. 
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Values after the Revaluation 
If we now understand the type of person that will undertake the revaluation, then perhaps 
we can also look at the character of the values that will emerge after the revaluation. 
Thomas Brobjer says that there are four different interpretations of the revaluation of all 
values that have been presented by commentators:  
1) The revaluation will lead to entirely new values, fundamentally different from 
ancient and Christian values. 
2) The revaluation is just a criticism of current values, making us aware of and 
diagnosing our current values.  
3) The revalution will be a simple reversal of current values 
4) The revaluation will be a return to ancient values. (342–43). 
To decide among these interpretations, I think we can start by eliminating the 
interpretations that seem to fall short. Interpretation #2, that the revaluation is simply a 
critique we have discussed above in critiquing Kaufmann’s interpretation. The basic 
problem is that the creation and destruction of values are intimately linked. This 
interpretation of his also doesn’t seem to agree with the radical and revolutionary nature 
of the revaluation as Nietzsche describes it. As already noted, Nietzsche predicted that 
The Revaluation of All Values would “rack the earth with convulsions”(EH “Wagner” 4), 
and spoke of it as revolutionary. Just criticizing current values doesn’t seem to qualify as 
revolutionary. 
I equally think that interpretation #3 also falls short. As mentioned, Deleuze was 
an advocate of the idea of the revaluation being a reversal (171). The interpretation of the 
revaluation as a simple reversal of values relies on the assumption that values are a 
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simple dichotomy of good and bad or higher and lower. In the previous chapter we talked 
about how Nietzsche, at least in his early critiques of morality, thought that good and evil 
are not different in kind but rather differences of degree (HAH 107). Additionally, when 
we are talking about a rank ordering of values, then the idea of inversion doesn’t seem to 
apply. As I have been arguing, the values really are relative scales of values, tables of 
values, with many values hierarchically arranged. In a revaluation, some values will be 
raised up, some lowered, but this could hardly be described as inversion. Nietzsche 
himself does use the language of inversion in many places, for example calling the 
Jewish revaluation of ancient values an “inversion of values”(BGE 195), but in these 
cases, he is speaking of a return to ancient values. In other words, if we’re talking about 
inverting the “anti-life” character of modern Christian values to more “life-promoting” 
ancient values, then lets not call it an “inversion,” but a return to ancient values. 
Thus, the most plausible explanations are that the revaluation will lead either to 
#1, some set of entirely new values, or #4, will lead to the return of ancient values via a 
reversal of the Christian revaluation of ancient values.  
Brobjer sides himself with the latter option, that the revaluation will lead to the 
return to ancient values, and there are good reasons for favoring this interpretation. 
Nietzsche does extol the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome at great length and 
favors life-affirming values, which he associates with the Greeks. I, on the other hand, 
prefer a compromise position, values that are both like the ancient values that Nietzsche 
frequently extols, but are also new, though, not entirely new. Brobjer does define these 
new values narrowly as, “entirely new values, fundamentally different from ancient and 
Christian values,” which I agree is too narrow since, as I will argue, I think the values 
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after the revaluation will be a lot like ancient values. Thus, I would say it would be a mix 
of ancient and new values. 
In the next section I will present the reasons why I think the values will represent 
or largely resemble the values of the Ancients, and then in the section following I will 
present reasons I think the values will be, at least in part new. As I said, I think both 
arguments have merit, and that what Nietzsche is imagining after the revaluation is a 
combination of new and ancient values, but I am more in favor of the latter interpretation. 
Ancient Values 
We will, first of all, look at the allusions to ancient values and the evidence that the 
revaluation was meant to return to ancient values. These allusions suggest that the values 
after the revaluation are meant to bear some significant resemblance to the values that 
Nietzsche attributed to the Ancients. 
The first explicit mention of the revaluation of all values in any published work 
occurs in Beyond Good and Evil 46, where Nietzsche describes the original revaluation as 
the Christian revaluation of ancient values. It was a revolt of the slave class against the 
noble class, a reversal of the previous order. This leads to a plausible interpretation that 
the current revaluation that Nietzsche calls for will be a reversal of this ancient misstep, 
to restore the proper hierarchy. As Walter Kaufmann says, “Nietzsche’s revaluation is 
meant to undo the damage done by a previous revaluation: values have been stood on 
their head and are not to be turned right-side up again”(Basic Writings, p 789, fn 2). In 
other words, Kaufmann is arguing that the ultimate revaluation will return us to the 
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ancient values (though, as mentioned, he thinks the immediate revaluation is simply a 
critique of current values). 
As Nietzsche describes the formation of our current morality under the valuation 
of the enslaved Jews in Genealogy, he is very explicit that it is a process of transition 
from a noble morality to a slave morality. He calls the ruling class variously “the rulers,” 
“the masters,” “the aristocratic,” as well as the “noble.” And he writes that, “Israel, with 
its revenge and revaluation of all former values, has triumphed repeatedly over all other 
ideals, all nobler ideals”(GM I:8), repeating the point from Beyond Good & Evil, that 
there was a Judeo-Christian triumph of values over previous nobler values, the values of 
the ancient world. He’s elsewhere clear that the values of the ancient world were 
“aristocratic values” (KGW VIII1 2[128]). 
When Nietzsche writes The Antichrist, the first and only completed book of his 
planned “Revaluation of All Values” project, he talks about the Renaissance as an 
attempt to replace Christian values with “noble values” (A 61). It seems pretty clear here 
that he is referring to “noble values” in the same way as he was before in Genealogy, 
namely the values of the dominant persons, which are opposed to the values of the 
subject peoples. He defines noble values elsewhere in Antichrist as opposed to 
ressentiment (A 25) and as regarding pity as weakness (A 7), both of which (pity and 
ressentiment) he associates with subject peoples. Christian values, on the other hand, are 
described as a rebellion of the lowly and ordinary against the lofty and extraordinary (A 
43) and as a set of values that destroyed noble sensibility (A 51). In short, the 
Renaissance attempted to return to the noble values that had been upturned by the earlier 
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revaluation. This process was brought to a halt by Luther and the Reformation, but 
perhaps another attempt can be made in Nietzsche’s day. 
The fact that the values that Nietzsche imagines after the revaluation are to be 
noble values clearly suggests that the values after the revaluation are going to be more 
like ancient values than they are going to be like Christian values. There are a number of 
elements of Christian morality that Nietzsche outright rejects, such as its tendency 
towards democratic leveling, utilitarianism, and pity. The noble values, on the other hand, 
extol pride, power, and self-determination. In short, what we should expect of the 
revaluation is that it’s going to lead to a set of new values which are, like ancient values, 
noble values. 
Nietzsche is quite explicit that he views the current Christian morality as 
antagonistic to life (GS 344, GM II:11,24, A 7, EH “Destiny” 7). In the previous chapter, 
I talked about what Nietzsche means by life-promoting (things that promote healthy 
human activity) and life-denying (things that lead us to favor a nonexistent other world 
over this life). And he also believes that Christian morality inevitably leads to 
immorality, namely that it is beset by internal contradictions that lead a person abiding by 
Christian morals to violate other moral rules. He even presents the revaluation as the end 
of Christianity (A 62). The ancient values, in contrast, are presented as pro-life, as 
healthy, and he certainly never indicates that he thinks they’ll lead to contradictions. 
Hence, from the above, we can conclude that there is strong reason to favor the 
idea that the revaluation will lead to ancient values or values that largely represent values. 
Nietzsche contrasts ancient and Christian values, speaks approvingly of ancient values 
and disparagingly of Christian values, thinks Christian values are beset with internal 
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contradictions, and predicts the revaluation as the end of Christianity. In this next section 
we will look at reasons why these values will also be new values. 
New Values 
Nonetheless, as I have already said, I don’t believe that Nietzsche is advocating simply 
for a return to ancient values. I think there are a few reasons for this: Nietzsche makes a 
number of references to “new” values and to the creation of values, the argument seems 
to assume there are really only two types of values; it proposes that ancient values 
represent a set of eternal values; and the revaluation depends upon the free and creative 
activity of the revaluator, which by its nature would tend to create new values. To be 
sure, as argued in the last section, the new values that Nietzsche advocates will bear some 
resemblance to ancient values, but they will not represent a simple reversion. 
First, we should look at the numerous references to “new values” (in German: 
“neue Werthe,” “neue Werthschätzungen,” “neuer Werthtafeln”) in Nietzsche’s writings. 
We find at least seven clear references in his published writings to new values (BT P 6, 
Z:1 P 9, “Three Metamorphoses,” “Flies in the Marketplace,” Z:II “Great Events,” Z:III 
“Old & New Tablets” 26, BGE 253). These are mostly in Zarathustra, but the dozen or 
so references in his notebooks appear over a broader time period (KGW V1 5[25], VI 
10[B53], V2 21[3], VII1 4[36], 4[268], 7[268], VII2 25[307], 26[243], VII3 35[47], 
38[13], 43[3], VIII1 6[25], 7[6], 7[64], VII2 11[411]). The repeated usage of such 
language suggests that there will be something significantly new in the values after the 
revaluation and that they’re not just old values revived. 
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Additionally, the revaluation is repeatedly spoken of in the context of the creation 
of values. (see, for example, KGW VII2 26 [284] & VIII3 14[136-37]. In Beyond Good 
and Evil, he speaks of, “The conditions that would have to be partly created and partly 
exploited for [the new type of philosopher] to come into being […] a revaluation of 
values whose new pressure and hammer will steel a conscience and transform a heart into 
bronze”(BGE 203). And of course, there are numerous times when he speaks of “creating 
values” and “value creation” and “creators of value.” The idea of creating values certain 
implies the creation of new values. 
Also, since it is up to certain individuals, certain revaluators and free spirits and 
higher individuals, to do the revaluation and such individuals are defined by 
individuality, independence, and freedom, it would seem a bit surprising for us to assume 
that their independent, free-spirited value-creation will lead back to ancient values. The 
independence of the revaluators will lead them into new directions with the revaluation. 
They are creator of value, after all. He calls his “new philosophers,” “strong and original 
enough to give impetus to opposed valuations and initiate a revaluation”(BGE 203). In 
other words, the revaluation is actualized by the originality of the value creators. 
Nietzsche also writes: “values and their changes stand in relation to the growth in power 
of the value-positer. The measure of unbelief, of ‘freedom of the mind’ that is admitted, 
as an expression of the growth of power”(WLN p148, KGW VIII2 9[39]). In short, as 
revaluators grow stronger, so do they grow more independent, more free and individual, 
and less restricted by some pre-determined formula of what the new values are supposed 
to look like. If such revaluators, such “free spirits” as he also calls them, are free to create 
values in their own image, why will they simply recreate the values of the Ancients? 
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The idea that Nietzsche is simply returning to ancient values would make sense if 
we assume there are only two types of values: the superior noble values and the inferior 
Judeo-Christian/Slave values that have come to dominate since the ascendancy of 
Christianity. As I said before, the values as Nietzsche presents them seem to be more 
complex, a hierarchical set of values, not just an either/or, higher/lower dichotomy. 
Though the way Nietzsche speaks of values and makes distinctions as anti-life vs. pro-
life, no-saying vs. yes-saying implies that there are broadly-speaking two types of 
morality, this overlooks the variety of different sets of values within each of these broad 
categories. For example, Nietzsche acknowledges both Christianity as well as Buddhism 
as two different versions of the anti-life. Similarly, there may be many different ways a 
set of noble values could be constructed. In short, the new values that will emerge after 
the revaluation will be some variation of these noble/higher/pro-life/yes-saying values 
that Nietzsche praises, though not necessarily a return to ancient values. 
The idea of ancient values being the correct values also seem to imply some idea 
of them being “eternal values”(see BGE 203; see also KGW VII2 25[307], 26[407], VII3 
38[14]), which Nietzsche despairingly associates with god and religion (KGW VII2 
26[407], VII3 37[14], VIII1 5[71] 1). That is to say, Nietzsche is critical of the idea of 
values that are true for all time. The idea of eternal values only makes sense if there is an 
eternal value-legislator, like God (see KGW VII3 38[13]; WP 972). If our revaluation is 
to return to ancient values, doesn’t this mean that the ancient values are the always-true 
values? It’s not even clear that the immediate revaluation Nietzsche foresees is meant to 
be the last revaluation (especially if we consider it plausible that Nietzsche thought there 
would be an immediate revaluation, conducted by persons like himself, that would pave 
100 
the way for future higher figures that would also be capable of creating new values). 
Jaspers had argued that Nietzsche believed that there would never be a final set of values 
but that new values must always be created (154). And presumably any subsequent 
revaluations after the first revaluation will lead to values even more radically different 
from the ones we are familiar with. 
New and Ancient values 
Despite the fact that Nietzsche frequently speaks of values in terms of newness, and 
speaks of value creation and free-spirited, independent value-creators, he rejects a simple 
dichotomy of two types of values and disparages eternal values, I still think that he 
expects the values to at least partially resemble ancient values. As I argued in the first 
section, Nietzsche praises and extols the ancient values and thinks they do lead to a 
healthy culture, and he speaks of the first revaluation (the Christian revaluation of ancient 
values) as inverting those ancient values. For these reasons, it wouldn’t be surprising if 
these new, better values are largely like the values Nietzsche regards as superior: ancient 
values.  
Also, I’d like to argue that saying these new values would be like ancient values is 
not an example of eternal values or of constraint on the free independence of the 
revaluator, if we assume that there are certain qualities that will lead one to be a 
revaluator. In other words, since not everyone can be a revaluator, the revaluator must 
have certain traits that make it possible for him or her to create and revalue values. Those 
traits may lead a person to favor certain values. And in fact, the traits of the revaluator, as 
spoken of in the first section of this chapter are traits Nietzsche associates with noble 
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persons: strength, independence, self-confidence, and self-determination. And these are 
also the traits that he associates with ancient values, the contrast to the Christian values of 
pity, selflessness, humility, devotion, and so on. Hence, the revaluator type, the higher 
person—the free-spirit or Dionysian person or noble person or future philosopher or 
overman—will have values that resemble ancient values as a condition of being such a 
revaluator type. And for this reason, the new values will also be much like the ancient 
values. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TWO VERSIONS OF THE REVALUATION 
There are two ways that we can interpret the scope of the revaluation. First, Nietzsche 
generally presents the revaluation of all values as a great society-wide revolution 
performed by some highly unique revaluator who will completely transform the values of 
Europe. In short, the influence of the revaluator will change things so that all people’s 
values are changed by the event. As already mentioned, Nietzsche speaks of the planned 
book The Revaluation of All Values as having a revolutionary role, as if its effects will be 
felt all across Europe. At the outset, it should be noted that this society-wide revaluation 
is the more plausible interpretation of the two simply by dint of quantity: Nietzsche 
speaks of the revaluation in these terms more often and in more direct and unambiguous 
terms.  
Second, as will be shown below, Nietzsche speaks of the revaluation and value 
estimates, at other times, in a very personal and individual way, as if it is a call for 
individual persons to revaluate their personal value estimates. In short, he speaks as if he 
is simply directing his books to his reader and asking the reader to perform a personal 
revaluation on his or her own values and nothing more. For example, Nietzsche a few 
times speaks of the concept of amor fati, the love of fate, as being his own personal 
principle, and speaks of individual values, as if he is merely trying to persuade his readers 
to change their own values and correct an individual problem (not trying to diagnose and 
correct a society-wide problem). 
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To be clear, there are two ways we might think of the difference between these 
two interpretations. First of all, there is a difference in who is responsible for the 
revaluation. In the case of a society-wide event, it is clearly something promulgated by 
influential individuals, who use their influence to change the great mass of society. In the 
individual case, individuals change themselves. Second of all, we might also compare the 
two interpretations in terms of what level the problem that the revaluation is supposed to 
cure is at. If the revaluation is at an individual level, then the proposal is more a matter of 
individual self-improvement, something along the lines of, “if you revaluate your values, 
then your life will be improved.” Whereas if it is society wide, then Nietzsche is 
diagnosing a problem that is endemic across society and is saying that one needs to 
remedy this problem to improve everyone’s life. In the former case, one can improve 
oneself without changing the whole society, whereas in the latter case this may not be 
possible. Also, in the former case, there are only some few select individuals capable of 
revaluation; in the latter case, self-revaluators may not be such a narrow group. 
These two interpretations of the revaluation of all values may seem incompatible: 
Nietzsche is either predicting and/or trying to effect a Europe-wide revolution or is trying 
to persuade his readers to change their personal values. But this is not necessarily the 
case. These two interpretations of the revaluation are not mutually incompatible 
interpretations, but may simply be two parts of the revaluation. As we will see, the 
interpretation of the revaluation as individual can be used to add to our interpretation of 
the revaluation as society wide. Nietzsche is actually addressing himself to potential 
value-legislators, to true individuals, to those who will have influence and shape the 
values of the society, and he is trying to persuade them to revaluate their values in a life-
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affirming way, and he is also predicting the result of the revolution wrought by these 
individuals. In other words, he is both writing a theory of history (describing broad 
historical trends from the past and projecting them into the future), and he is also trying 
to compel his readers to reform their values, perhaps in the hope that they will take part in 
that historical change. 
In this chapter, we will be looking at both the individual and the collective side of 
the revaluation, both showing how the revaluation is directed at individuals and asking 
them to change their values, and how Nietzsche advocates a great society-wide 
revaluation led by and promulgated by certain influential individuals. We will first 
present evidence that the revaluation was meant to be for the whole of society and then 
present evidence that it was meant to be for individuals, and then discuss the way that 
these two sides of the revaluation work can be integrated. In fact, the integration of these 
two interpretations will lead to a third interpretation, which I think is superior to both. I 
will be arguing that, in terms of this question, what Nietzsche is describing is that for 
certain capable individuals who will be responsible for the society-wide revaluation, a 
personal revaluation is a necessary precursor, an idea that is not incompatible with the 
two interpretation and in fact adds to them. Hence, when Nietzsche is advocating to his 
readers individual revaluation, he is addressing the select few who are capable of it, and 
he thinks that a society-wide revaluation will occur thanks to the influence of some of 
these individuals. 
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Revaluation as Society-wide 
We will begin by looking at the revaluation as a society-wide event performed by some 
few influential individuals. This has been the leading interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
revaluation, as far back as Ludovici (58–59) and Jaspers (251) and is more recently 
advocated by Slienis (11, 202) and Reginster (7–8). We can consider this to be the default 
interpretation, as it is generally implicit or explicit in most other interpreters. Not much 
argument is presented to defend this position. Because Nietzsche sees the problems that 
the revaluation is supposed to be addressed as endemic throughout Europe and because 
the need for revaluation is connected with the spread of Christianity throughout Europe, it 
makes sense to most interpreters that the revaluation would not be an individual remedy 
for an individual problem. We will go through the arguments in favor of this position 
merely in order to refute the position that the revaluation is meant to be only directed to 
individual readers. We will go through the reasons only briefly, because the main 
arguments have been presented before in earlier chapters in other contexts. Here, we’ll 
give a summary of the arguments. 
First, Nietzsche presents the revaluation, especially in his last few works from 
1888, as a cataclysmic and revolutionary event that is quite imminent. I had argued 
earlier that I thought Nietzsche believed himself to be contributing to the revaluation 
because he predicted that his upcoming book, “The Revaluation of All Values,” would 
have a huge impact upon its publication. He predicted, in numerous letters to friends, that 
the book would be epochal and earth shattering. It’s quite difficult to imagine how the 
revaluation could be purely personal and yet have such a broad impact. 
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Second, if we look at his models for previous revaluations, these are as well 
society-wide events. As has already been mentioned before, there are two examples he 
gives: the “revaluation of all values of antiquity”(BGE 46) and the unsuccessful attempt 
of the Renaissance at a “revaluation of all Christian values,”(A 61). He describes both of 
these events as changes that affect the whole of society. Values were transformed all 
across Europe due to the Christian revaluation, and presumably the Renaissance 
attempted, unsuccessfully, a similarly society-wide revaluation. 
Third, the revaluation is described in many places as an antidote to the problem of 
nihilism, which itself is frequently described as society-wide. He uses the phrases 
“European Nihilism” on seven different occasions,19 several of these being from plans for 
books on the will to power, eternal return, and revaluation of all values, not to mention 
other cases where he speaks of nihilism in the context of Europe or Christendom. 
Additionally, the whole problem of nihilism, as a problem of the loss of values, is 
described regularly as a problem for society as a whole, as something that will doom our 
society and mar our future. 
After laying out these arguments, if we accept that the revaluation is society-wide, 
one implication is that such changes in value will be due to the influence of certain 
authoritative persons who the great majority of society will fall in step with. Nietzsche 
does not tend to view change as occurring from the bottom-up (that is, great social 
upheavals being created by the actions of the masses; or the actions of the masses 
influencing those in power). Influence, for him, is primarily top-down. Hence, it seems 
                                                
19 GM:3 27, KGW VIII1 5[75], 6[26], VIII2 9[1], 11[150], VIII3 14[114], 18[17]. 
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unlikely that he is trying to change values by simply persuading the masses to revaluate 
their own values. 
We can look at the way Nietzsche perceives how a society is influenced and 
transformed first by looking at some early comments Nietzsche makes on the nature of 
language. In a very early essay “On the Origin of Language,” Nietzsche explained the 
relationship between the individual and the collective in the formation of language, 
writing: “Language is neither the conscious work of individuals nor of a plurality.[…] 
Language is much too complex to be the work of a single individual, much too unified to 
be the work of a mass; it is a complete organism”(209). As he later explained in his 
lectures on Rhetoric: “Language is created by the individual speech artist, but it is 
determined by the fact that the taste of the many make choices”(25). In short, language is 
a dialogue between individual speakers and the collective of other speakers; with 
individual speakers essentially nominating different speech patterns, conventions, idioms, 
and so on, and the rest of the community voting them up or down by their own usage. 
Presumably this is how Nietzsche believes that the formation of values also 
works. Just as individual speech artists play with and modify their own language, 
individual people may adopt their own individual values, and those values are in a 
dialogue with all others. Individuals project their values through what they say and do, 
and then the community votes on those values with their own actions, approval, 
tolerance, disapproval, and so on. 
Though he doesn’t speak in terms of the differing influence of different speech 
artists in this early lecture, Nietzsche would start to believe, as his philosophy matured, 
that not all individuals have equal influence on the values of the collective. Some 
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individuals have disproportionally more influence than others. Nietzsche wrote of this in 
several places. To give some examples, Nietzsche wrote in Daybreak, “every alteration 
effected to this abstraction [‘man’] by the judgments of individual powerful figures (such 
as princes and philosophers) produces an extraordinary and grossly disproportionate 
effect on the great majority”(D 105); he wrote in his notebooks: “Custom is created 
through the example of individual powerful personalities”(WEN p106, KGW III4 19[39]); 
and he wrote in Human All too Human: “Men traffic with their princes in much the same 
way as they do with their god, as indeed the prince has been to a great degree the 
representative of the god,”(HAH 461). This means that the changes in values and this 
dialogue of nomination and voting are not egalitarian. Some individuals are much more 
influential than others. 
For most people, Nietzsche seems to believe, their values, as well as their 
thoughts, tastes, and habits, are shaped by imitation of more authoritative and persuasive 
individuals. For a revaluation to take place, Nietzsche recognized that if people were 
persuaded to adopt a new set of values, it wasn’t going to be by philosophical argument. 
People are swayed by the authority of authoritative individuals, people who are, in 
Nietzsche’s view, high in the order of rank of individuals. And one of the consequences 
of the influence of these individuals is to create a revaluation that is felt across society. 
Revaluation as Individual 
Now we will look at the reasons why it seems plausible that Nietzsche thinks the 
revaluation he describes is actually meant to be merely an individual process, namely that 
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Nietzsche is addressing himself to individual readers and asking them to reevaluate their 
own personal values for their own personal benefit.  
Kathleen Higgins, for one, sought to emphasize the individual side of the 
revaluation in her article “Rebaptizing our Evil.” In her interpretation of the revaluation, 
she argues that we should focus on “individual reassessment” as part of the revaluation 
(Higgins 405). She highlights the idea expressed in Beyond Good Evil that “The great 
epochs of our lives come when we gather the courage to reconceive [umzutaufen]20 our 
evils as what is best in us”(116). Though Higgins doesn’t deny that Nietzsche may have 
viewed the revaluation as influencing great historical epochs, she thinks Nietzsche’s main 
focus is on the individual: that Nietzsche is addressing individual readers and asking 
them to remake their values. Nietzsche may be predicting great changes or great society-
wide changes of value, but he wants the reader to emerge with the lesson: I need to 
reevaluate my values. Higgins writes: “I am convinced that Nietzsche’s authorial 
strategies quite often aim to prompt individual reconsiderations on the part of his 
readers”(405). 
There are a number of reasons why we might find this interpretation to be valid. 
First, Nietzsche, throughout his writings, seems to place great value on individuality and 
people acting as individuals. In one aphorism of Daybreak he writes that the Greeks were 
defined by genuine individuality and genuineness. He writes, “these actions [actions 
stamped with genuine individuality] are precisely those which alone possess value for 
good and evil” and goes on to say that the Greeks were a culture defined by such “a 
shimmer of honesty, of genuineness in good and evil”; last of all, he writes that this type 
                                                
20 Higgins uses Kaufmann’s translation, which translates “umtaufen” more literally as 
“rechristen,” though it could also be translated “rebaptize.” 
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of individuality is what makes the Greeks so notable and memorable, since any society 
that imitates them, “will continue to shine on for many millennia after they have 
perished”(D 529). In short, Nietzsche is saying that the Greek culture has had a lasting 
glory that resonates throughout history because the Greeks acted with genuine 
individuality. A society that is more un-herd-like will be more glorious and memorable. 
Also, in Gay Science he advocates laughter as the remedy for the proposition, “The 
species is everything, an individual is always nothing,” since “an individual is always an 
individual, something first and last and tremendous; for him there are no species, sums, 
or zeroes”(GS 1). The actions of a society are dependent upon the actions and values of 
the individuals, who will collectively do the actual activity of the society. As he would 
write a few aphorisms later: “What is, therefore, first really praised when virtues are 
praised is their instrumental nature and then the blind drive in every virtue that refuses to 
be held in check by the overall advantage of the individual – in short, the unreason in 
virtue that leads the individual to allow himself to be transformed into a mere function of 
the whole”(GS 21). The importance of the individual is a theme repeated throughout 
Nietzsche’s writings on morality in the early 1880s. It makes sense that, if he is extolling 
individuality, values that are the result of individuality would be preferable to values 
derived from some society-wide revaluation. 
Nietzsche, in fact, emphasizes in a few places the idea that things that are shared 
are of a less value. For example, he writes in Gay Science: “it is selfish to consider one’s 
own judgement a universal law” selfish, that is, to propose the idea “here everyone must 
judge as I do”(GS 335). As he laid it out a bit more explicitly in Beyond Good and Evil, 
he writes: “And how could there ever be a ‘common good’! The term is self-
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contradictory: whatever can be common will never have much value […] all in all, 
everything rare for those who are rare themselves”(BGE 43). From these passages, 
Nietzsche seems to say that, if we are asking (as Nietzsche does in The Genealogy of 
Morality), “what is the value of a set of values?” the answer is that sets of values that are 
exclusive to fewer individuals are of greater value. If values broadly held are of less 
value, then it suggest that individuals should seek to create their own values. Such values 
would be more valuable than ones adopted from some grand revaluator. 
Third, adding on to the last point, Nietzsche doesn’t just say that people should 
hold unique values, but that one should specifically create tables of value that are 
personal and one’s own. For example, in the fourth book of the Gay Science, Nietzsche 
writes, “Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and value 
judgements and to the creation of tables of what is good that are new and all our own” 
[…] “We, however, want to become who we are – human beings who are new, unique, 
incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves!”(GS 335). Nietzsche 
also speaks about giving “style” to one’s character based on one’s personal strengths and 
weaknesses (GS 290). Around the same time in Book III of Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
writes: “But he will have discovered himself who speaks: “This is my good and evil.” 
With this, he has silenced the mole and dwarf who says: ‘Good for all, evil for all.’”(Z:3 
“On the Spirit of Gravity” 2). It makes sense that, if one wants to have values that are 
entirely unique to oneself, then one is going to have to create them for oneself (one can’t 
borrow them from someone else), and these passages emphasize that point. 
Fourth, Nietzsche is clearly opposed to any set of absolute values. He means by 
absolute values, values that are always the highest in all cases, “an unrestrictedly highest 
112 
value”21 as he calls it (KGW V1 3[37]), or a value that is self-justified. As he explains in a 
note from 1880: “One can only determine the value of morality by measuring it with 
something, for example with its utility (or fortune); but then that utility must also be 
measured with something – always in relation – absolute value is absurd”(KGW V1 
4[27]).22 In other words, one can only measure the value of something with a separate 
measure, but then one needs yet a second measure to measure the first measure, and a 
third to measure the second, and so on ad infinitum. Nietzsche is clear that the idea that 
there are absolute values is erroneous, listing among the four errors that have contributed 
to the development of morality the most: “the apparent absolute value of certain 
actions”23(KGW V1 3[37]). That there can be no absolute values upon which to measure 
other values presents a huge and well-known problem. If we are to revaluate values, what 
values can we base it upon? It’s not clear that Nietzsche answers this, perhaps because he 
believes that it is up to certain individuals, certain revaluators and free spirits and higher 
individuals, to simple decide what is valuable based on their own experience. In short, the 
solution to the problem of how one grounds or rationalizes a revaluation is simply that 
the individuals he is addressing in his writings ground the values in their own selves and 
create sets of values that are personal. 
That the revaluation is individual might also give some reason for the vague 
nature of his description of the results of revaluation. As we’ve discussed before, the 
prescription for how values are to be reshaped in the future is, at best, vague and 
                                                
21 My translation of the German: “eines unbegrenzt höchsten Werthes.” 
22 My translation, of the German: “Man kann den Werth der Moralität nur bestimmen 
indem man sie an etwas mißt z.B. am Nutzen (oder Glück); aber auch den Nutzen muß 
man wieder an etwas messen — immer Relationen — absoluter Werth ist Unsinn.” 
23 My translation of the German: “der Anschein eines absoluten Werthes gewisser 
Handlungen.” 
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schematic and at other times ambiguous. Such vagueness is unsurprising if we think that 
the revaluation may be the work of individuals revaluating in ways that are uniquely 
individual. If the revaluation were meant to be more society-wide, Nietzsche would be 
able to describe it in more detail, since it would be the result of social forces, and not so 
much of idiosyncratic individual choices. To describe the revaluation and lay out its 
details would make it common and thus less valuable. We discussed earlier how there are 
multiple conflicting interpretations on what the values will look like after the revaluation. 
This may be the result of Nietzsche simply running out of time before he had a chance to 
elaborate, but I think it is more plausibly the result of Nietzsche not knowing clearly what 
will happen because the results of the revaluation will undoubtedly be, at least to some 
degree, surprising. 
Integration 
Now if these reasons why the revaluation would be higher, more valuable, perhaps even 
more genuine if performed at an individual level are compelling, then we are presented 
with a problem when we want to reconcile these ideas with the frequently repeated notion 
that the revaluation is going to be some earth-shattering society-wide event that will 
change things for everyone. For this reason, I will discuss here ways both of these 
interpretations can be integrated into a single interpretation. 
First off, the idea that the revaluation is individual leads to some unresolved 
problems, such as the question that if Nietzsche expects individual persons to revaluate 
their own values, are all persons really capable of this? That is a basic idea behind this 
idea, but as we have been discussing in previous chapters, it seems like there are unique 
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individuals that are capable of this and a great many persons that are not. Also, we should 
note that Nietzsche’s notion of individuality is different from ours. Dombowsky describes 
(criticizes) Nietzsche’s individualism as an “Aristocratic Liberalism,” which is opposed 
to the atomistic individualism of egoistic private interest and equality (120). Nietzsche 
extols certain rare persons who are apart from the herd and are genuinely able to become 
individual. These individuals are more important and should devote themselves to higher 
goals and value legislation (121-22). In short, Nietzsche’s praise of individualism is not 
really a call for all of us to set ourselves apart for the crowd, but is only meant for those 
uncommon individuals who are genuinely able to do this. Instead, what Nietzsche is 
doing when he is at times appearing to present the revaluation as individual is actually 
addressing the members of his audience that he thinks may be capable of leading the 
society-wide revaluation. The interpretation that Nietzsche’s writings were not written for 
a general audience but are for certain higher persons goes as far back as Ludovici (73–4). 
Thus, Nietzsche’s advocacy of individualism is not for the great masses, but simply for 
those few, rare persons capable of individuality. 
If such is the case, then Nietzsche is saying to those rare individuals that they 
must revaluate their personal values, that they must go through a personal revaluation. 
Only after they have revaluated their own values can they can attempt a society-wide 
revaluation. 
With this possibility in mind, I think there is some textual evidence we can 
present to defend the idea that those revaluators who wish to transform society must go 
through an antecedent personal revaluation. There are some passages that we can cite to 
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show that what we are presenting can be grounded in some of his writings and is not 
purely a speculative interpretation. 
The first passage we’ll look at appears in 1873, well before Nietzsche ever 
mentions the revaluation in any of his writings and doesn’t appear to have any parallel in 
any of his published work; nonetheless, it does hint at the idea. There he writes: “The 
philosopher’s product is his life (first of all, before his works). That is his work of art. 
Every work of art is turned first toward the artist, then towards other people”(WEN p. 
182; KGW III4 29[205]). There is no reason to think that Nietzsche didn’t maintain this 
idea throughout his philosophy, and he certainly did think of a revaluator as being a 
creative person, an artist. If we were to apply the idea to the revaluation, it would follow 
that revaluators also apply first their art of revaluation towards themselves, then towards 
other people, namely towards society at large. 
Looking at some passages that were written a bit later, when Nietzsche was 
beginning to develop the idea of the revaluation, he mentioned at least in a few of his 
notes the question of how the legislator of values will have to be constituted. And in these 
passages he speaks of the legislator in a dynamic way, as if such persons have to become 
legislators (not just that they are born legislators) as if they have to make themselves into 
legislators. In one plan for a work titled The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of 
All Values, he plans on devoting the third book to “The problem of the legislator” and 
asks “How would men have to be constituted whose evaluations would be the reverse? – 
Men who possess all the qualities of the modern soul but are strong enough to transform 
them into pure health?”(WP 905; KGW VIII1 2[100]). The critical concept is that of 
legislators transforming the qualities of their soul into pure health. Shortly afterwards, in 
116 
a sketch of a plan for a work titled The Eternal Return, Nietzsche describes the third 
book—titled “Whose is the hand for this hammer?”—as being about, among other things: 
“How those men would have to be constituted who would accomplish this revaluation in 
themselves [Umwerthung an sich]”(WP 69 fn; KGW VIII1 2[131]).24 It’s the critical 
phrase, “revaluation in themselves,” that is the most suggestive. The phrase again implies 
that such individuals capable of holding the hammer for smashing old ideals will perform 
a personal revaluation in themselves before they take on a society-wide revaluation.  
When we start to look into Nietzsche’s published works, we find further evidence. 
For one, since the process of creating values is apparently quite involved, the value 
legislator cannot possible be born with these new values, but has to actually create them. 
As Nietzsche describes the activity of the philosophers of the future in Beyond Good and 
Evil:  
Perhaps the philosopher has had to be a critic and a skeptic and a 
dogmatist and historian and, moreover, a poet and collector and traveler 
and guesser of riddles and moralist and seer and “free spirit” and 
practically everything, in order to run through the range of human values 
and value feelings and be able to gaze with many eyes and consciences 
from the heights into every distance, from the depths up to every height, 
from the corner onto every expanse. But all these are only preconditions 
for his task… to create values (211).  
In this passage, as in others, what Nietzsche seems to be describing is a very personal 
process of the creation of values by higher persons that are capable of value legislation. 
And if we think of this in terms of the other passages we’ve cited, it seems plausible that 
this process would precede the society-wide value legislation. In fact, as he continues a 
                                                
24 Kate Sturge translate this passage: “How the men undertaking this revaluation of 
themselves would have to be constituted”(WLN p 87) 
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bit further down in the same aphorism, speaking again of these genuine philosophers, he 
writes, “their creating is a legislating”(ibid). 
Looking at it from another perspective, we might also add Nietzsche’s discussion 
of the individual as a non-singular multiplicity. This idea bridges the gap between 
society-wide and individual revaluation. In one notebook entry he says explicitly that, 
“man is a multiplicity of forces which stand in an order of rank, so that there are those 
which command.”(WLN p8; KGW VII3 34[123]). This passage precedes and is probably 
a precursor to the discussion of thinking, willing and the ‘I’ in aphorisms 16–19 of 
Beyond Good and Evil. Nietzsche writes there that “our body is, after all, only a society 
constructed out of many souls” and that when we will something, “what happens here is 
what happens in every well-constructed and happy community: the ruling class identifies 
itself with the successes of the community”(BGE 19). In short, individual persons aren’t 
really individual or singular, but are in fact a collection of “under-souls” and “under-
wills,” which contribute to action. Persuading all these many under-souls is akin to 
persuading the many individuals in a society, which highlights the difficulty of any sort 
of revaluation, personal or society-wide. 
The hard labor of such an individual revaluation, which will only occur in the face 
of resistance, is perhaps necessary because of the resistance of society to such society-
wide changes. At times the revaluation is described adversarially, as a conflict between 
individual and society. Society, for the sake of its cohesion and strength resists the strong 
individuals and tries to keep them in check, even when they are not attempting to 
revaluate values. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche describes the general reluctance 
that society has towards accepting any individual who stands apart: 
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When the highest and strongest drives erupt in passion, driving the 
individual up and out and far above the average, over the depths of the 
herd conscience, the self-esteem of the community is destroyed – its faith 
in itself, its backbone, as it were, is broken.[…] A high, independent 
spiritedness, a will to stand alone, even an excellent faculty of reason, will 
be perceived as a threat (BGE 201).  
In Daybreak he writes: “it is impossible to compute what precisely the rarer, choicer, 
more original spirits in the whole course of history have had to suffer through being felt 
as evil and dangerous”(9). With such strong and difficult resistance, we might think of 
the difficult process individuals go through to coerce and command their various wills 
into changing values as practice before the real battle of society-wide revaluation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IDEAS BEHIND THE REVALUATION 
Since we have here been arguing that Nietzsche himself was engaged in the project of 
revaluation, I will next be trying to show some of the ways that Nietzsche was trying to 
actually perform this using some of his key ideas. Part of Nietzsche’s attempt at 
revaluation came through direct attack; for example, as already mentioned, Nietzsche 
engaged in direct attack against Christianity, most notably in the Antichrist, the first and 
only completed work of his “Revaluation of All Values” project. But he also attempted 
revaluation through the promotion of ideas that had the effect of undermining current 
values. The ideas of the will to power, the overman, amor fati, and the eternal return of 
the same will be focused on here, to show how such ideas undermined values that 
Nietzsche believed himself to be battling against. I pick these ideas not because I think 
they are the only examples, but rather because they are prominent ideas that are 
significantly developed and thus give us good material for use. 
Whether such ideas were advocated simply for the purpose of revaluation or 
whether they were advocated because Nietzsche believed they were in fact true 
descriptions of the world is not something that needs to be addressed. They are perhaps 
interpretations of the world that have value but cannot be demonstrated (just as Nietzsche 
would describe mechanical necessity, as quoted below). About the best that can be said is 
that, based on Nietzsche’s notes and writings, all of these ideas appear to predate the idea 
of revaluation. The first time the phrase “will to power” is used is in an 1880 note (KGW 
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V1 4[239])25 and appears first in a published writing in Zarathustra I (1883, “Thousand 
& One Goals). The overman first appears in a note from 1882 (KGW V1 3[1] 385) and 
also first appears in published writings in Zarathustra I in 1883. The phrase “amor fati” 
is first used in an 1881 note (KGW V2 15[20]), and first appears in a published writing in 
The Gay Science (1882, GS 276). The eternal return is first spoken of in a series of notes 
from 1881 and also first appears in a published work in The Gay Science (285, 341). In 
short, all of these ideas are first mentioned in his notes from 1880-82 and first appear in 
published writings from 1882-83. The phrase “Revaluation of all Values,” on the other 
hand, isn’t spoken of directly until 1884 in his notes (KGW 26[284] & 26[259]), and 
doesn’t appear in published work until Beyond Good & Evil (1886, BGE 46 & 203). If 
the chronology of these writings accurately reflect the chronology of Nietzsche’s thought, 
then it suggests either: 1) that these four ideas were independently proposed (for 
whatever reason) and then later co-opted into the revaluation, or 2) perhaps that 
Nietzsche was engaged in revaluation all along, though it took him a while to articulate 
the idea (as already mentioned, more than once, Nietzsche described the Birth of Tragedy 
[1872] as his “first Revaluation of All Values”[TI “Ancients”]), and that he originally 
formulated these ideas to serve his not-yet-articulated concept of the revaluation of all 
values. 
Whatever the case may be, these ideas were clearly useful for revaluation and 
Nietzsche does indicate that these ideas are closely linked with the revaluation. For one, 
                                                
25 Though there is one appearance of the phrase earlier, in 1876 (KGW IV2 23[63]), it’s 
not clear if this is a reference to the idea, since the phrase doesn’t reappear until 1880, 
and in earlier writings, Nietzsche exclusively uses similar, but not quite identical 
concepts like “lust for power” (Machtgelüst, D 93, 113, 199, 204; GS 110), power-
seeking (Herrschsucht, HH 137, 142; WS 6, 10; D 68, 242, 245; GS 1, 72) and “love of 
power” (Liebe zur Macht, D 262). 
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looking through Nietzsche’s notes and his plans for the Will to Power/Revaluation of All 
Values project, we see that the will to power and the eternal return of the same were 
meant to play a central role in revaluation, as I demonstrate below. In addition, though 
the evidence for the utility or importance of the concepts of the overman and amor fati to 
the revaluation is not as explicit, Nietzsche does make clear connections between these 
ideas and the revaluation, which we will explore. Thus, in this chapter, we will give a 
very brief summary of each of these four ideas (insofar as they are relevant for 
revaluation) and an explanation of how they connect to the revaluation, in an effort to try 
to show that these ideas were meant to be used by Nietzsche in his active project of 
revaluation. 
Overman 
Basic Summary 
The overman was the concept of a higher person that Nietzsche focused on during the 
writing of Zarathustra. Almost all references to the overman in Nietzsche’s published 
writing can be found in Zarathustra and in the notes leading up to and during the writing 
of Zarathustra. 
The overman, as already mentioned, was very explicitly a figure of the future. 
Current humans were merely a stepping stone on the way to the overman: “Mankind is a 
rope fastened between animal and overman”(Z:I Prologue 4), and humankind is, “a 
bridge and not an end”(Z:III “Old & New Tablets” 3). This current state of humankind is 
something that must be overcome (Z:I Prologue 3; Z:III “Old & New Tablets” 3), and 
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Nietzsche, through the mouth of Zarathustra, encourages such overcoming since it is by 
no means inevitable. Evolution is not an upward progress, and Nietzsche explicitly says 
in a note that he rejects the idea of progress (KGW VIII3 15[8]). He writes that mankind 
does not represent a development for the “better,” “stronger,” or “higher,” and that 
Europeans of the Renaissance were worth more than the Europeans of his day (A 4). 
There are individual cases of success and development, and the overman would be the 
result of compounding this success by breeding such persons (KGW VIII2 11[413]). 
In fact, the work of creating the overman will be the work of many generations: 
“you could recreate yourselves into fathers and forefathers of the Overman”(Z:II 
“Blessed Isles”). The metaphor of the way to the overman as a rope suggests that it is a 
path that is narrow and precarious and that must be followed precisely. In a note already 
mentioned, Nietzsche says that there are two movements, one that will lead to the 
overman, and one, of the previous moralities, that will lead to the last man (KGW VII1 
7[21]). Nietzsche describes the last man in Ecce Homo as a person who is morally 
virtuous, the “‘good’, herd animals,” the “benevolent ‘beautiful souls’”(EH “Destiny” 4), 
the completely ordinary and unextraordinary and equal to everyone else; he elsewhere 
calls the last man the opposite of the overman (KGW VII1 4[171]). In Zarathustra, he 
describes the last man as only aiming for happiness and no longer striving to be better 
(“when human beings no longer launch the arrow of their longing beyond the human,” 
[Z:1 “Prologue” 5]). To take the path to the overman and avoid the path that leads to the 
last man is apparently not easy. 
We should also admit that Nietzsche believes that part of the idea is that the 
cultivation of the overman is a process of many generations of breeding. He mentions 
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breeding several times in his notes, connected with the overman (KGW VII1 15[4]), in 
plans for works on The Will to Power (KGW VIII1 2[74]), and in a book on values (VIII1 
7[64]). In Beyond Good and Evil, during an extended discussion of the “genuine 
philosophers,” he tells us that we need a “wholesale attempt at breeding and cultivation” 
so as to “teach humanity its future as its will, as dependent on a human will” and “to put 
an end to the gruesome rule of chance and nonsense that has passed for ‘history’ so 
far”(BGE 203). He also seems to be speaking of the idea in Zarathustra, writing that 
“You lonely of today, you withdrawing ones, one day you shall be a people: from you 
who have chosen yourselves a chosen people shall grow —and from them the 
overman”(Z:I “Bestowing Virtue” 2). The only thing he appears to say in the way of 
detail on this breeding program is that it requires “breeding by selection of location, sex, 
food, etc.”(KGW VII1 15[4]), and that the idea of the eternal return may be useful for 
breeding and selection, presumably because it will select out those individuals capable of 
handling the thought of the eternal return (KGW VIII2 9[8]). But, apparently, the basic 
idea is modeled after the selective breeding used to produce modern varieties of 
domesticated plants and animals: just as many generations of dog-breeding were 
necessary to produce the various breeds we have today, so many generations of human-
breeding would be necessary to produce the overman. In other words, the overman is 
something that a society needs to work towards, something that provides a multi-
generational goal for society to aim towards. 
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Its Role in Revaluation 
There are no explicit mentions of the overman in direct connection with the revaluation 
or mentions of it in any of the plans for Nietzsche’s “Will to Power” or “Revaluation of 
All Values” works. On the other hand, the idea is on several occasions spoken of in close 
connection to the eternal return (KGW VII1 10[47], 15[10], 16[54], 16[86], 20[10], VII2 
26[283], 27[58]). Namely, the overman is someone that might endure the idea of the 
eternal return or the idea of the eternal return might pave the way for the overman. 
Additionally, Nietzsche does seem to argue that the purpose of the revaluation is, as 
previously discussed, necessary to lay the groundwork for the creation of higher 
individuals, such as the overman. 
Additionally, if we look at the way that the idea of the overman is presented, and 
the type of ideas that it is used to promote, we will see that it challenges several important 
contemporary values and ideals. 
One of the fundamental ideas behind the overman was to give the course of 
human events a new goal towards which to aim (see Z:1 Prologue 5, KGW VII1 4[75], 
4[84], 4[198], VII2 26[232]). As Nietzsche writes in a note from 1887: 
as the consumption of man and mankind becomes more and more 
economical […] a countermovement is inevitable. I designate this as the 
secretion of a luxury surplus of mankind: it aims to bring to light a 
stronger species, a higher type […]. My concept, my metaphor for this 
type is, as one knows, the word ‘overman.’ […] An aim? a new aim?—
that is what humanity needs”(WP 866; KGW VIII2 10[17]. See also KGW 
VII1 4[84]). 
The overman is useful to provide such a goal because, as mentioned, it would take many 
generations of breeding to produce the overman. It’s not that humanity has tended to lack 
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a goal (though Nietzsche has said humanity as a whole lacks a single unifying goal [Z:1 
“Thousand & One Goals]), it is rather that, as he wrote a number of times in his notes, 
most moralities have tended to aim at stability and preservation above all else (KGW VII1 
7[21], 24[15] VIII3 22[25], 14[108]). His published writings have tended to confirm this 
idea, including Human, All too Human, where he writes, “Morality is first of all a means 
of preserving the community and warding off its destruction; then it is a means of 
preserving the community at a certain height and in a certain quality of existence”(WS 
44); in Daybreak, he writes, “Everywhere today the goal of morality is defined in 
approximately the following way: it is the preservation and advancement26 of 
mankind”(D 106); and in Beyond Good & Evil, he writes that “the preservation of the 
community is the only thing in view” for “moral value judgments”(201). 
Nietzsche lists one of the main tendencies of the revaluation in a note as, “no 
longer will to preservation but to power”(WP 1059; VII2 26[284]). Thus, the overman 
gives humanity a goal that goes beyond the preservation of the human, to point “the 
arrow of their longing beyond the human”(Z:1 Prologue 5). As he says in one note, the 
road to the overman is contrary to the road of stability and preservation, which leads to 
the last man, writing: 
 My demand: to develop beings who stand exalted over the entire 
species ‘man’ [….] all previous moralities were useful for giving the 
species primarily stability at all costs [….]  
 The other movement: my movement: is contrary, the intensification of 
all oppositions and rifts, elimination of equality, creation of the over-
powerful.  
 The former creates the last man. My movement the overman (KGW 
                                                
26 Nietzsche clarifies that both this “advancement” and “preservation” are just empty 
words here, since they don’t specify “advancement to what” or “preservation of what.” 
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VII1 7[21]).27 
In short, in so far as the overman is a goal worthy of aiming for, we will need to 
overcome and eliminate the value of stability and preservation. 
The concept of the overman is also meant to undermine the value of equality, and 
the ideal of humans as all equal. Nietzsche writes: “For thus justice speaks to me: 
‘humans are not equal.’”(Z:II “Tarantulas”). The concept of the generations of breeding 
that will lead to the overman, just as with the breeding of plants and animals, depends on 
selecting out, generation after generation, what are considered the best specimens, or, in 
Nietzsche’s terminology, those who rank highest according to the rank order of persons. 
Nietzsche speaks in a note of the problem of breeding (“Zucht und Züchtung) as related 
to the problem of rank-order (KGW VII3 40[48], VIII1 1[237]). Nietzsche also writes: 
“Each individual is a whole line of development […]. If he represents the ascent of the 
human line, then his value is indeed extraordinary; and extreme care may be taken to 
preserve and promote his growth”(WLN 242, KGW VIII3 14[29]). He writes in his notes 
that the movement leading to the overman involves, among other things, “elimination of 
equality”(KGW VII1 7[21]). 
As Nietzsche writes a few times, the road to the overman is one of mankind 
becoming more “evil”(Z:4 “Higher Man” 5). This is meant as a contrast to the road 
leading to the last man, who is the person who represents goodness, the good herd animal 
                                                
27 My translation of: “M e i n e Forderung: Wesen hervorzubringen, welche über der 
ganzen Gattung ‘Mensch’ erhaben dastehen [….] Die bisherige Moral hatte ihre Grenze 
innerhalb der Gattung: alle bisherigen Moralen waren nützlich, um der Gattung z u e r s t 
unbedingte Haltbarkeit zu geben [….] Die a n d e r e Bewegung: meine Bewegung: ist 
umgekehrt die Verschärfung aller Gegensätze und Klüfte, Beseitigung der Gleichheit, das 
Schaffen Über-Mächtiger.  J e n e  erzeugt den letzten Menschen. M e i n e Bewegung 
den Übermenschen. 
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(EH “Destiny” 4). As Nietzsche explains in Ecce Homo: “The word ‘overman’, as a 
designation for a type that has the highest constitutional excellence, in contrast to 
‘modern’ people, to ‘good’ people”(EH “Books” 1). The persons that are called evil are 
those that deviate from the prescribed morality. Nietzsche is here being quite explicit that 
the concept of the overman challenges accepted morality. This morality is, as explained, a 
morality of stability and equality. It seeks the stability and preservation of mankind, and 
seeks a leveling of mankind, whereby all persons are equal. These ideas of stability and 
equality are both interrelated when applied to the overman, since it is by the 
abandonment of the ideal of equality, by assuming that there is a rank order of persons 
and not all persons are equal, that we can cultivate and breed humans to create the 
overman, by selecting amongst the best.  
Hence, I perceive that Nietzsche uses the concept of the overman to try to 
undermine and revaluate the ideas of equality and stability. These ideas are at odds with 
the overman and, if society were to regard the overman as a goal worth seeking out, it 
would have to abandon and replace those values. 
Eternal Return of the Same 
Basic Summary 
The inspiration for the eternal return appears early in Nietzsche’s philosophy. It’s an idea 
he derives from the later Pythagoreans. He speaks of it both in History in the Service and 
Disservice of Life (HL 2, p 97) and in the lecture on the Pythagoreans from his Pre-
Platonic Lectures, attributing to the Pythagoreans the idea that “Whenever the stars once 
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more attain the same position, not only the same people but also the same behavior will 
again occur (PPP p 139). For reasons different from the Pythagoreans, Nietzsche 
proposes the idea that perhaps they are right, that the course of time is circular and that 
the same succession of all events will eventually lead back to a previous event, from 
which everything will happen again as it had before, all over again. And this recurrence 
has been going on and will go on eternally. 
Nietzsche does not simply assert this idea without argument. He lays out his 
reasoning. Most of the argument appears explicitly in the following passage from 
Zarathustra, where he writes: 
 From this gateway Moment a long eternal lane stretches backward: 
behind us lies an eternity. 
 Must not whatever can already have passed this way before? Must not 
whatever can happen, already have happened, been done, passed by 
before? 
 And if everything has already been here before, what do you think of 
this moment, dwarf? Must this gateway too not already — have been 
here? 
 And are not all things firmly knotted together in such a way that this 
moment draws after it all things to come? (Z:3 “Vision & Riddle” 2). 
The passage captures most, but not all of the argument, which is fully elaborated in more 
detail in his notes (see KGW V2 11[148], 11[202], 11[245] and VIII3 14[188]). These 
notes allow us to flesh out the logic of the argument, which appears to rest on three key 
assumptions: 
1) That there is a finite set of possible states of the universe, “a calculable number of 
combinations”(WP 1066; KGW VIII3 14[188]), 
2) That time stretches infinitely into the past and there is no beginning of time 
(“behind us lies an eternity”). 
3) That there is an absolute determinism of cause and effect. In Nietzsche’s words: 
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“all things firmly knotted together in such a way that this moment draws after it 
all things to come”(KGW VII1 12[8]). 28 In other words, for any given state of the 
universe, x, a state of the universe, y, must necessarily always follow. 
If we were to just take assumptions 1 alone (assuming also the conservation of matter and 
energy), three possibilities follow: a) time will end before all set of possibilities are 
exhausted, b) the universe will reach some sort of equilibrium29 in which change ceases 
and the universe remains eternally the same, or c) eventually some previous state will 
recur. 
As soon as we introduce assumption 2, then possibilities a) and b) are eliminated. 
A) is eliminated because, if time stretches into the past eternally, then all possibilities 
must have already been exhausted, not just once but an infinite number of times. And B) 
is eliminated, similarly, because, since time stretches back eternally, an equilibrium must 
have happened by now: “The world of forces suffers no cessation: otherwise this would 
have been reached, and the clock of existence would have stopped”(Nietzsche Reader, p 
240; 1881 V2 11[148]). If the universe had reached the equilibrium state it would still be 
there now, and, since things still are changing, which Nietzsche calls “the sole certainty 
we have in our hands”(WP 1066; KGW VIII3 14[188]), then it must never have been 
reached and can never be reached. This leaves only possibility c), that events will recur. 
But this doesn’t mean that events will necessarily follow in the same order. Just as if we 
                                                
28This assumption also is affirmed in KGW VII1 18[51], where Nietzsche speaks of, “the 
whole tangle and knot (Knäuels und Knotens) of cause and effect.” 
29 An example of equilibrium, the heat death of the universe, which Nietzsche correctly 
identifies as proposed by William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, KGW VIII3 14[188]. The idea 
of the heat death was that in some distance future of the universe, all energy would 
eventually be so dissipated, due to entropy, that no work would be any longer possible; 
and thus no motion, no life, no change theretofore. 
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have a jar of beads and repeatedly draw one bead then put it back in, we will eventually, 
by dint of probability draw the same bead again. But we won’t necessarily draw the same 
beads one after the other unless they are somehow strung together. 
If we add assumption 3) then it means that, single events won’t just recur, but the 
same succession of events will recur. According to assumption 3), as soon as a state of 
the universe x happens, it will be followed by a y, and that by a z, and an a, and so on. In 
other words, we will have the same succession of states that occurred before (everything 
repeats itself) in the same order, and that succession of states will also lead back to the 
original state, and a subsequent repetition and another and again and again indefinitely. 
Hence, from these three assumptions, the doctrine of the eternal return follows. 
Admittedly, we don’t have to accept Nietzsche’s assumptions, and thereby his 
conclusions. He does make some attempts to justify these assumptions, for example 
proving assumption 2), that time is infinite, by saying, “Nothing can prevent me from 
reckoning backward from this moment and saying ‘I shall never reach the end’”(WP 
1066; KGW VIII3 14[188]). And, according to the scientific theory at the time, 
assumption 3) was quite reasonable. Nietzsche described the idea of causal determinism 
as the “mechanistic” way of thinking, and wrote that the eternal return is “the most 
scientific of all possible hypotheses”(WLN p118; KGW VIII1 5[71]) because it is “the 
logical conclusion of the mechanistic [way of thinking]”(KGW VII2 34[204]). 
On the other hand, Nietzsche himself is critical of this mechanistic way of 
thinking, writing in his notebooks a section titled “On combating determinism,” in which 
he explains: “‘Mechanical necessity’ is not a fact: it is we who have interpreted it into 
what happens. […] from the fact that I do a particular thing, it by no means follows that I 
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do it under compulsion. Compulsion in things cannot be demonstrated at all”(WLN p 154, 
KGW VIII2 9[91]). In short, the idea of causal determinism is simply an interpretation of 
events. Without the notion of causal determinism, all we can say is that a given state of 
the universe x will recur and will have recurred an infinite number of times, but that a 
particular state y will not necessarily follow; thus a particular state of the universe would 
inevitably reappear (since there is a finite number and since change can’t stop, once all 
states have been used up a previous state would have to be reused), but the whole 
procession of repeating states wouldn’t follow since any state could follow after any 
given state; i.e. if the first time state y followed state x, the second time state z might 
follow state x. This seems unlikely to be the idea of the eternal return Nietzsche is 
advocating, since he includes the idea of assumption 3 in multiple justifications of the 
eternal return and says that that the Eternal return is the logical conclusion of the 
mechanistic way of thinking. But Nietzsche’s critique of the mechanistic way of thinking 
does suggest that the theory of the eternal return, like causal determinism, is to him 
merely an interpretation, a theory, a possibility, and that Nietzsche does not regard it as a 
truth. 
A number of commentators have shown that Nietzsche’s argument in favor of the 
eternal return is fatally flawed (Simmel 170ff; Jaspers 352–55; Danto 185–191), and I 
don’t think it’s possible to combat these arguments. Clearly there are a number of 
problems with his argument, and especially with his three assumptions, but that doesn’t 
mean that Nietzsche didn’t take this idea seriously as a scientific or metaphysical thesis 
or that he was aware of these problems. If we accept the assumptions the argument is 
coherent, and as noted above, since Nietzsche presents most of the argument in a 
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published work, Zarathustra, he must have given it some credence. The important point, 
though, is that the reason that Nietzsche proposed and advocated this theory, as we shall 
explore, is that it was useful for his idea of the revaluation of all values. 
Its Role in Revaluation 
It is clear that the idea of the eternal return was integral to the idea of revaluation based 
on Nietzsche’s writings and notes. One of the many proposed ideas for books that 
Nietzsche noted in his notebooks was an 1884 idea of a book titled “The Eternal Return 
of the Same” subtitled “An attempt at the revaluation of all values”(KGW VII2 26[259]). 
This was one of fifteen separate notes that included a proposed book idea titled or 
subtitled “The Eternal Return,” mostly from 1884–85 (KGW VII2 25[227], 25[323], 
26[243], 26[293], 26[298], 26[325], 26[465], 27[58], 27[80], 27[82], 29[40], 34[191], 
VIII1 2[199] and VIII3 20[167]). Several of these suggest that the idea of the eternal 
return will have a revolutionary role, and Nietzsche speaks of the eternal return in the 
context of “the new enlightenment (KGW VII2 26[293], 26[298] 27[80], 29[40]), the 
“new Rank-Order”(KGW VII2 26[243], 26[298), and subtitles works titled “The Eternal 
Return” as “A Prediction” (KGW VII2 27[58], 27[80]). As he started to develop his plans 
for The Will to Power and subsequent Revaluation of All Values books, he much more 
often planned to have the eternal return become the theme of a major part of the book, 
usually the last part or close to the end (KGW VIII1 5[75], 7[45], VIII3 13[4], 16[71], 
16[72], 18[17], 19[8] and 22[14]). Clearly the eternal return, as evidenced by these plans, 
was meant to play a central role in the revaluation. The shape of many of these outlines 
appeared to take the form of several books of criticism, of undermining current values, 
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with the last book or books describing the basis of the new values, a place which 
apparently at some points Nietzsche thought the eternal return would fill. 
Whether Nietzsche considered the eternal return to be a true physical fact or 
simply proposed it as a psychological test to test one’s capacity to bear this idea is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. That he put so much effort into creating an 
argument, suggests he wanted it to be a persuasive idea that people accepted as true. In its 
role of psychological test, it was useful to the revaluation and for at least two main 
reasons: because it is useful for selecting higher individuals and because it is the ultimate 
form of life-affirmation. 
First, we will look at the eternal return as useful for selection. In an early passage 
concerning fatalism, Nietzsche had written: “What then grows out of this belief [in 
fatalism] in your case – cowardice, resignation or frankness and magnanimity – bears 
witness to the soil upon which that seed corn has been scattered but not, however, to the 
seedcorn itself – for out of this anything and everything can grow”(AOM 363). That is to 
say, a belief in fatalism could lead to all sorts of beneficial or harmful attitudes, 
presumably depending on the character of the person (the soil) who believes in fatalism. 
In Wanderer, Nietzsche speaks of “Turkish Fatalism,” which is the idea that when certain 
people come to believe that their fate is predetermined, they resign themselves and give 
in to this fate, failing to understand that even the resignation and giving in must, 
according to this belief, necessarily also be fated (WS 61). The implication, in this early 
passage, is that a belief in fatalism will clearly lead to one of these beneficial or harmful 
attitudes. 
134 
This idea is carried forward into the concept of the eternal return, which includes 
a belief in fatalism. The eternal return, as mentioned above, requires the assumption that 
events are causally determined. The particular course of events that one is living has, in 
fact already occurred before, and will recur in the exact same order as before. This means 
that one has no power or ability to alter this particular cycle of events so that things turn 
out otherwise than as before. Nietzsche is explicit that belief in the fatalism concept of 
the eternal return will truly sort out the better from the lesser. In one notebook entry he 
calls the theory of the eternal return, “a means of breeding and selection”(WP 462; KGW 
VIII2 9[8]). Elsewhere the eternal return is repeatedly described as a hammer (KGW VII2 
26[298], 27[80], 27[82], 34[191], VIII1 2[129], 2[131], 5[70], 7[45], VIII3 13[3], 13[4]). 
The significance of the metaphor of the hammer is that it is a force that is both creative 
and destructive. Just as the creation of new values requires the destruction of old values 
to create new ones, the hammer can be both destructive and creative, and thus can be a 
tool of revaluation (he speaks of it in such terms in BGE 203 and 211). It can be creative 
and reveal the statue sleeping inside of a rock (Z:2 “Blessed Isles”), and can be used as a 
tool of destruction (EH “Zarathustra” 8); the hammer then can be used to sound whether 
some idol is hollow (TI Preface) and to destroy those idols found wanting. In a section 
probably referring to the doctrine of the eternal return as “the most death-addicted 
pessimism,”30 he says that it will produce a selection of the fittest (KGW VIII1 2[100]). 
He says, “Only those who consider their existence to be capable of eternal repetition will 
remain”(Nietzsche Reader, p 241; KGW V2 11[338]), and he called the eternal return a 
                                                
30 The passage, in German, “Der Hammer: eine Lehre, welche durch E n t f e s s e l u n g 
des todsüchtigsten Pessimismus eine A u s l e s e der L e b e n s f ä h i g s t e n bewirkt.” 
I translate: “The hammer: a doctrine which through the unleashing of the most death-
addicted pessimism causes a selection of the of the fittest.” 
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“challenge” [Probe], a challenge that will demonstrate who can bear the concept of the 
eternal return. In at least one outline, he suggests that the eternal return is meant to be a 
“middle” (Mitte), presumably as a doctrine that will serve as a bridge to a better future 
(1883 VII1 24[4]). In another place, he says that many generations will be necessary for 
the doctrine to sink in (KGW V2 11[58]). 
The reason that the doctrine of the eternal return had such selective power was 
that affirming the doctrine requires one to deny any supreme life-meaning and goals 
beyond those we give to life (KGW VIII1 5[71]). He describes the eternal recurrence as 
“without any finale into nothingness” and as “nothingness (‘meaninglessness’) 
eternally”(WLN p 118; KGW VIII1 5[71]). If existence has no finale it is heading 
towards, it can’t have a goal, and without a goal or objective, it can’t have any meaning. 
But meaning is something that humans need to live. Upon learning of the eternal return, a 
better type of person will be able to supply their life with meaning in this absence, 
whereas a lesser person will not, and will thereby succumb to suicide or resignation, as 
with the case of so-called “Turkish Fatalism.” 
Accepting the eternal return also requires the denial of salvation (VII2 25[290]) 
since, if there is no conclusion to time, no End of Days when God passes judgment, how 
can there be salvation? And how can there be an afterlife if a person is being continually 
reincarnated in the same life? In one note, Nietzsche writes: “Let us impress the image of 
eternity on our life! This thought contains more than all the religions that have taught us 
to despise this life as something fleeting and to look towards an indeterminate other 
life”(Nietzsche Reader, p 240; KGW V2 11[159]). The idea appears to be that since we 
will relive this life again and again eternally, then, we can’t be whisked away to an 
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eternal afterlife as a reward for our worldly virtue. This means no salvation and no 
afterlife. If there is no possibility of an afterlife then that means there is no other life to 
which we can compare this life. One of the problems Nietzsche saw in Christianity was 
that it viewed the afterlife as better than this life, thereby denigrating this life. Nietzsche 
viewed this attitude as anti-life. By rejecting this other life, then we are able to affirm this 
life. Nietzsche called the eternal return, “a pessimism that could result in that type of 
Dionysian yes-saying to the world as it is”(KGW VIII2 10[3]). Only those who can truly 
affirm life in the most extreme way will be able to bear eternal return, and thus it will 
have the effect of weakening those that cannot affirm life as strongly. 
Nietzsche speaks of eternal return as a concept that will lead to a state beyond 
good and evil: “In order to bear it, and not to be an optimist, one must eliminate ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’”(KGW VII2 27[67]). Without salvation and afterlife, the eternal return is also a 
concept that will undermine the concept of sin (1881 V2 11[144]). The concept of the 
eternal return will facilitate the revaluation in this undermining of the concepts of 
salvation, afterlife, and sin. Eliminating the concept of sin is part of Nietzsche’s project 
of revaluation, since many of the things he wants to raise in value are considered evil, and 
thus the concept stands in the way of changing values and morals. Eliminating the idea 
that sin is inherent in nature also facilitates the idea of individual humans as capable of 
creating their own individual values, which is necessary for revaluation. And eliminating 
the concepts of an afterlife and salvation (the latter of which depends on the idea of 
another world or other being that provides salvation) also facilitates the revaluation since, 
as he has said elsewhere, belief in another word devalues this world. Thus, it would 
permit us to raise in value this life. 
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Amor Fati 
Basic Summary 
The phrase “amor fati” only appears in four places in Nietzsche’s published writings,31 
and it only appears five times elsewhere in his notebooks.32 “Amor fati” translates to 
“love of fate” and the basic idea behind it seems fairly simple: embrace what is and what 
is to come; embrace that which is out of your control. Amor fati is how Nietzsche 
describes the reaction of a better type of person to fatalism. It is part of his general 
concept of life affirmation, which states that we should embrace and affirm all aspects of 
living. We should even embrace those facets that we might otherwise despise, such as 
fatalism and the eternal return of the same. His first reference is an 1881 note where he 
writes “‘Love what is inevitable’—amor fati, this would be my moral”(KGW V2 15[20]). 
The first mention in any of Nietzsche’s published writings is in Book IV of Gay Science, 
where he writes, “I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as 
what is beautiful in them — thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor 
fati: let that be my love from now on! I do not want to wage war against ugliness”(GS 
276). 
Amor fati seems to have continued to be an important idea in his late thought 
when Nietzsche was planning his Will to Power and Revaluation of All Values books. It 
appears in his 1888 book Nietzsche Contra Wagner, where he writes: “What my 
innermost nature tells me is that everything necessary, seen from above and in the sense 
                                                
31 GS 276, NCW Epilogue 1, EH “Clever” 10 & “Case of Wagner” 4 
32 KGW V2 15[20], 16[22], VII2 25[500], VIII3 16[32], 25[7] 
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of a great economy, is also useful in itself,—it should not just be tolerated, it should be 
loved… Amor fati: that is my innermost nature”(NCW epilogue 1; this aphorism is based 
on GS P 1). And he even mentions it in his final notebook from his last month or two of 
sanity: “I want nothing other, nor backwards,—I dared not want anything other… Amor 
fati… Even Christianity becomes necessary”(KGW VIII3 25[7]). 
Its Role in Revaluation 
Just as with the overman, there is no explicit connection with revaluation, and so we have 
to rely on indirect evidence. And for this all we can point to is its connection with the 
eternal return. Nietzsche speaks, in one note, of “amor fati” as a “Dionysian affirmation,” 
of existence, “without subtraction, exclusion and selection”(KGW VIII3 16[32]). In other 
words, amor fati, is a personal attitude of life-affirmation that one who accepts the eternal 
return would possess. 
Amor fati represents an extreme of life-affirmation that is connected with the 
eternal return, since fatalism is also an aspect of that concept. Schacht describes amor fati 
as one aspect of life-affirmation by assigning value to “‘our human existence’ and the 
world in which we find ourselves”(346). In other words, because our life is deterministic, 
then to embrace this determinism and valorize it is a form of life-affirmation. Amor fati is 
an embracing of fate and not just embracing, but loving the fact that the future is fated 
and can’t be changed. It is a standard of life-affirmation that Nietzsche is comfortable 
saying that he himself has reached, since he speaks repeatedly of amor fati in personal 
terms, as his own moral rule as his own innermost nature.  
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What differentiates amor fati from the eternal return is that amor fati describes a 
personal state, an attitude that one might have towards the concept of the eternal return or 
any other type of fatalistic concept. Reginster describes amor fati as having two stages: 
“In the first stage, I come to realize that my existence is a mere ‘accident’: it is not the 
product of a ‘purposeful creation’ (for example, by God), which would justify it, or give 
it meaning” and “In the second stage, the thought of the eternal recurrence is supposed to 
overcome the ensuing nihilistic distress by making me see my existence as 
metaphysically necessary.… The recognition of this metaphysical necessity is then 
supposed to usher in reconciliation with my existence, or amor fati, by inducing complete 
resignation or will-lessness”(Affirmation 207). Though there is no textual evidence of this 
first stage as being part of amor fati, it certainly is consonant with Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, and Nietzsche does make the connection to the eternal return explicit in an 
1888 note: describing his experimental philosophy as wanting the “eternal 
circulation”(den ewigen Kreislauf)(WP 1041; KGW VIII3 16[32]). Hence, to have a 
healthy attitude towards the eternal return one must embrace an attitude of amor fati. The 
eternal return requires the concept determinism, since events are recurring in the same 
way as they have before. It is this determinism that Nietzsche thinks we should love as 
our fate. 
In Daybreak, which Nietzsche completed in 1881, around the time of his earliest 
notes on the eternal return and amor fati, Nietzsche argued that free and unegoistic 
actions have been overvalued so far and that unfree and egoistic actions have been under-
valued (D 148). In order to change such undervaluing of the unfree, Nietzsche suggests 
that we need to abandon the concept of will and embrace the eternal return. In an 1884 
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note Nietzsche lists two conditions for “My completion of fatalism,”33 ostensibly 
referring to what concepts will have to be accepted before the concept of fatalism can be 
accepted. He lists 1) the eternal return and 2) the elimination of the concept of 
“will”(KGW VII2 25[214]). In another 1884 note, he lists “abolition of the ‘will’” as 
among the preconditions “to endure the idea of the recurrence”(WP 1066; KGW VII2 
26[283]). Hence, we might describe amor fati as the attitudinal side of the idea of eternal 
return. 
Amor fati’s role in revaluation thus overlaps considerably with the concept of the 
eternal return. On the other hand, the concept itself is a revaluation of fatalism: that 
fatalism is not something to be dreaded and denigrated but something to embraced. If one 
can embrace one’s fate, one can accept the even more terrifying concept that not only is 
everything fated, but everything repeats eternally, leading to the revaluation of other 
values, as mentioned above. 
Will to Power 
Basic Summary 
The concept of the “will to power” was clearly an important concept, with the number of 
references to it dwarfing any of the other concepts discussed in this chapter, including the 
“revaluation of all values.” By my count, there are 186 textual units that explicitly 
reference “will to power.” Only 22 of these are references to or plans for a book titled 
“Will to Power,” leaving the remaining 164 as references to the concept, and 36 of these 
                                                
33 My translation of: “Meine Vollendung des Fatalismus” 
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appear in published works.34 It is clearly one of the most (if not the most) important ideas 
in Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
Additionally, in earlier works, he had spoken of several similar (and probably 
overlapping) ideas, including the “desire for power”(Lust an der Macht and Machtgelüst) 
and the “feeling of power”(Machtgefühl and Gefühl der Macht), which both appear 
prominently in Daybreak. The general sense of these early ideas is that there is a certain 
pleasure in the exercise of power and the feeling of power, which people desire. 
The term “will to power” doesn’t completely supplant these earlier terms (which 
continue to be used, though rarely) but it does eclipse their usage, once Nietzsche starts 
speaking of the concept, which first appears in his published writing in Zarathustra (Z:1 
“Thousand & One Goals,” Z:2 “Self-Overcoming” & “Redemption”). 
Reginster describes the will to power as “striving against something that resists,” 
or the “will to overcoming resistance”(Affirmation 126). I think this is a good description. 
In one of his notes, Nietzsche defines the will to power as “an insatiable craving to 
manifest power; or to employ, exercise power, as a creative drive, etc.”(KGW VII3 
36[31]). Elsewhere in his notebooks, he explains will to power as “resisting what’s 
stronger, attacking what’s weaker”(WLN p25; KGW VII3 36[21]). In Beyond Good and 
                                                
34 Counting the number of references to “will to power” is not without ambiguity. The 
phrase appears in a single note in 1876, then in three notes from 1880 before becoming a 
regular concept in his notes and published writings from 1882 onward. I have decided to 
include these four references because they seem conceptually similar. Also, in Antichrist 
51 Nietzsche speaks of “diese will mit dem Christenthum zur Macht,”(translated by 
Judith Norman: “they want to gain power through Christianity”), which I think is a 
reference to the “will to power,” on the grounds that Nietzsche is playing on the 
similarity of “Wille” and “will.” Elsewhere, in an 1887 note, Nietzsche speaks of “des 
Willens zur Herrschaft,” (KGW VIII2 11[140]) which one wouldn’t be too amiss in 
translating “the will to power” though it probably doesn’t refer to the concept and I 
haven’t included it. It is probably better translated as, “the will to rule/command” (or as 
R.J. Hollingdale translates, “the will to dominate”[WP 936]). 
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Evil, Nietzsche speaks of will to power as the desire to discharge one’s strength, and 
specifically as a principle of life; he says that, “life itself is will to power”(BGE 13). In 
fact, will to power is an urge that pervades life. As Nietzsche writes in a note, “what 
every smallest part of a living organism wants, is an increment of power”(WLN 264; 
KGW VIII3 14[174]). In short, it is a compulsion common to all living things, to try to 
exercise and expand their power. 
In Nietzsche’s 1888 notes, he expands the scope of will to power so that it’s not 
just a principle of life, but a physical principle, applying to all of physical objects. 
Nietzsche calls it “the innermost essence of being”(WLN 247; KGW VIII3 14[80]), and 
“the origin of motion”(WLN 251; KGW VIII3 14[152]). The reason he calls it a property 
of all physical matter, is that, “we cannot imagine any change that does not involve a will 
to power,” and thus, “We do not know how to explain a change except as the 
encroachment of one power upon another power”(WP 689; VIII3 14[81]). Nietzsche 
asks, “Should we not be permitted to assume [the will to power] as a motive cause in 
chemistry, too?—and in the cosmic order”(ibid). Based on these notes, it seems the scope 
of the concept of the will to power expanded over time until, very late in his 
philosophical thought, he started to imagine it as the all-encompassing principle of the 
material world. 
Its Role in Revaluation 
The connection between the ideas of will to power and revaluation of all values is the 
best attested of any of the ideas mentioned in this chapter. Nietzsche makes numerous 
references in his notes, as well in as in the Genealogy of Morals (GM:III 27) to a book 
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project called “The Will to Power” which would be subtitled “Attempt at a Revaluation 
of All Values”(KGW VIII1 2[100], 5[75], VIII2 9[164], 11[411], 11[414], VIII3 14[78], 
14[136], 14[156], 15[100], 16[86] and 18[17]). The title alone implies that perhaps the 
book would be using the concept of will to power as a means of revaluation or that he 
would be writing a book about will to power and that it would effect a revaluation of all 
values. That Nietzsche changed the title of the book in late 1888 to simply The 
Revaluation of All Values, suggests maybe that the concept of will to power was no 
longer meant to have such a central role, especially considering his two outlines for this 
book don’t explicitly mention will to power (KGW VIII3 19[8], 22[14]). 
The basic way that the theory of the will to power would be used for revaluation 
seems to be that the creation of a system of values that more closely resembles our human 
nature would lead to the cultivation of humans that are stronger and healthier, since we 
are creatures compelled by will to power. The values that are being promoted at present 
are values of weakness and sterility. Life, according to the concept of will to power, is 
defined by the constant expansion of a living thing’s power, namely by conquest and 
domination of others (BGE 13, 36; KGW VIII1 2[108]). As Nietzsche says, “life itself is 
essentially a process of appropriating, injuring, overpowering the alien and the weaker, 
oppressing, being harsh, imposing your own form, incorporating, and at least, the very 
least, exploiting”(BGE 259). Thus, a system of values that is life-affirming would 
promote such values. 
The idea that the will to power is meant as the ultimate basis of the revaluation of 
all values is probably the most common interpretation of the revaluation, dating back in 
the scholarship at least as far as Heidegger. The connection of values to life and the 
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connection of life to will to power led Heidegger to interpret Nietzsche as maintaining 
that values are determined by will to power. Particularly, the will to power ranks things in 
accordance with preservation and increase—that which tends to preserve and leads to 
increase is a thing of value, is value itself (“Nietzsche’s Word” pp. 170–71). Heidegger’s 
interpretation that the revaluation is meant to replace life-denying values with life-
affirming values is a common interpretation35 and seems quite clear in Nietzsche’s 
writing. 
Another way that Nietzsche tries to undermine values is by showing their root or 
their origin. Values that have ignoble origins (that is, origins that would be considered 
ignoble by the established values) or are rooted in ignoble drives will be considered of 
less value when their roots or origins are exposed. In the particular case of the will to 
power, Nietzsche sees it as the basis all of our drives, including our drive to create 
morality. If it is the basis of all our drives, then the creation of the concepts of justice, 
equality, and morality are all driven by this will to power. This creates a contradiction, 
certainly in concepts like justice and equality, which seem antithetical to the ravenous 
will to power. It also undermines the value of these values, since it shows they have their 
basis in a motivation that is considered immoral, unjust, and antagonistic to equality. In a 
similar vein, Nietzsche once calls cruelty as the mother of unegoistic morality (KGW 
VIII1 8[7]). 
The idea of the will to power is thus meant to undermine many key ideas within 
the traditional morality, such as ideas of selflessness, equality, and humility. Along with 
the other three concepts discussed in this chapter, as part of its role in revaluation, the 
                                                
35 For example, Schacht 350; Reginster “Nihilism” 65; Sleinis xiv. 
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concept of will to power would raise the value of other qualities in place of these, such as 
the values of egoism and strength. 
In conclusion, the will to power, along with the other ideas of amor fati, eternal 
return, and the overman are ideas that clearly could be used by Nietzsche to undermine 
contemporary values. And Nietzsche does in fact use these on several occasions to attack 
contemporary values, both by undermining the value of those values and by showing 
internal contradictions in these values. 
146 
CONCLUSION 
After surveying the details of Nietzsche’s concept of the revaluation of all values, certain 
conclusions have been reached about this complex idea. For one, the idea evolved over 
the course of his career and reached its fruition primarily in his last full year of sanity. 
The idea came to be connected with several other key ideas of his, the eternal return, will 
to power, amor fati, and the overman. Nietzsche thought the historical epoch of 
revaluation was imminent and that he, along with other free spirits and immoralists like 
him, would be contributing to this event, as a necessary remedy to forestall the rise of 
nihilism. He thought that the values that it would lead to would be largely a revivification 
of ancient values, perhaps mixed with some new values, and he thought that his idea 
would impact the whole of society, though he may have been mostly directing his writing 
to higher individuals who he was calling upon to revaluate their own values before they 
tried to transform the values of society. 
In the end, however, we have to acknowledge that, in a certain sense, the 
revaluation of all values was an idea that Nietzsche didn’t complete. The planned book, 
The Revaluation of All Values, which Nietzsche had devoted years and many notes 
towards planning and preparing for, was never completed, and certain key questions 
about the concept were probably lost to us in the absence of this book. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the idea of revaluation that comes down to us, Nietzsche’s last and 
greatest (albeit incomplete) intellectual achievement. 
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